For all white-collar workers: the possibilities of radicalism in New York City's department store unions, 1934-1953 by Opler, Daniel J., 1975-
For All  
White-Collar Workers
The Possibilities of Radicalism in New York City’s 
Department Store Unions, 1934–1953
Daniel J. Opler
The Ohio State University Press
Columbus
Copyright © 2007 by The Ohio State University.
All rights reserved.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Opler, Daniel J., 1975–
For all white-collar workers : the possibilities of radicalism in New York City’s 
department store unions, 1934–1953 / Daniel J. Opler.
   p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 978–0–8142–1063–5 (cloth : alk. paper) — ISBN 978–0–8142–9141–
2 (CD-ROM) 1. Clerks (Retail trade)—Labor unions—Organizing—New York 
(State)—History. 2. Clerks (Retail trade)—Labor unions—New York (State)—
History. 3. Labor unions—New York (State)—History. 4. Communism—United 
States—History. I. Title.
HD6515.M39065 2007
331.88’1138114109747109044—dc22
                             2007003063
Cover design by James A. Baumann
Type set in Minion Pro
Printed by Thomson-Shore
The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of the 
American National Standard for Information Sciences—Permanence of Paper 
for Printed Library Materials. ANSI Z39.48–1992.
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
Contents
 List of Illustrations v
 Acknowledgments vii
 Introduction 1
Chapter 1 Foundations, 1934–35 13
Chapter 2 Legitimacy, 1935–37 44
Chapter 3 Stability? 1937–41 73
Chapter 4 Realignment, 1941–45 117
Chapter 5 Collapse, 1945–48 143
Chapter 6 Defeat, 1948–53 175
Conclusion Where Labor Lost, and Why 210
 Notes 215
 Bibliography 257
 Index 265

Illustrations
Figure 1 Protest in Union Square, probably in 1934. 16
Figure 2 Shoppers on 34th Street, 1936. 76
Figure 3 Workers on the picket line in front of the Oppenheim  165 
Collins store, 1948. 
Figure 4 The disastrous strike at Hearn’s, 1953. 205
Table 5.1 Salaries and sales in large department stores, 1935–45.  148


Acknowledgments
I have had the great pleasure and the good luck to work with many talented 
people during the course of writing this study. My first thanks must go to 
the historical actors in this study, many of whom were kind enough to spend 
hours sharing their recollections of the department store unions with me. In 
this regard, I must especially thank Anne Haicken, Blanche Mendelssohn, 
Ruth Papa, Ruth Pinkson, Gertrude Reiss, Annette Rubinstein, and Jane 
Spadavecchio. It was my distinct pleasure to be able to record a few of their 
accomplishments in this book.
 As always in a historical study, archivists played a key role in my work. 
At the Tamiment Library, I must thank the entire staff, every one of whom 
has contributed to this study in numerous ways. Especially appreciated was 
Erika Gottfried’s assistance in tracking down illustrations. Archivists at the 
Museum of the City of New York, especially Marguerite Lavin, also provided 
assistance in my search for material on Union Square and 34th Street. I must 
also extend my deepest thanks to Joe Turrini for both informing me about and 
providing access to the Catholic University of America’s excellent materials on 
the RWDSU, and to the late Debra Bernhardt, who not only created many of 
the oral history interviews that I use in this study, but also told me about the 
existence of the oral histories and the various collections that addressed the 
unions.
 A number of scholars deserve thanks for their help. Joshua Freeman first 
recommended department store unions when I was an undergraduate seek-
ing a subject for a research paper. Elaine Abelson at the New School was 
constantly encouraging and helpful during my stint as her research assistant. 
Lotte Larsen, Dan Bender, and Shannon Jackson all chaired panels where I 
presented material that made its way into this manuscript, and all three had 
ii
important comments that eventually served to enrich this study. While I was 
at New York University, Tom Bender, Adam Green, Atina Grossman, Walter 
Johnson, and Ann Pellegrini all read and commented on material from the 
dissertation version of this study. Most importantly, Molly Nolan and Robin 
Kelley deserve extensive thanks for their advice and assistance throughout the 
dissertation process. Both of them contributed materially to this book. Finally, 
the two anonymous readers for The Ohio State University Press also offered 
important and valuable critiques.
 While I was writing this study of American unions, it was my good luck 
that teaching and research assistants at NYU formed a union of their own, 
affording me a first-hand look at the practice and pitfalls of organized labor in 
America. I must thank all those who were and are involved with GSOC, many 
of whom—especially Derek Musgrove—had insights that enriched my own 
understanding of unionism.
 While writing, I also taught at several schools, most recently at the College 
of Mount Saint Vincent. Colleagues at all the places I’ve taught have had 
plenty of encouraging words and helpful advice over the last few years, espe-
cially Heather Alumbaugh, David Gallo, Dave Kinkela, Claire Nolte, and Steve 
Tischler. I must also extend my very deepest thanks to my students, who 
repeatedly convinced me that the work that went into this project was balanced 
out by the joy of sharing a classroom with such extraordinary individuals.
 My parents, Lewis and Annette, and my siblings, Mark, Michelle, and 
Douglas, all provided more support than I could have imagined or expected; 
thanks are due also to new family members Paul Grennan and Stacy Liechti. 
My grandmother, Charlotte Sagoff, read the early works that turned into this 
study, and patiently shared plenty of advice and criticism; her insights are 
greatly appreciated, as are her support and love.
 Many grad students and recent Ph.D.’s also read and commented on parts 
of this manuscript. Special thanks on this account are due to Andrea Siegel, 
Laura Helton, and Donna Truglio Haverty-Stacke. In addition, Mark Noonan, 
Paul Naish, and my other fellow editors of the Columbia Journal of American 
Studies also provided important support and encouragement. Finally, Sandy 
Crooms and other editors at The Ohio State University Press were extremely 
helpful in transforming the dissertation into a publishable manuscript.
 Four people contributed so much to this project that I have to single them 
out individually and at some length. As I was writing and becoming involved 
with GSOC, it was my great good fortune to become friends with Kimberly 
Quinn Johnson. A full-time union organizer for several years, Kimberly taught 
me by example of the complex tasks and contradictions that organizers confront. 
iii Acknowledgments
Her experiences with the labor movement greatly enriched my understanding 
of the movement’s history, and I thank her for sharing them.
 Few people have contributed as much to the final shape of the manuscript 
as Jeannette Gabriel. Jeannette, whose important research on the Workers 
Alliance is gradually reshaping our understanding of the Depression, kindly 
read through the first few chapters of the manuscript, and her advice allowed 
me to restructure much of the material on the Depression, especially on chap-
ter 3. Her advice and support in all things have been tremendous, and this 
publication likely would not exist without her help.
 My dissertation advisor, Danny Walkowitz, has been at all times and in 
many different ways a role model. I cannot imagine that I would have gotten 
through graduate school, let alone the arduous process of job hunting, without 
his assistance and advice. Danny’s sharp criticism and keen understanding 
of history; his ability to see exactly where my work was going off-course and 
suggest ways to correct it; his support in job searches; his advice on teaching 
style; his willingness to read and reread a seemingly endless stream of disserta-
tion drafts; and his attention to detail, wording, and argument all contributed 
materially to this project as well as my development as a historian. I could not 
have wished for a finer advisor, and cannot thank him enough.
 Finally, I must thank Tami J. Friedman, my friend, walking partner, fellow 
labor historian, sometime mentor, and sounding board for much of this study. 
Ever since she was my teaching assistant at Columbia all those years ago, Tami 
has been ready to read any passage that was giving me trouble, to give advice 
about research methods, to remind me of the need to be patient with all the 
pieces of the profession, and to provide at least as much advice about other 
aspects of my life. More than that, she always seemed so absolutely certain 
of me—certain that I would finish the dissertation, that I would transform it 
into a manuscript, that I would get a teaching job. That sort of faith is always 
welcome, and often necessary in working on a project that lasts as many years 
as this one did. It is, indeed, that sort of faith that allows projects of this magni-
tude to come to completion. And it is that sort of faith which I feel particularly 
honored, in having finished this project at long last, to have justified.
ixAcknowledgments

Introduction
1.
When the factories moved away from the industrial centers of the North, 
American labor unions became mere shadows of the mass organizations they 
had once been. Unionization rates in America in 2004 were at 12.5 percent, 
the lowest they have been since the 1920s. According to the U.S. government’s 
Bureau of Labor Statistics, labor unions have been in decline for at least the 
past twenty years, and arguably for many years more.1
 This decline was not an inevitable result of deindustrialization. Had the 
labor movement established a strong base in the retail and service industries, it 
is possible that labor unions would continue to play a central role in American 
public life. Yet in the retail and service sectors, unions have been noticeably 
ineffective. In the retail industry today, unionization rates hover around 3.6 
percent, as opposed to approximately 12.9 percent in the remaining manufac-
turing jobs and 14 percent in the construction industry.2
 This study seeks to explain the weakness of the American labor movement 
by explaining why labor failed to organize service-industry workers, particu-
larly retail workers. As a way to better understand this failure, the study begins 
during the Great Depression, at the founding of the modern labor movement, 
when powerful and permanent retail workers’ unions seemed a real possibility. 
In 1930s New York, organizers seemed to be realizing this possibility, and the 
managers of the largest and most famous stores in the country recognized the 
unions. The study then looks at the ways in which economic, social, cultural, 
and political developments of the 1940s and early 1950s forced retail workers’ 
unions into decline, and permanently weakened the American labor move-
ment.
 In the mid 1930s, even as union organizers began to take seriously the pos-
sibilities of mass unions of unskilled workers in the great factory towns of the 
Midwest, they all but ignored the thousands of workers, skilled and unskilled 
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alike, in retail stores. There were several reasons for this oversight on the part 
of 1930s union organizers: most important among them, the retail labor force 
was largely made up of women, and they simply did not fit 1930s understand-
ings of what a worker was. The very concept of a “white-collar worker,” a 
worker from outside manufacturing or construction, was a radical concept 
at the time. Indeed, in New York City radical union organizers, associated 
with the Communist party, were the ones to realize that white-collar workers 
represented an important part of the working class and could form success-
ful unions. As a result, union organizers affiliated with the Communist Trade 
Union Unity League set up unions in the city’s department stores in the mid-
1930s.3
 There are many reasons that Communists made for such effective union 
organizers in the retail industry, besides their insight that white-collar work-
ers were, in fact, workers. Perhaps the most important advantage Communists 
had was their link to a larger radical movement, one that included unemployed 
people as well as workers in many industries besides retailing. This mass 
movement was critical for workers in retail stores who wished to form unions. 
A strike at a New York City department store, when led by Communists, could 
gain support from Communists throughout the city. In the 1930s and early 
1940s communism functioned as a remarkable network which allowed strik-
ers to call upon a large and diverse group of allies in their battles against store 
managers.
 Additionally, Communists were successful partially because they had a 
broader conception from the beginning of the rise of the retail workers’ unions 
of what a strike could be. To Communists, strikes could be ways to claim pub-
lic space, and on more than one occasion in the unions’ history, workers under 
Communist leadership lay claim to the stores and the streets surrounding the 
stores. In areas like Union Square, Brooklyn’s Fulton Street, and Manhattan’s 
garment district, areas which were already difficult for managers to control, 
Communists’ willingness to challenge that control still further made them 
formidable opponents indeed.
 Finally, Communists were relatively supportive of working-class militancy. 
By the late 1930s anti-Communist organizers frequently attempted to restrain 
workers who were willing to strike, but, with the critical exception of the 
World War II period, Communists were more willing to support workers’ 
strikes. As late as September of 1941, Communists in the department store 
unions demonstrated their support for workers’ militancy, despite less radi-
cal union leaders’ emphasis on concession and compromise. And in the late 
1940s, when Communists found themselves increasingly on the defensive, 
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they were still able to find support from the workers they led, by emphasizing 
their belief in workers’ ability to lead the union at the precise moment when 
non-Communist union leaders were becoming less tolerant of workers taking 
initiative in their struggles against management.
 These factors made Communists powerful leaders for retail workers in 
New York City. Communists were virtually unchallenged in their efforts to 
organize unions in New York City’s department stores, and by the late 1930s 
most of the major stores in New York City had Communist-led unions: stores 
such as Gimbel’s, Bloomingdale’s, Stern’s, Loeser’s, and Hearn’s all had unions 
led by Communists. At Macy’s, Communists played a key but supporting role 
in a union led primarily by liberal non-Communists.
 None of this is to say that Communists were ever ideal union leaders. 
As other historians have pointed out, communism was, in many respects, a 
top-down movement. Its leaders could be remarkably racist, sexist, and short 
sighted, and Communist union organizers made serious policy mistakes 
throughout the unions’ history, most important among them their failure to 
adequately challenge racial hiring practices. But in the 1930s they were the 
only ones who recognized that these department store workers’ unions needed 
to be formed. As a result, for all their faults, they played a critical role in these 
unions’ successes.
 This study also addresses anti-communism, one of the most important 
forces behind the failure of American unions in the retail sector. Anti-
Communists in the late 1940s and early 1950s forced organizers in the depart-
ment store unions to take a far more defensive position at the precise moment 
that store managers weakened the unions by restructuring the retail industry 
and cutting thousands of jobs. Eventually, union organizers capitulated entire-
ly to the demands of anti-Communists, distancing themselves greatly from the 
militant labor movement of the 1930s and 1940s.
 In the process of this examination, this study argues that some aspects 
of anti-communism have been underexplored by historians. In particular, it 
calls for a reexamination of the Taft-Hartley Act, which among other things 
required all union leaders to declare themselves non-Communists. I argue 
that this development not only made it impossible for Communists to lead 
unions; it also made it impossible for non-Communist and Communist union 
leaders to work together without acknowledging the political differences 
between them. In the CIO’s retail union, the Retail Wholesale and Department 
Store Union (RWDSU), union leaders were virtually silent on the issue of 
communism between the union’s founding in 1937 and its disintegration in 
1948. This tacit agreement not to use the word “Communist” within the retail 
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union was critical for the union’s survival, since the national leaders of the 
union were anti-Communists and the leaders of some of the largest locals 
were Communists. However, when it was finally apparent that Taft-Hartley 
would not be overturned, RWDSU leaders could no longer ignore the issue of 
communism; their attempt to confront this issue split the RWDSU and led to 
disaster for the future of retail unionism in America.
 As other historical studies have done in recent years, this study argues that 
the history of communism and anti-communism must be placed firmly within 
a local context. Communist organizers in the department store unions were 
far more affected by the Great Depression, working conditions in the stores, 
events in the streets surrounding the stores, the changing role of the federal 
government, and postwar suburbanization than they were by any policies com-
ing out of the Soviet Union. To say otherwise—to treat American Communists, 
as some historians have, as mindless drones who took orders directly from 
the Comintern—is to dilute their politics and to fail to realize the possibilities 
inherent in the Communist-led union of department store workers.
 Adopting a local context for communism requires historians to address the 
question of how and when Communist party (CP) policies affected activists 
within local struggles. These policies, I acknowledge, did affect Communists, 
but far more important than acknowledging the power of CP policies is under-
standing why Party members or fellow travelers followed these policies. In New 
York City’s department stores, Communist union organizers sought alliances 
with non-Communists in the 1930s and early 1940s not because the Comintern 
called for such policies (at least at some points during these years), but instead 
because such a policy was a powerful organizing strategy. At the same time, 
in the late 1940s, as the CP retreated from any sort of united front with liber-
als, Communist union organizers in New York City’s department stores found 
themselves isolated primarily because of anti-Communist attacks from the 
right, not simply because they chose to follow CP policy. Understanding why 
and how union organizers changed tactics requires far more attention to local 
conditions than to events or declarations taking place in the USSR.
 Adopting a local context for the history of communism also requires histo-
rians to determine what constitutes a local context. Here, too, this study makes 
contributions in addressing the importance of the middle class, contests over 
public space, and the changing nature of consumption in the history of these 
unions. Anti-Communists began their most extensive attacks precisely in the 
years when suburbanization and the rise of the middle class were severely 
affecting retailing in general and upscale department stores in particular. As 
historians have long realized, these developments were closely linked to new 
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patterns of consumption. In this study, I argue that these new patterns of con-
sumption were visible not only in the consumer goods furnishing middle-class 
suburban homes, but also in a rapidly changing environment within the stores, 
in part created to better serve middle-class customers. Self-service shopping, 
which sprung up throughout New York City stores in the early 1950s, allowed 
managers to increase their control and cut their labor costs, permanently 
weakening the unions. And the closing of some stores whose managers were 
unable or unwilling to adjust quickly enough to the new retailing environment 
left the unions even more vulnerable to anti-Communist attacks.
 By focusing on the role of communism in the history of these unions, this 
study addresses the history of department store workers in America in a very 
different way than scholars have previously done. Other studies, most impor-
tantly Susan Porter Benson’s landmark Counter Cultures, describe in rich detail 
the history of worker-management relations in the department stores, although 
without addressing the unions formed within these stores. In this study, I 
move beyond the somewhat self-contained department stores that dominated 
Benson’s excellent study, to place these stores within a much larger and more 
complicated historical framework. This study takes into account processes that 
affected the stores and unions directly, like suburbanization and the rise of anti-
communism. It also looks at the changing nature of the streets outside the stores, 
streets that were dominated by radical protests and strikes in the 1930s, but rap-
idly became far less important sites of militant activism in the 1940s and 1950s. 
Finally, this study looks at larger historical events like the Great Depression and 
World War II from the vantage point of the stores and the unions.4
 While this study moves away from previous studies of department store 
work and workers in placing greater emphasis on context, it retains the focus 
on women’s history established by many of the scholars on the history of 
department stores. Women played a number of key roles in the history of New 
York City’s department store unions. They represented, first of all, many of the 
workers organized within these unions. Second, especially in the early years of 
the unions’ history, some of the most important union leaders were women, 
largely due to Communists’ willingness to recruit women as union organizers. 
Finally, women played key roles in the unions’ history as store customers. Unlike 
Benson, however, I argue that there was seldom if ever any consciousness of 
shared femininity between store customers and store workers, especially in the 
upscale stores where the unions were most successful. Instead, I argue that in the 
1930s store workers found themselves in a highly antagonistic relationship with 
customers. Partially as a result of this antagonistic relationship between depart-
ment store workers and their wealthy customers, department store workers got 
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the chance to prove that they shared the negative assumptions about upper-
class women that were widespread in this era. During their sit-down strikes 
at Woolworth’s and, later, during their more conventional strike at Gimbel’s, 
women working in the department stores proved that they were as hostile to 
upper-class women as were any of their male counterparts.5
 Women played key roles in the department store unions throughout the 
unions’ history, but these roles were less pronounced in the late 1940s and 
early 1950s. Even in these years, union members continued to hold discus-
sions about gender equality and gender relations at union meetings and in the 
union newspaper. At the same time, by the late 1940s, union leaders openly 
began supporting the male breadwinner norm, something that had not been 
the case a decade earlier. By the 1950s, as the unions shifted towards a more 
conservative political stance, union leaders also supported a more conserva-
tive set of gendered assumptions, whether through cheesecake photographs in 
the union newspaper or fighting for the rights of “breadwinners and heads of 
families” to take the best-paying jobs.
 Finally, this study uses the history of these unions as a way of addressing 
the history of white-collar workers in America. Particularly in the 1930s, as 
organizers in the department store unions made their most important gains, 
the term “white collar worker” had tremendous importance for the unions’ 
history. During strikes in these years, department store workers actively 
employed a rhetoric that identified white-collar workers as members of the 
working class. This rhetoric allowed department store workers on strike to 
mobilize allies ranging from low-paid office workers to actors, writers, chem-
ists, and doctors. By the late 1930s, however, as these unions entered the CIO, 
they ceased discussing the specialized nature of white-collar work and white-
collar workers in favor of analyses that placed greater emphasis on the shared 
concerns of all working-class people. Within just a few years, people who had 
once called themselves “white-collar workers” began thinking of themselves as 
members of the middle class, and eschewed the sort of alliances with strikers 
that once gave the unions such power.
 The connections between the history of white-collar workers and the his-
tory of the department store unions consists of far more than the history of 
the term “white collar worker” or the changing nature of the middle class. 
This study addresses the critical issue of when, how, and why white-collar 
workers became a minor part of the American labor movement. As already 
suggested, today such workers represent a tiny minority of union members. 
Statistics demonstrate that this weakness is rooted in the 1930s, 1940s, and 
1950s. According to a study of American union membership between 1939 
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and 1953, the percentage of unionized workers in the service sector (includ-
ing retailing) grew only slightly in these years, from 6 percent in 1939 to 9.5 
percent in 1953. In the textile industry, the only sector of the manufacturing 
industry with similarly low rates of unionization in the late 1930s, unions grew 
tremendously in the same period, moving from 7 percent unionized workers 
in 1939 to 26.7 percent unionized workers in 1953. The numbers for the entire 
manufacturing industry are even more striking; in the same time period, 
from 1939 to 1953, the percentage of unionized workers in the manufacturing 
industries went from 22.8 percent in 1939 to 42.4 percent, a far larger growth 
both in actual numbers and in percentages.6
 As these figures demonstrate, the growth in retail unions between 1939 and 
1953 did not have anywhere near the success of the unionization drives in even 
the least unionized sectors of the manufacturing industries. By 1953, the year 
this study ends, the possibilities that had been so evident in New York City in 
the 1930s had disappeared. Divided around the issue of communism, facing 
managers’ restructuring, suburbanization, and an extremely hostile govern-
ment, department store union organizers in New York City were struggling 
to retain those unions that already existed. Fighting this struggle gave union 
organizers no chance to match the rapid expansion of retailing in post–World 
War II America.
2.
In recent decades, historians looking at blue-collar workers have discussed 
the concept of the radical possibilities of the 1930s at great length. In doing 
so, they have come to critical realizations about this decade. In particular, 
they have called for bottom-up histories of both American communism and 
American unions, trends this study seeks to continue.
 In the early 1970s a group of labor historians made the changing nature of 
unions a central concern of American labor history. Using blue-collar work-
ers and their unions as examples, these labor historians argued that unions 
began as powerful organizations created and controlled by the working class 
in the early and mid-1930s. During the mid- and late 1930s, these historians 
argued, paid CIO organizers and CIO leaders stepped in and took over the 
grassroots labor movement, and finally stamped out most workers’ dissent in 
their enforcement of the no-strike pledge during World War II.7
 At the very moment that labor historians were reshaping their field, other 
historians were also examining the history of American communism in a new 
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light. By the 1970s and especially the 1980s many historians of communism 
argued that Communists had not been the sinister manipulators of the labor 
movement that consensus school historians had claimed. Instead, these new 
historians argued, Communists’ role in the labor movement had been far more 
complex. Communists had served as among the most dedicated union orga-
nizers, who fought tirelessly for workers’ rights, especially in the 1930s.8
 Increasingly in the 1980s and early 1990s historians portrayed Communist 
union organizers as far more dictatorial and separated from the rank and file. 
By 1982, Nelson Lichtenstein was able to argue in Labor’s War at Home that 
Communists’ willingness to support the World War II no-strike pledge was 
tantamount to a betrayal of the working class, very similar to other labor lead-
ers’ betrayal in the same era. By the mid-1990s George Lipsitz, in Rainbow at 
Midnight, took this argument one step further, arguing that the very concept of 
the Communist party as the workers’ vanguard was destined to separate them 
from those militant workers who were not willing to be led by Communists. 
These historians asserted that Communist union leaders, like non-Communist 
union leaders, benefited from workers’ willingness to strike and resist in the 
1930s, but then stamped out that militancy in the 1940s.9
 This study seeks to address the issues raised by these historians, most 
importantly the subject of the missed opportunities of the 1930s. Staughton 
Lynd correctly called workers’ successes in the 1930s a demonstration of the 
possibilities of radicalism, a phrase with echoes in nearly every study of the 
1930s published since. This study points to one of these possibilities—the 
possibility for unions in the retail sector—that was even less realized than the 
possibilities of unionism in the factories that Lynd and his followers examined. 
To explain why these possibilities existed in the first place, I draw heavily 
upon the work of historians who have studied 1930s communism as, in part, 
a gender system. As these gender historians have argued, many Communists 
shared similar gendered assumptions: in particular, many strongly emphasized 
the masculine nature of working-class radicalism. While in the early 1930s, 
Communists did see important possibilities for women to play key roles in 
community-based organizing in particular, by the late 1930s, according to 
historians like Elizabeth Faue and Van Gosse, Communists argued that men 
were the fundamental agents of the working class.10
 As these historians make clear, there was a great deal of complexity in 
Communists’ understandings of gender. Communists did, as Faue especially 
has pointed out, associate bourgeois femininity with corruption and workers’ 
oppression. At the same time, many Communists recognized the important 
role of working-class women in class struggle. Most importantly, in the early 
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and mid-1930s Communists supported women workers’ unions in ways that 
many more conservative union organizers did not. Unlike the far more con-
servative organizers in the American Federation of Labor (AFL), Communist 
union organizers were willing to go into department stores to aid women 
workers in their struggle to form unions.
 This study also addresses some of the themes that Lichtenstein and Lipsitz 
address, namely, the relationship between Communist union organizers and 
workers. Unlike Lichtenstein and Lipsitz, however, both of whom focus on 
blue-collar workers, there is no evidence in the department store unions’ 
history that Communists were at odds with the most militant workers in 
the unions. While in the late 1940s a few workers did form anti-Communist 
blocs within the unions, the anti-Communists represented a tiny and isolated 
minority within the department store unions in the 1940s. Most members, as 
demonstrated by the union elections of the late 1940s, continued to support 
union leaders’ right to hold political beliefs contrary to the beliefs of most 
workers, and there is no record of any workers in these unions calling for 
wildcat strikes or rejecting the no-strike pledge.
 Rank-and-file anti-communism in the department store unions was a 
result not of Communists’ errors but of changing economic circumstances in 
the late 1940s and early 1950s. As suburbanization and restructuring contin-
ued, managers laid off workers; Communist union leaders could not prevent 
this. The end result was that by 1953 the rank and file was constantly criticiz-
ing union leaders’ political views, demanding that union leaders recant their 
radical politics and concentrate more on the bread-and-butter issues workers 
had to confront. The union leaders, to their credit, followed suit, but this 
did nothing to help them combat managers’ efforts to restructure the stores, 
efforts that eventually required fewer workers with fewer skills. The powerful 
coalitions that had formed around communism during the 1930s would never 
again reemerge, and the union leaders would find themselves and their mem-
bership increasingly isolated and unable to meet the challenge of the structural 
changes in retailing during the 1950s.
3.
Chapter 1 describes the first major strikes in the department stores of New 
York City, the Klein’s-Ohrbach’s strikes that took place in New York City’s 
Union Square in 1934–35. Both Union Square and the stores were highly 
contested spaces at the time. Communists in the streets of Union Square 
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repeatedly tried to make the square their own, while police and local business 
managers (including store managers) worked to contest Communists’ efforts. 
While these parties struggled over the space in and around Union Square, a 
related struggle took place over the buildings on the square’s southern border, 
the Klein’s and Ohrbach’s stores. Store managers found themselves constantly 
struggling to control working-class consumption, to prevent shoplifting and 
overcrowding. As these struggles raged, workers at the Klein’s and Ohrbach’s 
stores, many of them women, went on strike demanding union recognition. 
With support from Communist organizers in the Trade Union Unity League, 
the workers at Klein’s and Ohrbach’s were able to launch a dramatic and mili-
tant attack on the owners and managers of these stores in strikes that lasted 
for almost six months. At the end of these strikes, workers were able to declare 
a partial victory, after which department store workers throughout New York 
City began organizing unions within their stores.
 Chapter 2 discusses the next three years of the unions’ history, from 
1935–37. In these years the Communists leading the department store unions 
sought greater legitimacy by uniting with the AFL’s Retail Clerks International 
Protection Association (RCIPA). They also led two militant although not very 
successful strikes in 1935 and 1936. During these strikes Communists found 
themselves increasingly at odds with the corrupt anti-Communist leaders of 
the RCIPA, who shut down one of these strikes while condemning the settle-
ment in another. In 1937 workers won their first major victories, in the sit-
down strikes at Woolworth’s and other five-and-dime stores. In these strikes, 
department store workers firmly established themselves as an integral part 
of the American labor movement. They adopted the same tactics and made 
many of the same demands as other workers in the fledgling industrial union 
movement that would result in the CIO. Late in 1937 the department stores’ 
successful job actions forced CIO leaders to recognize the existence of retail 
workers, leading to the creation of the CIO’s retail workers’ union, the United 
Retail Employees of America.
 Chapter 3 discusses the ways in which workers created unions at New York 
City’s upscale 34th Street department stores in the later 1930s. Far more than 
in the downscale stores, workers’ successes in these upscale establishments 
resulted in the creation of permanent union locals. Workers faced significant 
challenges in creating these unions. At stores like Macy’s, Bloomingdale’s, and 
Gimbel’s, workers found themselves in a highly antagonistic relationship with 
customers, due largely to the system of consumption practiced at these stores. 
In part seeking protection from customers, workers joined the union, some 
of them even leaving the store to become permanent and full-time union 
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organizers. By the late 1930s, 34th Street store managers, seeking a way to gain 
control of their increasingly restive workforce in a neighborhood constantly 
beset by street protests and strikes, accepted the union as one possible way to 
stabilize their situation. But the local leaders had other ideas, as the unions 
became an integral part of the anti-Fascist Popular Front formed in the late 
1930s, gaining numerous powerful allies in the city’s radical movement. By 
1941, with these allies’ support, workers at the 34th Street stores won the eight-
hour day and the forty-hour week for retail workers throughout New York 
City.
 Chapter 4 addresses the department stores and unions during World War 
II, when everything that had once guaranteed the union success began to 
disappear. The radical protests that had once dominated the streets around 
the stores now disappeared in favor of patriotic parades. Meanwhile, store 
managers began to use the stores in order to further the war effort, gaining the 
support of the government and the public in the process. National union lead-
ers also found themselves increasingly in the government’s good graces, win-
ning support for their strike against Montgomery Ward after managers there 
refused to grant the closed shop. For the Communists in the department store 
unions, the newfound strength of managers and national union leaders was a 
constant and unanswerable threat. The threat was made all the more serious 
by managers’ early efforts at restructuring the stores in an effort to deal with 
wartime labor shortages. Additionally, Communists’ strong support for the 
no-strike pledge and their conflict with national leaders led to their condem-
nation of the government-approved Montgomery Ward strike, damaging their 
relationship with the national union leaders still further. By the end of World 
War II, the Communists in the department store unions found themselves 
isolated, with less power in the national union than ever before.
 Chapter 5 addresses the immediate postwar era in the department store 
unions’ history. In the critical period between 1946 and 1948, local and nation-
al union leaders came to an unstated agreement about what their respective 
roles would be within the union. The local department store union leaders 
gave up on any control over the national union’s policies, while national union 
leaders allowed the local leaders greater autonomy in the running of the local 
unions. This compromise did little to meet the challenges department store 
workers faced in the postwar era. Managers, continuing their wartime efforts 
at restructuring the stores, now began laying off workers in record numbers 
and opening branch stores in the outer boroughs and in the suburbs to appeal 
to the increasing numbers of suburban residents. As the layoffs mounted, 
the U.S. government put the Taft-Hartley Act into effect, requiring all union 
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officials to declare themselves non-Communists, something the local lead-
ers could not do. By 1948 local leaders’ refusal to declare their opposition 
to communism attracted national attention. The leaders of New York City’s 
department store unions were called to testify in a set of HUAC hearings 
on communism in New York City’s retail trade. Shortly after the hearings 
concluded—and after several of the leaders of these unions pleaded the Fifth 
Amendment and refused to answer questions about their political beliefs—the 
national union leaders purged the department store locals from the CIO, 
establishing dual unions to compete with the Communist-led department 
store locals.
 Chapter 6 looks at union organizers’ efforts to continue to lead and even 
expand the retail unions at the height of the McCarthy period, from 1948 to 
1953. In these years Communist union organizers found themselves strug-
gling with the simple tasks of retaining their leadership of the union while 
staying out of jail. Meanwhile, in response to the rising numbers of middle-
class consumers as well as the rise of national brands and a desire to cut costs, 
managers began even more radical reconstruction of the stores, instituting 
self-service retailing, laying off still more workers, and closing some stores. 
With organizers struggling to stay out of jail and workers losing their jobs by 
the thousands, union members increasingly demanded that the union lead-
ers move to the right politically. By the spring of 1953 the department store 
unions had passed resolutions condemning communism as an anti-demo-
cratic movement. In condemning communism as a grave danger to American 
democracy, the union leaders gained a degree of legitimacy, but they also lost 
the ability to challenge decisions made by the anti-Communist state without 
being accused of being Communists. This became critically important during 
the Hearn’s strike of 1953, when workers went on their first strike to challenge 
managers’ right to restructure the stores. When a court granted Hearn’s man-
agers an anti-strike injunction, strikers and union leaders, still determined to 
prove their loyalty, strictly abided by the injunction. This decision effectively 
deprived union organizers of the ability to challenge managers’ restructuring 
programs, bringing an end to the possibilities represented by the powerful 
union of department store workers in New York City.
Chapter 1
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Introduction
Class determined where and how people shopped in New York City dur-
ing the Great Depression. Wealthy consumers went to the upscale stores on 
Fifth Avenue, or to the great department stores on 34th Street, making their 
purchases amidst elegant surroundings. Working-class people had their own 
less elegant shopping districts, both in the city’s outer boroughs and around 
Union Square, on Manhattan’s 14th Street. 14th Street featured a number of 
working-class stores, and two of the most important, Klein’s and Ohrbach’s, 
were right on the square.
 Union Square was a site of radical protest as well as working-class consump-
tion throughout the 1930s. Both local business managers and Communists 
attempted to claim the square, putting up signs and staging dramatic pageants 
in order to attract the attention and support of working-class people within the 
square. These practices became extremely important when workers at Klein’s 
and Ohrbach’s declared themselves on strike, and set about creating a strike 
replete with signs and pageantry.
 Like Union Square, the stores were contested spaces even before the strikes 
began. In downscale stores like Klein’s and Ohrbach’s, customers and man-
agers found themselves at odds. Managers attempted to control customers’ 
behavior very carefully, trying to force customers to behave in an orderly and 
legal way while making purchases. Customers fiercely resisted managerial 
control, crowding exits and shoplifting whenever they could. Although store 
managers tried to prevent this practice, they were unable to do so, and both 
businesses lost large sums of money to shoplifters each year.
 Within these contested spaces, Klein’s and Ohrbach’s workers were highly 
exploited. Their salaries were some of the lowest offered in the city, and 
throughout the early years of the Depression, workers at these stores put in 
longer hours for less pay. Additionally, workers at these stores had no unions, 
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largely because they were far removed from the concept of organizable work-
ers as defined by the American Federation of Labor (AFL), the largest and 
most powerful union at the time. In 1934, however, these workers found that 
the Communists organizing protests in the streets outside the stores were will-
ing to lead unions of white-collar women workers. As a result, workers at these 
stores joined the Communist-led Office Workers Union (OWU).
 As part of this union, workers at Klein’s and Ohrbach’s were able to manip-
ulate the rhetoric of class in order to take advantage of the contested public 
spaces in which they worked. In particular, workers and union organizers pro-
claimed the importance of their struggle for white-collar workers, and created 
a coalition of chemists, doctors, actors, writers, and office workers to support 
the strike. With the help of these white-collar workers, the strikers successfully 
challenged managers’ control over both the stores and over Union Square, 
forcing managers to settle the strike and establishing Communists’ role as 
leaders in the struggle to organize New York City’s department store unions.
The Contested Square
The Great Depression was a nightmare for working-class people in New 
York City. “You can’t possibly understand it if you didn’t live through it,” a 
working-class Bronx resident named Ruth Papa said in describing the city 
at the time. Papa’s father—a self-educated worker in a shoe factory—had 
constantly searched for a job during the early years of the Depression, and 
attempted everything from running a push-cart to shoveling snow, with little 
success. Papa’s mother and two older sisters, as well as Papa herself, took up 
housework to try to make ends meet, but the family was still barely surviving; 
eventually, both Papa and her older sister found jobs, and the family’s financial 
crisis eased slightly. Papa remembered a near-constant fear of dispossession 
throughout the Depression, however, and remembered on more than one 
occasion having to use candles after not being able to pay the electric bill. 
Papa’s family’s experiences of poverty and unemployment were mirrored by 
many other New Yorkers during the Depression. Throughout New York City, 
working-class people, many of them immigrants or children of immigrants, 
struggled with unemployment and near-starvation during these years. Many 
lost their homes, moving into temporary shelters, but shelter managers had to 
turn away still more homeless men and women.1
 The homeless victims of the Depression sometimes found shelter within 
the city parks, among them Union Square Park, an empty space of approxi-
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mately three square blocks just north of Greenwich Village. One homeless 
man described sleeping in the park as a grueling experience: “Sleeping in the 
parks was much less satisfactory [than sleeping in subway cars]. Tired, hungry, 
and cold, stretched out on the bench . . . I was awakened by a patrolman who 
had swung his nightstick sharply against the soles of my feet, sending an inde-
scribable electric pain through my hunger-racked body.” Despite the misery 
this man associated with sleeping in the parks, homeless people continued to 
frequent Union Square Park throughout the early years of the Depression.2
 While the rise in unemployment led homeless people to set up residence in 
Union Square, the related revitalization of the city’s radical movement made 
the square a center of American radicalism. Communists and other radicals 
filled Union Square during the early years of the Depression, making Union 
Square what historian and journalist Matthew Josephson described as “New 
York’s Red Square . . . the very vortex of revolutionary activities” in New York 
City. Josephson went on to describe his memories of a visit to Union Square 
in the early 1930s: “Soapboxers were going on in routine fashion: ‘Garbage! 
That’s what the bosses give the American workers,’ one of them shouted sud-
denly. His small audience responded with a roar of laughter, some of them 
waving placards with slogans such as ‘Jobs—Not Charity.’” While Josephson 
describes the audience as fairly passive, other observers disagreed. In the late 
1930s, Federal Writers Project interviewers writing about these same soapbox 
speakers claimed that the audience frequently gathered not only to listen to 
the various speakers, but to argue with other listeners or even with the speak-
ers themselves about the issues being discussed. One WPA worker, writing a 
few years after Josephson, described the square as the site of long debates, a 
“diminutive Hyde Park.”3
 The lengthy political debates extended to buildings around the square’s 
border. A few small cafeterias lined Union Square, and one working-class 
woman who frequented them when she was young remembered that it was 
in those cafeterias that she had learned about literature and politics, primarily 
from other people her own age. Young people would sit in the cafeterias for 
hours, talking about unions, class struggle, and racism, among a variety of 
other subjects. Like the soapbox speakers in the square, working-class people 
used the cafeterias as spaces to debate and discuss a wide range of issues.4
 Like the soapbox speakers and the cafeterias, political rallies in Union 
Square also allowed working-class people to express their opinions on politi-
cal issues. Drawing on a century-long tradition of political protest in Union 
Square, Communists and other radicals staged rallies in the square nearly 
every week in the early 1930s, around issues ranging from the wrongful arrest 
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Protest in Union Square, probably in 1934. Outside the Klein’s and Ohrbach’s stores, 
the protests in the Square were large and militant and occasionally resulted in vio-
lence. Thus, any strike at those stores was a potentially serious situation for managers, 
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which also led many of the unemployed protests taking place in the Square. (Courtesy 
of Milstein Division of United States History, Local History & Genealogy, The New 
York Public Library, Astor, Lenox and Tilden Foundations)
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of the Scottsboro Boys to unemployment relief. Any of these protests could 
end in violence. Albert Halper, a novelist who lived just off Union Square at 
the time, later remembered that “there were weekly left-wing parades which 
frequently ended with clubbings by the police. On Saturday mornings, I could 
see the mounted cops in the side streets, bunched together, resting, healthy 
faced, chatting cheerfully before the afternoon’s action.”5
 Other working-class people—particularly women—came to the square 
to shop in the numerous stores that lined its southern border. Here, too, 
the Depression affected people’s presence within Union Square, as women 
in particular responded to the Depression by being more careful with their 
spending habits, and by bargain-hunting at the discount stores bordering on 
the square. As a result, Samuel Klein, the owner and manager of Klein’s, one 
of the most important downscale stores in New York City at the time, was one 
of the few business owners who actually saw an increase in profits during the 
Depression. In addition to these indoor establishments, street peddlers sell-
ing food and other goods filled the southern end of the square. Combined 
with the easy access to the square by public transportation, these stores made 
Union Square “the place where we came to shop,” as one working-class woman 
remembered it.6
 People who owned buildings around Union Square were very aware of 
the crowd’s presence, and many attempted to control the crowd’s activities by 
putting up signs. On the southern side of the square, Samuel Klein put huge 
signs in his store’s windows advising customers of the “tremendous values in 
fur coats” and reminding them that customers had a right to their “money 
back within five days.” Even the water tank, standing up above the rest of the 
building, carried with it the name of the firm, “Klein’s.” On the northwest cor-
ner of the square stood another building, also covered in signs. These signs, 
however, called for viewers to “Fight Police Terror, Unemployment, and War 
Preparations!” They called “for Defense of the Soviet Union!” and for the 
struggle of “class against class!” This building was the headquarters of the Daily 
Worker, the official newspaper of the Communist party of the United States 
(CP). The signs on both buildings illustrate the building owners’ determination 
to gain the support of the people who passed through Union Square Park.7
 Both store owners and Communists used pageantry as well as signs to 
attract the attention of the crowds that filled Union Square. The Communists 
staged many of the weekly protests which took place in Union Square during 
this era, as well as what was probably the largest protest in New York City 
during the Great Depression, the International Unemployment Day protest of 
March 6, 1930. As a reporter for the Daily Worker described the proceedings, 
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during this protest 100,000 people gathered in Union Square to hear speeches 
calling for “immediate relief for the jobless from the funds of the city treasury 
and from taxes on the wealthy exploiters, for unemployment insurance paid 
for by the employers and administered by committees of the workers and 
unemployed, and for the seven-hour day and the five-day week.” The speak-
ers—most of them CP officials—called on the huge crowd to elect a commit-
tee to take their demands to City Hall. The crowd roared back at the podium, 
apparently in agreement, and eventually a number of CP officials volunteered 
to serve as the Workers’ Committee. However, when the protesters attempted 
to follow the committee to City Hall, the square became the site of a bloody 
battle. Police emerged, many with nightsticks, many on horseback. In order 
to prevent what they perceived as the beginnings of a riotous attack on City 
Hall, the police began beating those protesters who were attempting to march 
south. Most of the crowd fled in the confusion; police arrested those who did 
not escape quickly enough.8
 International Unemployment Day and the smaller protests that frequently 
took place in Union Square served several functions. First, these protests 
allowed workers to express their political views; in this respect they were simi-
lar to the soapbox speakers and the cafeterias which lined the square. Second, 
Communist-led protests generally presented Communists as the leaders of the 
working class. At the International Unemployment Day protest, the Workers’ 
Committee, made up of Communists, was supposed to represent the city’s 
workers, although most workers in New York City would hardly have accepted 
this representation. Finally, protests in Union Square allowed the Communists 
an opportunity to lay claim to Union Square as their space, to force Josephson 
and other observers to acknowledge that it was a “Red Square.”
 Like the Communists, business owners and managers operating in the 
square also found political demonstrations useful tools with which to exert 
control over Union Square and to challenge Communists’ control over the 
square. To this end, the city government and local business owners and manag-
ers cooperated to organize the Union Square Centennial Celebration on April 
23, 1932. Local business owners and managers used this celebration as a lightly 
veiled challenge to the Communists’ control over Union Square. The celebra-
tion began, for instance, with a large and very well-publicized “Americanization 
meeting,” which featured former governor and Democratic presidential candi-
date Alfred E. Smith giving a speech on equality. Aware of the significance of 
Union Square for Communists and others who attacked ruling-class privilege, 
Smith opened his speech by stating that in America “there is no such thing as a 
ruling class, though that phrase is often used to arouse passion.”9
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 The celebration organizers powerfully illustrated their claim to Union 
Square as a public space for anti-communism through the actions of the police 
on the day of the celebration. As the New York Times described their participa-
tion, the police presented an “exhibition drill by a company of the Police Rifle 
Regiment in riot drill and formation,” which ended in “a bayonet charge into a 
mythical [rioting] crowd.” This bayonet charge, taking place as it did at the site 
of so many actual confrontations between police and Communist-led protes-
tors, could hardly be described as anything but a threat to the Communists, 
and a challenge to their continued presence in Union Square.10
 Smith’s casual denial of the existence of class in America and the Police 
Rifle Regiment’s demonstration of crowd-control tactics did nothing to pre-
vent the Communists from using Union Square for May Day only a week 
later. Despite heavy rain, the thousands of participants in the annual march 
gathered in the square that year for a brief rally before proceeding along their 
march to Columbus Circle. If the Centennial Celebration was intended as 
a threat, the Communists did not respond as the backers of the celebration 
hoped they would. Local business managers therefore resolved to continue 
their campaign against communism in their neighborhood. Only a few weeks 
after that 1932 May Day protest, local business owners and managers formed 
the Union Square Association, an organization intended to “advance the inter-
est of Union Square as a patriotic center.” Samuel Klein served on the new 
association’s board of directors.11
 Store owners and Communists shared two goals in the early 1930s. First, 
both attempted to control the environment in Union Square through signs 
and demonstrations, and to use that environment to communicate with work-
ing-class people—both potential consumers and potential Communists—in 
the square. Second, as part of this campaign, store owners and Communists 
attempted to win the allegiance of the working-class people who frequented 
Union Square. The Communists wanted working-class people to view them 
as the legitimate representatives of the working class, and used the dramatic 
International Unemployment Day protest, before it erupted into violence, to 
make some of their leaders just such representatives, through the Workers’ 
Committee which the protestors chose. The store owners used this environ-
ment to encourage working-class people to shop in their stores, a task which 
was all the more important since store owners in Union Square seldom adver-
tised in newspapers and therefore lacked one particularly powerful way to 
draw in customers.
 It is difficult to determine the nature of department store workers’ relation-
ship to these struggles over Union Square. Anne Haicken, who worked in 
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Ohrbach’s during these years, remembered that the protests seemed far away 
from her daily existence: “You had to go all the way across 14th Street to the 
Park” and to enter Union Square and to hear the protesters or soapbox speak-
ers, she remembered. At the same time, Matthew Josephson believed that at 
least some people may have made the trek across 14th Street. During one visit 
to Union Square, he claimed that “knots of people who looked like workers 
from the nearby garment shops were standing about listening to some speak-
ers mounted on little portable platforms.” And, when they did go on strike, 
department store workers willingly worked alongside the Communists who 
had previously organized demonstrations in Union Square, often laying claim 
to the same space.12
 Whether or not department store workers paid attention to these struggles, 
other observers around the state and the country were very aware of the 
Communists’ presence in Union Square. During a parade sponsored by the 
right-wing Veterans of Foreign Wars in Union Square just a few weeks after 
International Unemployment Day, speaker after speaker called for an end to 
Communist control of Union Square. Later that year, an assistant adjutant 
general of the New York State National Guard called the square “the frontier 
of today, right in the heart of your greatest city . . . and it is our duty, as much 
today as in the early days, to encourage our conservators of the peace and 
guardians of the frontier” to make sure that the Communists did not gain 
control over the square.13
 Despite the importance of Union Square to the struggles of the early 1930s, 
it is important to remember that the entire country was in turmoil, not just 
these three city blocks. The most important of the struggles that character-
ized this era—the famous Bonus March—ended with the United States Army 
chasing World War I veterans away from Washington, creating widespread 
fear that the nation really was crumbling. Meanwhile, unemployed workers 
attended regular protests in front of city halls in major cities across the coun-
try. Particularly in northern cities like New York and Chicago, nearly any evic-
tion could result in a spontaneous rally. The mass unemployment and mass 
poverty which began in 1929 had, it seemed, stirred the working class into 
action, and many believed that the country was on the brink of revolution.14
 With hindsight, we now know that, in the end, the Communist movement 
was soundly defeated. We know that American workers did not create a revo-
lution in the 1930s; and that the election of Franklin Delano Roosevelt in 1932 
meant that, instead of revolution, workers and their bosses would come to 
what Roosevelt quite accurately referred to as a “New Deal” over the splitting of 
profits. We know that Union Square was to become a center of commerce, not 
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of communism, by century’s end. But in the early and mid-1930s there seemed 
to be at least a possibility that no solution would be found, that American capi-
talism was truly doomed to failure. And Communist control of Union Square, 
at the very least, seemed to many observers a near certainty.15
 The conflict in Union Square, a microcosm of these much larger struggles 
taking place in the country as a whole, set one of the two stages for the strikes 
at Klein’s and Ohrbach’s. Communists’ active participation in the fierce battle 
that raged over the square in the years before the strikes was almost certainly 
one reason that the Communists were drawn into the strikes to begin with. 
Additionally, the conflict outside the stores gave the strikers one of their most 
powerful opportunities to challenge managers, by disrupting still further man-
agers’ efforts to control the stores’ exterior environment.
The Contested Stores
As in Union Square, the pre-strike struggles and conflicts inside the stores were 
critical for the way in which the strikes and the unions developed. Working-
class consumers fought to get as many high-quality goods as they could for 
as little money as possible, while store managers fought to encourage spend-
ing and control customers’ often unruly competition over goods within the 
stores. Like customers, workers and managers struggled even before the Great 
Depression. Workers, who had no union at either store before the Depression, 
frequently left their jobs to protest the poor working conditions. In response, 
managers set up limited benefits programs at both stores, attempting to con-
vince workers to stay longer. These programs, combined with the high unem-
ployment rates of the early Depression, made workers more likely to remain 
working at Klein’s and Ohrbach’s, despite the low pay, long hours, and dismal 
working conditions.
 Managers at both Klein’s and Ohrbach’s used the self-service method of 
retailing, a rarity among clothing stores at the time. Customers at both stores 
had direct access to goods, without necessarily going through a salesperson. 
A reporter doing a profile on Klein and his store in 1934 described the pro-
cess as “a clothing cafeteria” where “customers pick garments from the racks 
and shelves and try them on in communal dressing rooms where green baize 
curtains are the only concession to privacy. Then they take their selections 
to cashiers, pay for them and have them wrapped.” It was a process far more 
efficient, inexpensive, and impersonal than the sort managers offered custom-
ers in upscale stores. In both Klein’s and Ohrbach’s, managers relied for profits 
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on low prices, extremely rapid stock turnover, and low overhead (including 
wages). In Klein’s, the overhead, including both rents and salary, was low 
indeed, reportedly around 6 or 7 percent of the store’s total profits.16
 Due to the low overhead and consequent low prices, as well as the high 
quality of the merchandise, these stores were very popular place for workers 
to shop. Working-class people throughout New York City, especially from the 
immigrant communities of the outer boroughs, would frequently take the 
subway to Klein’s and Ohrbach’s to do their shopping. Additionally, during the 
Depression, some women who might ordinarily have spent more money at the 
upscale department stores instead chose to limit their spending and shop at 
Union Square. As a result, Samuel Klein was one of the few business owners 
in New York City to see an increase in profits during the Great Depression, 
making over a million dollars in profit every year.17
 Although profitable, catering primarily to working-class consumers had 
some disadvantages. Store managers had tremendous difficulty controlling 
customers, especially during sales. During these sales, working-class consum-
ers sought to stock up on as much clothing as possible. Halper described one 
sale as rowdy and chaotic. “Greater crowds of women were now storming 
all the entrances to Klein’s . . . overturning tables stacked with handbags and 
blouses.” Klein and Ohrbach both employed private security guards in part to 
deal with these sorts of unruly crowds.18
 Customers also engaged in shoplifting, which cost the store owners as 
much as $100,000 a year. Since, unlike at many more expensive stores in 
New York City, customers had direct access to merchandise at Klein’s and 
Ohrbach’s, customers frequently practiced shoplifting there. Some customers 
even took shoplifting a step further, using the stores as a training ground to 
pass the practice on to the next generation. Anne Haicken, who worked at 
Ohrbach’s for several years, remembered years later her surprise that she had 
once caught a mother teaching her children how to shoplift.19
 Managers at both stores sought to control this practice as best they could, 
with little success. While the hundreds of employees at each store could have 
been extremely useful in helping to catch shoplifters, they were, in many ways, 
caught between the customers and the store managers. On the one hand, not 
only were department store workers members of the same class as most of 
the stores’ customers, but they also shared ethnic and neighborhood ties to 
the customers. They, like the customers, were primarily Jewish-American 
and Italian-American women. Many of these workers also lived in the same 
immigrant communities as did the customers (most of the store workers, at 
least at Ohrbach’s, were the children of immigrants rather than immigrants 
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themselves). On the other hand, part of their job was to catch shoplifters, and 
the extensive network of informants and detectives at both stores ensured that 
any store workers who did take part in shoplifting, even to the point of allow-
ing customers to get away with it, might well get caught themselves.20
 Since most store workers were of limited help in preventing shoplifting, 
managers turned to other methods. For the most part, they relied heavily on 
the store security forces to prevent shoplifting. In addition, managers at the 
Klein’s store hung huge posters on the interior walls of the store, warning that 
“Dishonesty Means Prison” and that prison meant “disgrace to your family” 
in five different languages. There is some disagreement, however, about how 
regularly these threats were carried out. Klein’s supporters claimed that “the 
few who disregard these formalities and get caught [shoplifting] usually end 
up in the ‘crying room,’ . . . [where] he listens to their excuses,” and often 
allowed them to go free. One dissatisfied employee at Klein’s, however, wrote 
that “it is well known that Mr. Klein prosecutes [shoplifters] to the bitter end,” 
unlike department store managers who catered to wealthier people.21
 If workers were little help in preventing shoplifting, they were more helpful 
in other aspects of customer control. In particular, store workers reportedly 
made sure that the boundaries of race were preserved at these stores. Despite 
the lack of de jure segregation, Klein’s and Ohrbach’s catered strictly to white 
working-class people, and store workers were responsible for guarding this 
status quo. A worker at one of these stores told Communist party leader 
Benjamin Davis that managers at Klein’s and Ohrbach’s encouraged employees 
to “insult Negro patrons so that they won’t come back again,” and there is no 
record of workers resisting these instructions.22
 Managers at these stores had to balance out these attempts to control custom-
ers with attempts to encourage customers (at least white customers) to make 
purchases in the stores. Here, too, workers played a key role. The profit margins 
at Klein’s and Ohrbach’s did not allow managers at either store to resort to the 
sorts of extravagant and ornate methods of creating desire which have dominat-
ed department store historiography. In fact, both Klein and Ohrbach expressed 
tremendous disdain for such tactics. Ohrbach dismissed the fancy displays 
of the upscale stores as “fanfare and circus methods” of stimulating customer 
interest, and Klein agreed, joking in one interview that “a customer can’t take a 
window home with her.” Neither offered extensive services or even advertised 
in newspapers, relying instead on word of mouth as well as the prominence of 
their location to attract potential customers. At downscale stores like Klein’s and 
Ohrbach’s, where low overhead was key to the businesses’ survival, managers 
simply could not afford to use any more extravagant methods.23
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 Downscale store managers’ refusal to resort to expensive methods of 
attracting customers made the workers employed in these stores—matrons 
and cashiers as well as sales workers—almost the sole means of communica-
tion between managers and customers. Their work required few skills, and 
almost no training, but impeccable appearance and behavior. As a result, in 
downscale stores, despite the informal and inexpensive settings, managers 
nonetheless had to carefully control their workforce. In order to do so, manag-
ers at these stores carefully selected workers of a particular age, race, ethnicity, 
and gender; workers were young, almost exclusively white, and mostly female. 
At both Klein’s and Ohrbach’s, managers also hired mostly Jewish workers, 
with a few Italian workers as well, perhaps to appeal to the communities they 
viewed as their most important customers. As in almost all other depart-
ment stores in New York City at the time, African American workers in these 
stores held only highly subservient jobs: the only recorded case of an African 
American worker at either store is at Klein’s, where a matron in the fitting 
room, Julia Jacobs, was African American.24
 Managers also had strict rules about other aspects of workers’ appearance. 
Managers at some stores refused to employ “stout girls,” for instance. Ohrbach 
took into account such things as “the appearance of nails, neatness of cloth-
ing, [and] general good taste shown by grooming,” as well as general physical 
fitness, when hiring store workers. Store managers also controlled workers’ 
appearance by carefully regulating the clothing which they allowed workers to 
wear. A 1929 Journal of Retailing study of New York City metropolitan stores 
found that managers of 19 out of 22 stores allowed workers to wear only dark 
blue or black clothing, and found that “all stores take for granted that long 
sleeves must be worn” with only “moderate or inconspicuous” trimmings.25
 Although managers found hiring practices helpful in regulating employee 
appearance and behavior, they supplemented these practices through heavy 
employer supervision. In Nathan Ohrbach’s 1935 Getting Ahead in Retailing, 
he described his own system for personally supervising his workers, noting 
that he spent “a good part of my time walking through the store . . . to hear 
how our floor people talk to our customers and what they say. Is that salesgirl 
trying to convince a customer that an obviously poorly fitting dress ‘is simply 
divine’? Is this salesgirl talking to a fellow worker while a customer is being 
neglected . . . Is still another salesgirl showing signs of becoming impatient 
and possibly discourteous?” With this level of supervision, store owners were 
keenly aware of what their employees were doing, making these stores intimi-
dating and uncomfortable places to work.26
 While close supervision had always been an unpleasant part of working in 
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these stores, before the Depression began there were also important advantag-
es to working in department stores. This was particularly true when these jobs 
were compared to the other jobs open to working-class women in New York 
City, such as those in the garment factories. The most obvious advantage of 
retail work was that the work was less physically strenuous and less dangerous. 
In addition, wages tended to vary less over the course of a year than did most 
factory jobs open to women, although workers often made less money in the 
stores than they would make in a factory. Workers also tended to have to work 
fewer hours in the stores than in factories; especially before the Depression, 
many retail workers throughout the country worked only eight hours a day, 
years before the eight-hour day became the standard working day in the rest 
of the country. And in the 1920s, at another 14th Street department store, 
Hearn’s, managers found that opening the store a half-hour later and allowing 
workers to work fewer than eight hours a day actually benefited sales, in that 
the more contented workers were better at handling customers.27
 Whatever advantages retailers offered potential employees in the 1920s, 
however, were severely curtailed by the Great Depression. The Depression 
meant a sharp decrease in wages. This was especially a problem at stores like 
Klein’s and Ohrbach’s, where managers had historically offered lower wages 
and required longer hours than in many of the more upscale stores. Stella 
Ormsby, a Klein’s worker hired in 1932, wrote a letter to The New Republic in 
which she claimed that “the girls whom [Klein] had [recently] displaced were 
receiving ten dollars per week and they were all discharged in favor of the new 
group who were getting only eight.” According to Ormsby, a still later group of 
workers made only seven dollars a week. The result of these sorts of cuts was 
that, in New York City over the course of the first half of the 1930s, most sales 
workers experienced a 50 percent drop in wages.28
 Department store workers also worked longer hours during the Depression. 
While historian Susan Porter Benson suggests a somewhat mixed picture on 
a national scale, she also observes that, in response to the Depression, many 
downtown stores stayed open later, increasing working hours. These long 
hours were a major concern of workers at both Klein’s and Ohrbach’s. At 
Klein’s, Ormsby wrote, she was expected to work a 57-hour week, from “nine-
thirty in the morning until seven in the evening, including Saturday.” While 
the Ohrbach’s store did not open until 9:45 a.m., workers at both stores worked 
six days a week throughout the early 1930s, and one of the first strike demands 
at Ohrbach’s was for the forty-hour week.29
 In addition to complaints over wages and hours, many workers found the 
store environment cramped, loud, and unsanitary. Ormsby describes “the 
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basement,” the heart of Klein’s operation, as “a long, winding, angular affair 
. . . low-ceilinged and without windows . . . I walk many miles a day in per-
forming my job [adjusting customer’s dresses] and what with . . . the milling 
crowds, the foul [unventilated] air and the noise and the bawlings out from my 
supervisors, I find myself at the end of the day in a state of utter exhaustion.” A 
photograph of Klein’s from the early 1940s backs up at least part of Ormsby’s 
descriptions; the ceiling hung only a few feet above women’s heads, and huge 
metal pipes hung down below the ceiling.30
 Even before they began forming unions, workers had at least one powerful 
weapon at their disposal to fight these sorts of working conditions: they could 
quit. Up until the Depression began, the most dissatisfied workers simply 
left the store. Both Klein and Ohrbach—and, to a lesser extent, managers at 
higher-priced stores as well—found that store workers had extremely high 
turnover rates. One study done in 1929 discovered that the average annual 
turnover rate in New York City retail stores was approximately 137 percent—
that is, more workers left the average New York City store in a single year than 
the total number of store employees. Once the Depression began, however, 
workers tended to stay longer at their jobs, sharply reducing the turnover 
numbers; and by 1936 a second study indicated that the rate of turnover had 
dropped to somewhere closer to 25–35 percent.31 While this drop is signifi-
cant, it probably tells us little about turnover at Klein’s and Ohrbach’s. Due to 
the unusually low pay and poor working conditions at these stores, those few 
workers at downscale stores who chose to make retailing a career did so pri-
marily in upscale stores, where working conditions, wages, and hours were all 
somewhat better.32
 In response to the constant possibility of workers quitting in search of new 
jobs, managers at Klein’s and Ohrbach’s set up modest benefit programs within 
the stores. Klein’s managers offered employees yearly bonuses at Christmas 
time, and discounts on store merchandise, as well as bonuses for weddings 
(perhaps hoping that workers would not leave the stores after getting married). 
Managers at Ohrbach’s provided employees with paid vacations, a store nurse’s 
office, and, beginning in the early 1930s, a profit-sharing program as well.33
 Many workers later claimed that these perks were much more rhetoric than 
reality. While on strike, a number of workers claimed that the services were 
definitely not worth the “fifteen cents and twenty cents taken from their sala-
ries” to pay for these bonuses. One described the nurse’s office at Ohrbach’s: 
“if they got sick . . . they were given a pass and allowed to go up to a room 
to lie down. At the end of a half hour the nurse would tell them acidly that 
the half hour had passed and they should go back to their work.” In addition, 
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these workers claimed that managers seldom let workers take advantage of 
Ohrbach’s much-touted free vacations. A striker told a columnist for the Daily 
Worker that “the company, just before vacation time, would lay a girl off. They 
could then say she had not been working a full two years for them,” and there-
fore not give her a free vacation.34
 With managers struggling to control both workers and customers, Klein’s 
and Ohrbach’s were sites of constant struggle during the Great Depression. 
Dissatisfied workers continued to quit the store, and customers continued 
to shoplift, and there was little managers could do to prevent either. Like the 
struggles taking place in the streets outside the stores, the struggles within the 
stores set the stage for the strikes of 1934–35. In fact, store managers’ attempts 
to control the actions of store workers led directly into the Klein’s-Ohrbach’s 
strikes of 1934–35.
The Strikes Begin
Like many of the strikes of 1934, the Klein’s-Ohrbach’s were in many ways a 
response to the New Deal. The explicit support the federal government gave 
unions under the first New Deal meant that workers increasingly turned to 
unions as the solution. The workers at Klein’s and Ohrbach’s had a particu-
lar challenge here. Besides the extremely corrupt Retail Clerks International 
Protection Association (RCIPA), no unions affiliated with the AFL had a 
charter to organize retail workers. And even the RCIPA had never made any 
serious headway into department stores, where the employees were mostly 
women; instead the RCIPA restricted its efforts to grocery stores. Those work-
ers who wished to join a union had to settle for a union not affiliated with the 
AFL, one that would organize white-collar women workers. This led directly 
to the rise of Communists within the department store unions.
 As managers at Klein’s and Ohrbach’s cut workers’ salaries and extended the 
number of working hours, the federal government offered unionization as a 
way to solve workers’ problems with minimum disruption. The groundbreak-
ing National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) of 1933 was primarily intended 
to bolster the economy by allowing businesses to set up self-regulatory agen-
cies and thereby limit competition and end price wars. At the same time, one 
of the requirements of these self-regulatory agencies was that they all include 
a rule that “employees shall have the right to organize and bargain collectively 
. . . and shall be free from the interference, restraint, or coercion of employers” 
in forming unions.35
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 Despite pro-union language like this, many retail executives enthusiasti-
cally supported the NIRA, and with good reason. As Business Week described 
it, the first year of the NIRA meant national “inflation . . . living minimum 
wages, and . . . trade practice rules,” all of which suggested the possibility for 
higher prices. Even the possibility that store managers might raise prices as a 
result of the NIRA meant that customers began to buy more, trying to get their 
purchases in before prices went up. For store managers, therefore, “industrial 
recovery looked like a fait accompli” after the passage of the NIRA.36
 Like these managers, union organizers greatly benefited from the NIRA. In 
1933 and 1934, a national strike wave took place, the first major strike wave 
since 1919. In the last six months of 1933, in fact, there were more strikes 
than there had been in any full year since 1921. More amazing than the sheer 
numbers was the workers’ militancy; many of the larger strikes often devel-
oped into violent battles. Throughout the country, from Minneapolis and 
Toledo to San Francisco and the textile factory towns in the southern states, 
workers engaged in bitter and often violent fights to demand the right to form 
unions.37
 Despite this national strike wave, most union organizers refused to orga-
nize department store workers, many of whom were women. The AFL, which 
contained by far the largest and most powerful unions in the country, had 
several unions with women members, but AFL leaders saw organizing women 
workers primarily as a way to support men’s wages. Labor historian Alice 
Kessler-Harris notes that “articles [in the AFL press] that began with pleas 
that women stay out of the work force concluded with equally impassioned 
pleas to organize those who were already in it.” The key to labor’s success, in 
the view of AFL organizers, was to maintain the family wage, a wage earned by 
the male breadwinner. The sole worker of any importance, in the view of AFL 
organizers, was therefore the head of household, who was invariably assumed 
to be a man. As a result, while the AFL did not generally oppose women join-
ing unions, many AFL organizers viewed working women as supplemental to 
working men, rather than workers in their own right.38
 For workers in Ohrbach’s and Klein’s the AFL’s gender analysis collapsed 
on a number of different grounds. Most of these workers were young women, 
and therefore defined out of the scope of the AFL’s primary interest. At the 
same time, due to the high unemployment levels of the early Depression, 
these workers were sometimes the sole wage earners for their families. Within 
the department stores, it was very often young women, not male patriarchs, 
who were the earners of the family’s only wage, however inadequate that wage 
was.39
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 To a great extent, Communist-led unions shared the AFL’s gender analysis 
in the early 1930s. In her masterful study Community of Suffering and Struggle, 
historian Elizabeth Faue argues that during the 1930s American Communists 
were united with other leftists and liberals around a gendered narrative in 
which this male working class struggled against the weak, fat, and—in Faue’s 
analysis—less masculine ruling class. There is plenty of evidence for Faue’s 
claims in the literature produced by the Communist-led Trade Union Unity 
League (TUUL), which strongly emphasized the masculinity of the targeted 
membership. Illustrations in TUUL pamphlets, for example, frequently fea-
tured large and muscular men as the sole representatives of the working 
class.40
 Communists had a number of different ways available to discuss women’s 
role in class struggle, many of them relatively conservative. Women served, for 
instance, as powerful symbols of workers’ poverty and hardship in Communist 
literature. One contributor to Working Woman identified women as the true 
victims of the Great Depression. “The wife of the unemployed gets the worst of 
it. She is the one to answer her children’s cry for bread. She has got to face the 
landlord. All the misery of the shortage, of keeping the family from starvation 
in time of unemployment falls heaviest on the housewife.” Other contributors 
to Working Woman discussed women in a different light, as helpmates to radi-
cal working men. During the Klein’s-Ohrbach’s strikes, for instance, articles in 
Working Woman, the CP women’s newspaper, addressed issues such as how 
a working woman could dress without spending much money, what sorts of 
foods would most efficiently feed her family, and the importance of women’s 
auxiliaries during strikes of male workers. Even this understanding of work-
ing-class women as home-based revolutionary helpmates could allow women 
a degree of agency that the family wage did not. As part of this concept of 
the revolutionary helpmate, Working Woman devoted a number of articles to 
more overtly political issues centered on the home. The paper’s editors printed 
a number of articles on the proper methods of birth control, for example. More 
importantly, the paper repeatedly addressed the food boycotts in New York 
City during the early 1930s, boycotts which were led by women.41
 All of these discussions of women’s role in class struggle were in some ways 
similar to the role of women in the AFL’s notion of the family wage. All, for 
instance, depicted the primary duties of working-class women as being within 
the home, dealing with issues of consumption and reproduction, despite the 
key role labor played in women’s lives in this era. As a result, many of these 
articles used women to reaffirm men’s role as the head of Communist house-
holds.
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 The editors of Working Woman moved beyond these relatively conserva-
tive gender divisions by adding extensive coverage of women’s own struggles 
within the workplace. Contributors constantly discussed women who were 
involved in the labor movement, and they portrayed women strikers not only 
as newsworthy and admirable, but also as militant fighters for workers’ rights, 
much like male strikers were. Working Woman also included extensive cover-
age on women strikers, coverage that was mixed in among the recipes and 
fashion tips and the use of miserable women as symbols for the oppressed. 
The Communists may have considered women helpmates and victims, but 
unlike the AFL, Communists also made a point to identify women as funda-
mental agents in the class struggle. The editors of and contributors to Working 
Woman, and presumably many of the Communists who read it, never success-
fully resolved this tension. They seem instead to have accepted the contradic-
tion, between victims and actors, symbols and agents, as a fundamental part 
of their understanding of women.42
 Like other Communists, the TUUL emphasized the importance of men’s 
activism while nonetheless recognizing the need to organize women workers. 
In the organization’s mission statement, TUUL leaders reminded their readers 
that “women workers play an increasingly important role in American indus-
try . . . [they] are subjected to the fierce speed-up of capitalist rationalization, 
and are super-exploited.” In the same mission statement, the TUUL attacked 
“the trade union leaders [who] have typically failed to make a fight for the 
women workers, barring them from the unions and discriminating against 
them in industry” and promised that the TUUL would fight for the rights of 
these women workers.43
 TUUL leaders therefore set up the Office Workers Union (OWU), the 
union which initially organized department store workers in New York City. 
This union was created primarily to organize office workers, another group of 
white-collar workers largely made up of women. Its commitment to women 
workers was further signified by the fact that the union included several 
women in leadership positions. Gertrude Lane, who was the highest-ranking 
union official, and Clarina Michelson, one of the two full-time OWU organiz-
ers, were both women, and both won a great deal of respect from the workers 
whom they organized. In part, this was because both Lane and Michelson 
were somewhat older than the other union members and leaders, many of 
whom were only in their teens. Ruth Pinkson, the nineteen-year-old National 
Organizer of the OWU at the time, later described Michelson as having a 
“motherly” relationship with the teenagers whom Michelson helped to orga-
nize. The seniority and competence of Michelson and Lane, at least according to 
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Pinkson, made both men and women in the OWU far more aware of women’s 
important role in labor struggles.44
 The OWU had a strong presence in Union Square in the early 1930s. OWU 
members often participated in the May Day parades and other protests which, 
as the OWU press described them, “choked Union Square and all the streets 
surrounding the Square.” In addition, during these parades, the OWU news-
paper claimed, “a continuous chant rose from the ranks, ‘White collar workers 
join our ranks! White collar workers join our ranks!’”45
 In 1934, due either to the OWU’s presence in Union Square or simply to 
the absence of any alternative, workers at Klein’s and Ohrbach’s went to the 
OWU for assistance in creating a union. The OWU agreed to provide support, 
and Clarina Michelson was assigned full-time as an organizer of department 
store workers. Michelson, an openly Communist member of an upper-class 
family from Massachusetts, and the wife of fellow TUUL organizer Andrew 
Overgaard, was in some ways a surprising choice to lead a union of depart-
ment store workers. Unlike the women working and shopping in Klein’s and 
Ohrbach’s, Michelson was not from an immigrant community, and—except 
for her work as a union organizer—she had apparently never held a job. 
Despite this very different background from the workers she organized, 
Michelson had some important strengths. She was a highly skilled and expe-
rienced organizer by 1934, having been involved in radical politics ever since 
the campaign to free Sacco and Vanzetti. She also had significant experience 
organizing unions, having had numerous successes in TUUL campaigns in 
the southern coal-mining industry. Finally, she had some important connec-
tions for the union, among them her participation as the Recording Secretary 
of the League of Struggle for Negro Rights (LSNR), a Communist group that 
helped lead the “Don’t Buy Where You Can’t Work” campaign, a movement 
to get African American workers jobs in stores where they made purchases. 
Over the next five years, during which she continued to lead New York City’s 
department store unions, Michelson would prove herself a major asset for the 
unions.46
 These workers’ decision to join a union, especially one under Communist 
leadership, greatly upset their employers. Despite their avowed support for 
the NIRA, managers at both stores took a strong anti-union stance, and 
managers at Klein’s went so far as to fire union workers in the winter of 1934, 
openly defying the NIRA. In an interview with Newsweek in December 1934, 
Samuel Klein professed his bewilderment that anyone would have the right 
to tell him whom to fire and whom not to fire: “‘My store’s business always 
falls off at Christmas time . . . About Dec. 1 each year I have to lay off a few 
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employees. This year we let only 87 go, against 300 last year and 250 in 1932. 
Then the other day I got a “summons” from the NRA’” (National Recovery 
Administration, the agency which was responsible for seeing that the NIRA 
codes were followed).47
 The “dimple-cheeked proprietor,” as he is referred to in this article, failed to 
mention that nearly all of the 87 employees he laid off in 1934 were members 
of the newly formed Klein’s branch of the Office Workers Union. He also failed 
to mention that during that same month, December 1934, workers under 
OWU leadership had already gone on strike against Ohrbach’s, just a few 
doors away from Klein’s. Ohrbach’s workers, also encouraged by the NIRA’s 
official support for the rights of labor, were demanding a pay raise, a forty-
hour work week, and an end to discrimination for union activity. It did not 
take any more encouragement than the firings to get Klein’s workers to join 
Ohrbach’s workers on the picket line.48
 The strike was a very small one—only 200 of the 2600 workers employed 
at the two stores joined picket lines in 1934–35. With workers struggling to 
support families on their already meager wages, it was a difficult decision to 
join the picket line, and to make matters even more discouraging, Ohrbach’s 
managers obtained an anti-picketing injunction from the state supreme court, 
which meant that being on the picket line was breaking the law. But despite 
all the obstacles they faced, the tiny number of strikers were determined to lay 
claim to the stores and to Union Square, to create a broad coalition of support-
ers, and to effectively demonstrate that retail workers could force managers to 
back down.49
Monkey Business
When Leane Zugsmith described a fictionalized version of the Klein’s-
Ohrbach’s strikes in her 1936 novel A Time to Remember, she chose to have 
the initial call for a strike take place in a fictionalized setting. Aline, a young 
woman worker who had never been part of a union before, let alone a strike, 
is about to go onstage during a store-sponsored play performed by store 
employees. Nervous at performing and even more worried that she and her 
fellow workers had voted the night before to go on strike, Aline stops just 
before going onstage, returns to an empty dressing room, retrieves a handful or 
two of strike leaflets, and then returns to stage “half-smiling, her face feverish 
beneath a mask of grease paint . . . the leaflets pressed against her breast . . . 
like a shield.” Aline then proceeds to toss the leaflets out over the audience and 
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make a speech about the strike which will begin the next day. This section of 
A Time to Remember appears to be entirely fictional; no evidence exists that 
plays were even performed at either of these two stores.50
 Zugsmith’s hijacked theater works well as a metaphor to describe the strik-
ers’ use of a set of tactics that union leaders nicknamed “monkey business.” 
Monkey business was an attempt to wrest control of the department store and 
its surroundings from the store managers. In many ways store employees con-
tinued performing as they had while working within the stores; they certainly 
continued to focus on communication with customers, a factor which had 
been so important to the stores’ daily functioning. Only, as with Aline stand-
ing on the employer’s stage while distributing strike leaflets, during monkey 
business actions the Klein’s-Ohrbach’s strikers no longer worked to communi-
cate with customers for their employer’s ends. During the strike, they instead 
worked to communicate with customers for their own ends, disrupting mana-
gerial control over both stores and square alike in the process.51
 If they were to disrupt managers’ control over the stores and the square, 
workers had to find ways to get support from people not directly involved 
in the strike. By far the most important group of allies the strikers recruited 
were the people they called upon as “white-collar workers.” Again and again 
in the strike literature, one sees reference to the label of white-collar work and 
white-collar workers. Ruth Pinkson remembered these strikes as the “first big 
white-collar strikes in New York City,” and suggested that the strikes were seen 
by many white-collar workers as a test case. In her novel Zugsmith referred to 
Aline’s discovery “that a victory for them would be a victory for workers in all 
department stores, for all white-collar workers, for the labor movement as a 
whole.” And Arnold Honig, a Klein’s striker, suggested that the strikes proved 
that even white-collar workers could be “good, militant fighters who can dose 
a backward boss with a good assortment of hell-fire.”52
 The category of “white-collar workers,” which these workers used so suc-
cessfully to recruit allies, gave the strikers a broad base of support. Particularly 
during the 1930s, people who might have thought of themselves as members 
of the middle class instead defined themselves as white-collar workers. Edward 
Dahlberg, a writer who joined the Klein’s-Ohrbach’s picket line, suggested that 
this new consciousness was a direct result of the Depression:
The college diploma was the exchange currency in the student’s mind  
. . . for a ritzy law office and a motor car . . . Marriage for the department 
store girl, being another economic diploma, was thought of in terms of 
leisure and West End Avenue, and the Holy Grail for the writer was the 
Foundations, –
boulevards of Paris . . . but with vast unemployment, evictions, empty 
stomachs, [and] the wholesale slashing of wages these sleepy, moving pic-
ture wishes lost for the wisher[s] whatever little reality they once had.
The Depression, in Dahlberg’s eyes, had destroyed the privileges which allowed 
certain workers to think of themselves as anything besides workers. As a result, 
many who had once thought of themselves as middle class found it “impos-
sible and suicidal . . . to stand aloof,” and instead decided to organize, to begin 
to think of themselves as part of the working class. By using the term “white 
collar worker” to describe themselves, department store workers implicitly 
called upon these workers to support them. In response, office workers, actors, 
chemists, doctors, and writers all joined the fight in support of the workers at 
Klein’s and Ohrbach’s. For a moment, at least, these people rejected the idea of 
the middle class, instead throwing in their lot with the strikers.53
 These white-collar workers who emerged as strike supporters were critical 
to the tiny strikes on Union Square. Not only did they swell the numbers of 
strikers; they also played active roles in creating tactics, including monkey 
business. The monkey business committee, described in the strike records as 
a “very small, very secret committee to work out stunts,” was not made up of 
only strikers. Other OWU members and organizers from outside the depart-
ment store industry were also committee members, Clarina Michelson and 
Ruth Pinkson (at the time an office worker as well as an OWU organizer) 
among them.54
 In addition, due to the OWU’s close association with the Federation of 
Architects, Engineers, Chemists, and Technicians (FAECT), another TUUL 
affiliate, workers had access to technical knowledge and tools that rivaled store 
managers’ own technical advisers. The strikers’ technical abilities, however, 
were put to very different ends. At another point, for example, a chemist who 
was a member of the FAECT provided the employees with a box of white 
mice. The employees took the box into Klein’s and let the mice run free, thus 
“frightening women shoppers who entered the store in ignorance of the fact 
that a strike is in progress there,” as the Daily Worker put it. Other monkey 
business actions required more technical abilities. At one point, a strike sup-
porter poured a substance into the elevator motor in the Ohrbach’s store which 
caused an elevator to get stuck between floors. On these occasions, as Pinkson 
recalled, “people started to get afraid to go into the store, because they didn’t 
know what [the screaming] was all about.”55
 While many monkey business actions were derived from technical abili-
ties, very simple actions could also be extremely effective. Clarina Michelson 
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recalled one incident when strikers at Ohrbach’s gave children of shoppers 
entering the store balloons reading “Don’t Buy At Ohrbach’s!” “When the chil-
dren would go into the store, the managers would have to run up and take the 
balloons away,” Michelson remembered. The managers frequently caused the 
children to get upset, leading to loud and often disruptive arguments between 
store managers and the children’s parents.56
 Actions like these, which created disruption inside the store, were very 
powerful. First, of course, they slowed down purchases, and made customers 
uneasy about shopping in the stores. In addition, these actions also made 
the managers’ job of controlling customers more difficult. As already 
suggested, this control was always somewhat tenuous. By adding mice, 
elevator malfunctions, and other disturbances, the workers were able to lessen 
this control still further, and thereby give managers an additional reason to 
settle the strike.
 Strikers were also able to take advantage of the struggles outside the store, 
the struggles in Union Square. Since signs visible from Union Square were a 
central part of managers’ efforts to attract customers, the strikers made Union 
Square an essential part of the strike, beginning with attacks on the exteriors of 
the store buildings, which were important tools for store owners to communi-
cate with the public. Ruth Pinkson remembered one such incident, which, like 
many of the actions within the stores, required the aid of FAECT members to 
make it work:
We cut out a sign from cardboard, saying “STRIKE—DON’T ENTER!” 
. . . We had a base, some kind of metal base, and we poured in a chemi-
cal and cut out the words, but we had to put that up against the window. 
. . . We had to work quickly . . . so one of the young men in the union 
and myself were standing by the window, and we were hugging and 
kissing, and I pressed it against the window. A cop walked by, but . . . he 
just saw a young couple kissing, so he didn’t bother [us]. . . . 
 It didn’t cut through immediately. But the next morning . . . it was 
etched in, the chemical had etched [the slogan] into the window. [Store 
managers] were panicked. . . . A couple of us had gotten there early, to 
see what effect it would have, and [managers] didn’t know what to do, 
so they got cardboard [and covered the sign], but it kept people out. 
People coming out of the subway were confronted with the sign.
If managers at Klein’s and Ohrbach’s could use signs to make the exterior of 
the building serve their purposes, so could the strikers. With the help of their 
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white-collar allies, the strikers here transformed a store building itself into a 
strike weapon.57
 Strikers also combated managers’ billboards by literally going into the 
square. They did so first by staging weekly rallies. Every Saturday—the 
busiest shopping day at the stores—became an occasion for a mass strike 
rally in Union Square, and each rally had a particular theme. The strikers 
held Catholic Day, Jewish Day, Writers’ Day, Theatrical Day, and a number of 
other different theme protests, when a different community was supposed to 
come to the square in support of the strikers. Radical novelists like James T. 
Farrell, the author of the Studs Lonigan trilogy, and Nathanael West, author of 
Day of the Locust and Miss Lonelyhearts, joined Leane Zugsmith and Edward 
Dahlberg on the picket line for Writer’s Day, and all were arrested for breaking 
the anti-picketing injunction.58
 The strikers also made use of the importance of Union Square to other 
protests. Participants in unemployment demonstrations, for instance, mixed 
freely with the strikers, often joining the picket line after their own demonstra-
tions. As a result, Pinkson claimed that at least five young women on the picket 
line met their future husbands during the strike, because so many men came 
over to offer their support to the strikers. Picketers responded to this support 
by taking part in other left-wing activities centered on Union Square, at one 
point carrying signs in celebration of the eleventh anniversary of the Daily 
Worker.59
 Store managers deployed police as a response to these sorts of rallies. Police 
frequently arrested strikers and their supporters, often forcefully. However, 
unlike in most strikes, here police violence had strong negative effects on 
employers’ businesses. Zugsmith, who had been on the picket line on at least 
one day when police had made arrests, described the fighting which took place 
on the picket line: “The policemen had driven their horses into the swarm 
of pickets and passers-by on the sidewalk. Fanny’s leg had been broken. But 
. . . patrons, sickened by the sight of blood, thrown into panic by the plung-
ing horses and swinging nightsticks, had not made their purchases . . . that 
day.” Police violence might terrify the strikers; it might make the strike into 
a bloody and very one-sided battle; but it also scared away customers. This 
violence was therefore a two-edged sword in the battle for control over Union 
Square and the potential customers within the square.60
 Perhaps the most pointed attempt on the strikers’ part to control Union 
Square was their use of the statues. At the time there were two major stat-
ues in Union Square, one of Lafayette and one of Washington. The statue of 
Washington stood near the stores, on horseback, with its arm outstretched. 
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Early one morning the strikers took one of their strike posters, reading “Don’t 
Buy At Ohrbach’s,” and placed it on the Washington statue’s outstretched 
arm. By doing so, the strikers made Washington, the symbol of freedom and 
of Americanism, a representative for the strike, at least until the sign was 
removed later that day.61
 For the five months of the strike, from December 1934 through April 1935, 
the Klein’s-Ohrbach’s strikers became an intrinsic part of daily life in Union 
Square. The mass protests of the strike became so much a part of Union 
Square’s atmosphere that at least one painter trying to capture the essence 
of life in Union Square included in the background picketers in front of the 
stores.62
 The strikes also had effects far beyond Union Square and the stores; indeed, 
they were felt throughout New York City. For one thing, the numerous pro-
tests in Union Square—and the repeated and brutal reaction by police to the 
protests—resulted in the regular disruption of traffic throughout the area. The 
strikes also led to the temporary cancellation of the off-Broadway play, the 
Shores of Cattaro. Actors were also included in the strikers’ call for support 
from white-collar workers, and the cast of The Shores of Cattaro was strongly 
supportive of the strikers. One day, the entire cast came down to the picket 
line, only to be immediately arrested for breaking the anti-picketing injunc-
tion. According to one source, when the announcement was made at the the-
ater that night that the play was canceled because the entire cast was in jail for 
breaking the injunction, the audience burst into applause.63
 Allies played a critical role in the strikers’ campaign to make the strike a 
city-wide issue. At one meeting held at a high school near the stores, both 
playwright Lillian Hellman and strip-dancer Gypsy Rose Lee addressed the 
striking workers. The strikers rather optimistically believed that the more 
celebrities they could attract, the more press coverage they would receive. As it 
turned out, the press—hardly anxious to offend an advertising bloc as impor-
tant as the retail industry—all but ignored these two strikes, and frequently 
belittled the strikers when it did cover their actions.64
 The strikers also determined to win press coverage, disrupt managerial con-
trol, and make the strike a city-wide event by challenging Ohrbach and Klein 
directly when the store owners were away from the stores and the square. At 
one point, for example, “Mr. Ohrbach, escorting a young lady into the Astor 
Hotel at about 11:30 at night, was met by a parade of strikers and sympathiz-
ers over 200 strong that was marching down Broadway.” Zugsmith also reports 
in her fictionalized account that picketers went to one of the retailers’ homes, 
though there is no evidence to support this claim.65
Foundations, –
 The most powerful action taken during the strike, one of the few that did 
win extensive press coverage, was another attack against Nathan Ohrbach’s 
non-business life, particularly against his charity activities. At the time of the 
strike, Ohrbach, who had given a great deal of money to Brooklyn Hospital, 
was on the hospital’s board of trustees. As a trustee, he was required to attend 
certain charity events, including a large banquet in the Grand Ballroom of the 
Waldorf-Astoria Hotel, to which New York City Mayor Fiorello LaGuardia 
was also invited. Some of the senior doctors for whom the dinner was being 
thrown considered themselves white-collar workers and, as such, strongly 
sympathized with the strikers. These doctors offered to get tickets to the event 
for a number of strikers. The strikers, knowing both that the mayor would 
be there and that the entire event would be broadcast on live radio, gladly 
accepted the offer.66
 In the strikers’ decision to confront Ohrbach at the Waldorf-Astoria that 
night, we therefore have Zugsmith’s theatrical metaphor played out for high 
stakes. Ohrbach had a forum with a large audience of radio listeners, and had 
helped to create a drama to demonstrate, among other things, his role as a 
great philanthropist in supporting the hospital. And strikers and their sup-
porters were ready to steal the forum, to instead send their own message, that 
Ohrbach was an exploiter of workers.
 On the night of the banquet, dressed in their finest evening clothes, strik-
ers surreptitiously entered the Waldorf-Astoria ballroom. And, as LaGuardia 
began to speak of the important work done by Ohrbach and by the doctors 
themselves, one of the strikers spoke up from the balcony. “I want to introduce 
myself. I am an Ohrbach striker,” she said.67 By the time hotel security guards 
realized that she was chained to the balcony, another woman striker spoke up, 
also from the balcony: “Nathan Ohrbach may give thousands to charity, but 
he doesn’t pay his workers a living wage.” Security guards rushed over, only to 
find out that she, too, had chained herself to the balcony.68 The security guards 
immediately sent for hacksaws. As the audience struggled to make sense of the 
disruption, another striker, also in the balcony, took handfuls of flyers about 
the strike and tossed them out over the audience, to the amazement of all 
concerned. According to the Times, LaGuardia continued to speak, although 
without much success in being heard, since both workers also continued 
speaking.69
 In the Waldorf that night, the strikers made their message heard. They also 
successfully disrupted Ohrbach’s drama on live radio. The action was a stun-
ning success, in some ways an even greater success than workers had hoped. 
At the time, workers thought that the two strikers inside the hall would receive 
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up to six months in jail for their actions; it was not until later that night that 
the rather bewildered hotel managers, apparently not knowing exactly what 
else to do with them, freed both strikers after giving them a warning never to 
return to the Waldorf-Astoria again. In a slightly ironic twist, the lawyer who 
had arranged for the anti-picketing injunction at Ohrbach’s gave the two work-
ers cab fare to get home, perhaps acting out of paternalistic motives.70
 The end result of the actions at the Waldorf-Astoria was an outpouring of 
press coverage the next day. Not all or even most of the coverage was favorable; 
the New York Times, for example, described the workers as “hecklers” who had 
maliciously disrupted a charitable event. Perhaps not surprisingly, only the 
Daily Worker portrayed the strikers in a positive light, as “comely pickets” who 
had made their exploitation known to the entire city through radio.71
 Despite its tone, the press coverage which resulted from this event turned 
the tide of the strike. Klein and Ohrbach, now acutely aware that their busi-
ness and personal lives would be disrupted until they agreed to settle, finally 
backed down. Managers at both stores agreed to hire back the strikers in late 
February and early March 1935, much to the strikers’ delight. As Zugsmith 
described strike headquarters on the day of the announcement, in noticeably 
gendered terms:
The floor quakes under their stamping feet. The ear drums recoil at the 
roar of rejoicing. Peck Hirschberg rushes outside to tell the pickets and 
call them off. Duke prances like a bear on his hind legs, forcing May 
Lundstrom to curvet with him. Mrs. Bauer’s stumpy frame is shaken by 
shuddering sobs and her little girl, hanging onto her skirt, looks up with 
a puckered face, ready to cry with her mother. With a kind of ferocity, 
Manny Lorch and Muriel Cline hug each other, their eyes glazed with 
joy.72
 As some were quick to point out when Zugsmith’s novel appeared in print, 
the workers’ victory was far more limited than Zugsmith acknowledged in 
A Time to Remember. At Klein’s, workers got back pay and reinstatement; at 
Ohrbach’s, strikers did not receive the raise they had demanded, although they 
did receive a verbal contract guaranteeing a decrease in hours. Neither Klein 
nor Ohrbach agreed to recognize the Office Workers Union as the workers’ 
bargaining agent.73
 Store managers proved unwilling to live up to even those demands to 
which they had agreed. As early as April 1935, at a leaflet distribution 
in Klein’s, union organizers encountered what they called “the old pre-
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strike difficulties.” As organizers attempted to distribute leaflets outside 
the employees’ exit, store executives positioned themselves in front of the 
exit, and, as the OWU paper described it, “suggestively ‘eyed’ the outgoing 
workers” to see if any of them accepted flyers. Policemen were also present, 
ostensibly to make sure that no littering took place. In addition, managers 
at both stores began steadily laying off workers who had participated in the 
strike. The workers at Klein’s, without a strike fund, having survived for 
five months with no income during some of the worst years of the Great 
Depression, decided not to return to the picket line, instead choosing to 
look for work elsewhere. Most workers at Ohrbach’s followed their example, 
except for about twenty workers, who returned to the picket line again in 
1936. As discussed in the next chapter, they eventually achieved a controver-
sial and somewhat unsatisfactory settlement.74
 If in many respects the Klein’s-Ohrbach’s strikes were defeats for workers 
at both stores, the strikes were nonetheless important victories for the union. 
During these strikes, the strikers had forced two major retailers to submit to 
negotiations, even if managers in the end got the best of the negotiations. As 
a result of this victory, RCIPA organizers were finally forced to acknowledge 
that department store workers could be organized, and in 1935, just after the 
strikes, RCIPA and OWU organizers met for the first time. That year the OWU 
joined forces with the leaders of the RCIPA. By the end of 1935 the victories at 
Ohrbach’s and Klein’s, fleeting though they were for many strike participants, 
had made it possible for New York City’s department store union, consisting 
primarily of workers at Klein’s and Ohrbach’s, with only a handful of members 
in other stores around the city, to become Local 1250 of the RCIPA.75
 In merging with the RCIPA, the OWU leaders took a serious risk. The East 
Coast branch of the RCIPA was under the leadership of a man named Roy 
Denise, who had a long-standing practice of giving RCIPA charters to com-
pany unions. Perhaps not coincidentally, Denise was paid on a commission 
basis, receiving a bonus for every new member of the union as well as every 
charter.76 With corrupt practices like these commonplace in the RCIPA, some 
OWU organizers were worried about the merger from the very beginning. 
“They were crooks. And we knew that they were,” one OWU organizer said 
some years later. Still, at least for the moment, the OWU leaders agreed to the 
alliance. Michelson later stated that, at the very least, she believed that being 
affiliated with the AFL would bring them some sort of legitimacy within the 
labor movement and the city at large, and perhaps make department store 
managers more willing to sign contracts. In this belief, Michelson was gravely 
mistaken.77
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Conclusion
The Klein’s-Ohrbach’s strikes demonstrate the role Communists played in 
American labor history. The Communist party never contained more than 
a tiny minority of the working-class people who presumably were its target 
membership. Yet Communist union organizers, who embraced a more com-
plex notion of women’s role in the labor movement than did the AFL, had a 
critical role to play during the Great Depression. Without them, the Klein’s-
Ohrbach’s strikes would never have taken place, and the union never would 
have won its first victories, however negligible those victories were for the 
workers themselves. It is quite possible that the 1930s labor movement would 
not have so centrally included workers in the retail industry without the radi-
cal influence of the Communists in 1934–35.
 This does not mean that Communists controlled these strikes, in the sense 
that some historians of communism argue that Communist party policy was 
the controlling factor in the unions in which Communists participated. What 
Communists did, as seen quite vividly during the strikes, was to provide tools 
for workers to struggle against managers. Communists no doubt played a role 
in giving the workers the ability to etch signs into the side of the store build-
ings, and getting workers tickets to the banquet at the Waldorf-Astoria Hotel. 
But the Communist party did not force workers to etch a sign into the store 
window, or control what workers said once they entered the banquet hall.
 On the contrary, far from confirming the top-down analysis of Communists’ 
role in the labor movement, these strikes demonstrate the necessity to examine 
both American radicalism and American labor in their local contexts. Neither 
the strikes nor the Communists who led them can be separated from the daily 
struggles taking place in Union Square, or in the stores. To attempt to perform 
this separation, to write about communism or the labor movement as though 
local developments did not play a critical role in the creation of these move-
ments, is in the end an impossible task.
 Besides complicating historians’ understanding of communism, the strik-
ers had also demonstrated something else—something more important 
for their immediate future. Not only could strikes, like those at Klein’s and 
Ohrbach’s, take advantage of larger movements; they could also become part 
of larger movements. On their own, the Klein’s-Ohrbach’s strikes were minus-
cule—two hundred workers are easily ignored amidst the far larger strikes of 
1934. But the Klein’s-Ohrbach’s strikes did not exist in isolation. Instead, they 
were part of a larger campaign, led by Communists and their supporters, to 
reimagine class and reclaim public space. The Klein’s-Ohrbach’s strike became, 
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for those few weeks in 1934 and 1935, an occasion for yet another challenge to 
Union Square, and an occasion for creating a vision of the working class that 
included white-collar workers, ranging from doctors and actors to the low-
paid clerks at Klein’s and Ohrbach’s. As such, it was an important victory for 
the Communists in more ways than one.
 At the same time as the Klein’s-Ohrbach’s strikes represented an impor-
tant victory for the Communist leaders of New York City’s department store 
unions, they also exposed a number of weaknesses that union organizers 
attempted to correct during the next few years. For all the creativity that the 
strikers had shown, only a small minority of the workers in the two stores had 
honored the picket lines. Additionally, managers, while they had finally agreed 
to negotiate, had nonetheless refused to recognize the union. In the end, as 
we have seen, the strikes were a defeat for the workers in the two stores, and 
resulted in mass firings in the strikes’ aftermath. Organizers believed their 
weaknesses stemmed from a lack of legitimacy, which, they felt, allowed store 
managers, workers, and the press to dismiss the union as nothing more than 
a radical fringe group. Union leaders attempted to correct this weakness over 
the next few years, during their disastrous alliance with the RCIPA.
Chapter 2
Legitimacy, –
Introduction
Throughout their alliance with the more conservative leaders of the American 
Federation of Labor’s RCIPA, the Communists leading the department store 
unions sought legitimacy. Now officially affiliated with the AFL, they had 
every reason to believe that affiliation with this legitimate and less radical 
organization would convince managers to sign union contracts, and thereby 
avoid the debacle in the aftermath of the Klein’s-Ohrbach’s strikes. Instead, 
the alliance with the RCIPA was marked by one crisis after another. Scandal, 
defeat, and internal conflict racked the department store unions, now RCIPA 
Local 1250, from 1935 to 1937. While Clarina Michelson and other leaders of 
Local 1250 maintained their close relationship with workers and continued 
to encourage workers to take leadership roles in the union, they found them-
selves increasingly at odds with the more authoritarian and conservative lead-
ers of the RCIPA, who determinedly and sometimes destructively meddled 
in the local union’s affairs. Throughout these years, national leaders and their 
allies unilaterally called off strikes and launched public campaigns attacking 
Michelson and Local 1250 alike.
 Although union leaders’ attempts to gain legitimacy in these years ended 
in disaster, workers proved themselves far more able to gain a prominent role 
in the burgeoning labor movement. In March 1937, with the full support of 
the Communist union leaders, workers began massive sit-down strikes at 
five-and-dime stores throughout New York City. In these successful sit-downs, 
workers captured national media attention. By the end of 1937, under pressure 
from Local 1250 and other RCIPA dissidents, the CIO set up the United Retail 
Employees of America, a union designed specifically to organize retail workers 
like those who had launched the five-and-dime sit-downs of 1937.
 Developments in the department store unions exemplified much larger 
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changes going on in American radicalism in these years. Beginning in 1935, 
communism became more and more a part of American cultural and social 
life. That year was the beginning of the United Front, when Communists 
began to form alliances with socialists and eventually with liberals as well. This 
development would play an important role as Communists in the department 
store unions searched for allies of their own. Despite the importance of shift-
ing Communist party policies in the unions’ history, however, workers’ actions 
cannot and should not be reduced to Communist politics. Workers, like union 
leaders, sought a way to make their union more permanent and more power-
ful. As during the Klein’s-Ohrbach’s strikes, communism was to be a powerful 
tool in pursuit of this goal.
Disasters at May’s and Ohrbach’s, –
The period immediately following the Klein’s-Ohrbach’s strikes did not look 
promising for the union that had once been part of the OWU. Union organiz-
ers’ attempts to find legitimacy within the AFL resulted in two brief strikes 
that brought defeat and scandal to the union. In the strikes at May’s and 
Ohrbach’s, as in most of what union organizers attempted in 1935–36, they 
found the alliance with the national RCIPA leaders to be a hindrance. By early 
1937, the split between the Communist leaders of Local 1250 and the national 
RCIPA leaders had become very public, eventually leading Local 1250 to bolt 
from the RCIPA with other dissident RCIPA locals.
 Like Union Square, Fulton Street in downtown Brooklyn was a busy work-
ing-class shopping district as well as the site of political protests. However, the 
protests in downtown Brooklyn never rivaled the size or importance of those 
that took place in Union Square. Protesters did occasionally emerge, particu-
larly after the city’s Emergency Relief Bureau opened a headquarters at Fulton 
Street. Labor disputes also occasionally disrupted life on Fulton Street: when 
workers at Dean’s cafeteria announced that they were paid starvation wages, 
students from nearby Brooklyn College immediately set up a picket line in 
front of the cafeteria. But protest was always relatively rare on Fulton Street.1
 Consumption was far more central to Fulton Street life than were strikes 
and protests. Fulton Street was a center for consumption, particularly (in the 
nine blocks between Flatbush Avenue and Court Street, where the May’s store 
was located) working-class consumption. “An endless procession of shoppers,” 
the WPA Guide to New York City reported, patronized large downscale depart-
ment stores like A&S, Namm’s, and Loeser’s. Smaller stores selling clothes, eye-
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glasses, accessories, and numerous other goods also offered customers chances 
for consumption. Towards the Flatbush Avenue end of the area, “an amusement 
center,” with a half-dozen movie theaters, burlesque houses, “legitimate” the-
aters, cafeterias, and an automat, allowed working-class people spaces to relax 
and eat. As a shopping district, Fulton Street presented one major drawback. 
Above all the bustling stores stood the elevated train, blocking out sunlight 
and creating what one observer described as a “constant din.” Throughout 
the 1930s the elevated train stood above the stores, making shopping in these 
places a dark and noisy experience, and making the Fulton Street shopping 
district less prestigious than many shopping districts in Manhattan.2
 Nestled beneath the elevated train and among the larger downscale stores 
stood the May’s store. In the 1920s May’s had been a relatively upscale store, 
built to serve the wealthy customers living in nearby Brooklyn Heights. But 
when the stock market crashed in 1929, May’s manager Joseph Weinstein was 
among the first retailers to respond, instituting a new store policy: “small prof-
its and large volume.” The store began selling $1 dresses and coats, and tens 
of thousands of customers, most of them from immigrant neighborhoods, 
began flooding the store during sales. No longer would May’s offer deliveries 
or charge accounts; now it would be strictly self-service, much like the stores 
on Union Square.3
 There were many similarities between May’s and the Union Square stores. 
Weinstein, for instance, made his profits by keeping overhead and labor costs 
down, and shoplifting was a constant—and expensive—problem at May’s. 
There were also some important differences. Weinstein engaged in more 
physical intimidation than did the managers at the Union Square stores. By 
the time of the strike, workers had given Weinstein the nickname “King Kong” 
for his habit of stomping around the store and yelling at workers who were not 
performing to his satisfaction. Workers at May’s were also worse off economi-
cally. Since most workers at the store were only part-time employees, they took 
home even less money than workers at Klein’s and Ohrbach’s, and their situa-
tion was even more precarious than that of the workers in Union Square.4
 Working conditions in May’s were also far worse than conditions in Klein’s 
and Ohrbach’s. Pearl Edison and Evelyn Cohen, who worked at May’s and 
made affidavits concerning their work within the store, reported that there 
were only two toilets for all the store employees, which “were kept in a filthy 
condition.” The bathrooms were also located in the store’s basement, which 
was “infested with rats. . . . Occasionally, a rat will die, and the stench from its 
rotting body will be present in this unventilated [basement] for weeks.” Edison 
and Cohen also complained of the lack of steam heat and the failure of May’s 
Legitimacy, –
managers to provide chairs for the workers. They also complained that the 
workers were used as human elevators, to lug dresses and other merchandise 
from the storage facilities in the basement up to the top floor, and remembered 
that when they “protested at the size of the load[s], the favorite crack [of man-
agers] has been that ‘We will shoot you and get another horse.’”5
 The strike at May’s grew out of the strikes at Ohrbach’s and Klein’s. It 
began, in October 1935, when a May’s worker named Elsie Monokian began 
trying to organize a union in May’s “after a friend of hers, who had worked 
in Ohrbach’s Department Store in Manhattan [and had presumably been 
involved in the union’s struggles there], had interested her in trade unionism.” 
After Weinstein found her handing out union literature on multiple occasions, 
he called Monokian into his office and offered her a bribe to get the names 
of any workers meeting with the union. Monokian refused, and in response 
Weinstein promptly fired both Monokian and her best friend in the store, who 
presumably also helped to organize the union. Both workers left the store and 
formed a picket line outside. Their two-person picket line grew into a strike of 
between fifty and one hundred of the approximately 150 workers employed at 
May’s.6
 As with the Union Square strikes, workers’ primary tactic throughout the 
strike was to prevent customers from crossing the picket line to shop at May’s. 
Their tactics were therefore strongly reminiscent of those used during the 
Klein’s-Ohrbach’s strikes. For one thing, the strikers attempted to claim the 
same revolutionary heritage as they had claimed by dressing up the George 
Washington statue in Union Square. On Washington’s Birthday workers 
gathered with signs announcing that “Exploitation Without Representation 
Is Tyranny,” and that “The May’s Strikers in ’36 Have the Spirit of ’76.” And 
on Lincoln’s Birthday one of the male strikers came dressed up as Abraham 
Lincoln, complete with beard and hat. The police immediately arrested the 
man dressed as Lincoln for disturbing the peace, to the great amusement of 
the strikers.7
 Workers also drew other tactics from the monkey business of the earlier 
strikes, laying claim to Fulton Street as they had once laid claim to Union 
Square. On November 16, for example, workers reenacted part of the inva-
sion of the Waldorf-Astoria Ballroom, by chaining themselves to the elevated 
train pillar in front of the store. “Within a short time,” a police department 
memorandum claims, “Fulton Street became a seething mass of humanity,” as 
crowds gathered to hear what the chained strikers had to say. At other times 
the elevated train platform became a speakers’ podium for rallies, as it did at 
one point for members of the left-wing Artists’ League, where they gathered 
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“a vast crowd, which was more or less disorderly, interfering with the business 
of the merchants on either side for five or six doors down the street.” Fulton 
Street, crowded and somewhat chaotic under the best of circumstances, was 
now also the site of a contest over public space, much as Union Square had 
been the year before.8
 The major difference between the Klein’s-Ohrbach’s strikes and the strike 
at May’s was political. Now within the AFL rather than the OWU, strikers 
were less openly radical in their tactics than they had been during the Klein’s-
Ohrbach’s strikes. Certainly no workers during the May’s strike carried ban-
ners honoring the Daily Worker, for example; and there is no record of any 
unemployed workers joining the picket lines in front of May’s.
 Possibly as a result of these less openly radical stances, the workers were 
able to attract far more prestigious allies, including some quite wealthy women 
who had become involved with the League of Women Shoppers (LWS). 
Clarina Michelson co-founded the LWS in June 1935, along with the wife of 
Arthur Garfield Hays, a leader of the American Civil Liberties Union at the 
time. After the Klein’s-Ohrbach’s strikes demonstrated to union organizers 
that they would need the support of customers to be successful during strikes 
at retail stores, Michelson set out to form a lasting organization which would 
provide customer support for striking workers, both in the retail industry 
and elsewhere. The LWS was the result, and it quickly attracted numerous 
prestigious women from around the country. LWS stationery listed a number 
of very well-known women as supporters, including Suzanne LaFollette, Stella 
Adler, Mary R. Beard, Dorothy Day, Mrs. Morris Ernst, Mrs. Ira Gershwin, 
Freda Kirchway, Fola LaFollette, Lucy Sprague Mitchell, Mrs. Elmer Rice, Mrs. 
Jacob Riis, Mrs. George Soule, Mrs. Leo Sulzberger, Mary Van Kleeck, and 
Leane Zugsmith, who played an active role in the May’s strike while finishing 
A Time to Remember.9
 There were important differences between elite women’s involvement in 
the Klein’s-Ohrbach’s strikes and the LWS’s support for the May’s strike, in 
terms of the ways in which strikers and union leaders called upon wealthy 
allies for support. During the Klein’s-Ohrbach’s strikes, Michelson and others 
had called upon these people as white-collar workers. LWS members, how-
ever, supported the strike out of moral obligation, not out of class solidarity 
as white-collar workers. In one LWS leaflet, in fact, the organization’s leaders 
boasted of this very lack of class affiliation, claiming that “we are outsiders and 
not part of either the labor groups or the employing groups.”10
 Michelson’s actions in setting up the LWS, antithetical as it was to the con-
cept of class struggle that was a guiding principle during the Klein’s-Ohrbach’s 
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strikes, was fairly common for a Communist union organizer in 1936. In the 
era of the United Front, the Communist party actively encouraged cross-
class coalitions like the LWS. In fact, Communist party officials criticized 
Michelson’s work because she was not willing to participate in additional coali-
tions of this nature. This criticism sometimes bordered on outright attacks, as 
did a letter Communist party functionary Gussie Reed wrote to Michelson:
It should not be necessary for us to point out how extremely impor-
tant it is to begin doing work in the Women’s Trade Union League . . . 
Unless you take an active interest in this important work we will not be 
able to work in an organization which gives us access to thousands of 
organized and unorganized women. The success or failure of this work 
depends upon you. I am sure you do not want to bear the responsibility 
of any possible failure.11
Reed’s letter is, of course, a remarkable one for what it tells historians about 
the Communist party’s problematic role in the activities of individual 
Communists. Michelson, over the course of a few short months, had led a 
remarkable strike and set up a new organization to support workers that did 
not rely on the sometimes tenuous support the Women’s Trade Union League 
showed for women workers. Yet in this letter Reed ignores these achievements, 
instead issuing the rather cold warning that Michelson, should she continue 
in her present course of action, would “bear the responsibility of any possible 
failure.” If Reed’s letter illustrates the worst aspects of Communist activism, 
however, Michelson’s response also is highly illustrative. There is no evidence 
that she got actively involved in the Women’s Trade Union League as a result of 
Reed’s order to do so; nor is there any record of any response Michelson wrote 
to Reed’s letter. Michelson would remain a Communist, but that did not mean 
that she followed party orders without question—instead, she would interpret 
policies like the United Front in her own way, setting up the organizations and 
alliances that she believed worked best for her circumstances.
 With the support of the LWS, the May’s strikers represented a formidable 
challenge to store managers. Managers responded by launching a determined 
campaign against the strikers. Some of their tactics were extralegal if not 
illegal, such as (even according to lawyers in the employ of May’s) planting 
listening devices in strike headquarters. But store managers acted through 
the law as well as outside it. The company that owned May’s gave tremendous 
sums of money to local Tammany Hall officials, and as a result managers at 
the store had strong connections to the local justice system. Once again, police 
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became strikers’ most determined adversaries. According to one LWS petition, 
the police were “beating and clubbing men, women, and pedestrians,” in their 
efforts to break up picket lines and rallies, and, as a result of their determina-
tion to end the strike, placing a number of fairly prestigious strike support-
ers under arrest. Both Mrs. Harry Ward and Socialist party leader Norman 
Thomas went to jail during the May’s strike.12
 Throughout the strike, police and local judges acted openly in the interest 
of store managers. According to a report by the League of Women Shoppers, 
store officials “would point out individual pickets and direct police officials to 
arrest them.” On another occasion, after LWS members complained to a police 
captain that police were making arrests with no cause, the captain “said he 
would let them repass the store with their signs” with no further arrests if the 
strikers would then disperse immediately and go back to work. Local judges 
consistently set high bail for strikers and supporters arrested during the strike, 
and sentenced at least two strikers to thirty days in jail for extremely minor 
offenses. The district attorney’s office even allowed Abraham Kartzman, a law-
yer employed by May’s, to act as the prosecuting attorney in several cases.13
 Elite members of the LWS demanded that Mayor LaGuardia intervene to 
put an end to these questionable practices. Throughout late 1935 and early 
1936 LaGuardia found himself confronted with petition after petition and 
letter after letter on the May’s strike, some of them signed by very prominent 
citizens. In response, LaGuardia got involved in the strike. Demanding an 
explanation, he forwarded the LWS complaints about police misconduct to 
the local police department, who quickly denied the validity of the strikers’ 
complaints. LaGuardia then appointed a committee of three local religious 
leaders to investigate the claims of police and managerial misconduct during 
the May’s strike. The investigative committee LaGuardia appointed found 
heavily in favor of the strikers, finding store management guilty of everything 
from underpaying their workers to providing substandard working conditions 
and manipulating the local justice system. The committee ended its report 
to Mayor LaGuardia with a ringing endorsement of the strike, suggesting 
that “the shoppers of Brooklyn make their purchases where a sense of justice 
controls employment policies.” Store managers, who challenged the validity of 
the entire report, were especially furious about this last statement, complain-
ing that the committee had no right to “tell the people of Brooklyn where to 
shop.”14
 These events during the May’s strike suggest that union organizers during 
this strike had found the sort of legitimacy they had sought through the alli-
ance with the RCIPA. Suddenly, with the aid of the AFL and the LWS (many 
Legitimacy, –
of whose members would no doubt have balked at supporting an openly 
Communist union like the OWU), the union organizers found moderate 
support from the mayor’s office. Other signs of the union’s new legitimacy 
were also forthcoming. Perhaps most important for the strike itself was the 
support of the AFL-affiliated Teamsters; as a result of the department store 
union’s affiliation with the AFL, union truck drivers refused to cross the May’s 
picket line, seriously disrupting deliveries to the May’s store. Department store 
managers across the city found this perhaps the most worrisome prospect of 
all. “One of [store managers’] weak spots,” industry expert Ruth Prince Mack 
asserted later in 1936, “is in the engineering and operating ends of the store. A 
strike here could, and would cripple any store.”15
 Important though this legitimacy was, it came at a huge price for the strik-
ers at May’s and for Local 1250 as a whole. The national RCIPA had assigned 
professional organizer Benjamin Goodman as an organizer of Local 1250 to 
replace the OWU organizers lost when the department store union became 
part of the RCIPA. Goodman was a poor replacement. Both the workers he 
was supposed to be organizing and Michelson found him aloof and undedi-
cated, a hindrance rather than an ally. Goodman’s actions during the May’s 
strike, combined with the actions of the national AFL leaders, made the strike 
one of the greatest defeats the union suffered, despite the massive success in 
getting support from both Mayor LaGuardia and the Teamsters.16
 Throughout late 1935 and 1936 Michelson and other local RCIPA lead-
ers in New York City were involved in a series of conflicts with the national 
RCIPA leadership. The national RCIPA allowed local union leaders to have 
representation in policy decisions in proportion to the local’s membership, but 
the proportions were based on the 1924 membership rolls. This meant that 
those locals which had grown since 1924, such as Local 1250 and the much 
larger Local 338 (the local which had the charter for organizing all the grocery 
clerks in New York City), had little say in the national union’s policies. This 
practice, combined with East Coast leader Roy Denise’s standing practice of 
issuing charters to company unions and taking a percentage of the per capita 
union dues as a bonus, infuriated a number of local leaders, Michelson and 
Samuel Wolchok, the leader of Local 338, among them. Though Denise was 
removed in response to their furor, the national RCIPA leaders refused to hear 
any of the local leaders’ other complaints. In response, Michelson, Wolchok, 
and a few other New York City local leaders refused to pay dues to the national 
RCIPA throughout 1936.17
 This degree of tension between the radical local leaders of Local 1250 and 
the national RCIPA leadership created an awkward situation for Benjamin 
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Goodman. Goodman had been assigned to the union solely due to his connec-
tions to the national RCIPA leaders, not to Michelson or the department store 
workers themselves. Rather than condemn Michelson outright, Goodman 
withdrew from the union, refusing to take any role at all in the May’s strike 
after an initial promise to take charge of fundraising activities. Michelson and 
the strikers took on the task of fundraising, in addition to running the picket 
line and arranging bail for arrested strikers. With all these other responsibili-
ties, strikers had little time for fundraising, and by early 1936, the strike fund 
was nearly empty.18
 The combination of Goodman’s inaction and Michelson’s open defiance 
of the national RCIPA leaders led to a disaster at May’s. In the spring of 
1936, with the local union’s strike fund nearly empty, national RCIPA lead-
ers ordered that control of the strike be turned over to Local 1125, the Retail 
Women’s Apparel Salespeople’s Union, whose leaders were not withholding 
dues from the national union. The May’s strikers immediately protested, since 
they had been working so closely and for so long with Michelson and other 
members of Local 1250. The national leaders of the RCIPA refused to recon-
sider, and they even took the fight a step further, warning workers and Local 
1250 leaders that unless the strike was turned over to Local 1125, there would 
be no more strike benefits, since Local 1250 had no money with which to run 
the strike. The strikers, badly in need of these benefits, which represented their 
only source of income during the strike, agreed to switch unions.19
 Local 1125 leaders immediately proved that the strikers’ hesitancy about 
the switch in jurisdiction was justified. In the midst of the strike, the leaders 
of Local 1125 refused to issue union cards to any strikers. Since Weinstein had 
fired them, the strikers were technically not employed at any retail store, and, 
as one Local 1125 official stated, “[T]he international’s constitution forbids 
membership to clerks who are unemployed.” The leaders of Local 1125 then 
immediately took away the workers’ picket signs and closed the strike head-
quarters, declaring the strike at an end.20
 In contrast to the aftermath of the strikes at Klein’s and Ohrbach’s, the 
department store union could not claim even a symbolic victory at May’s. 
While Michelson and her allies in Local 1250 could claim that their leadership 
of Local 1250 had not been responsible for this failure, even this claim was an 
empty one. It had been Michelson and other ex-OWU leaders who had cho-
sen to follow the United Front policy by allying themselves with the corrupt 
and conservative RCIPA, hoping to gain greater legitimacy, and as a result the 
workers at May’s lost their strike.
 The scandal surrounding the second strike at Ohrbach’s was just as devastat-
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ing as the defeat at May’s. Like the May’s strike, this second strike at Ohrbach’s 
was an outgrowth of the Klein’s-Ohrbach’s strike. Managers at Ohrbach’s had 
fired practically every worker who had been involved in the 1934–35 strike, 
and a few of these fired workers still had the courage to return to the picket 
line in 1936. This time only around twenty workers went out on strike, most 
of whom had been involved in the earlier strike as well. Among those few who 
had not been involved with the earlier strike was a young Italian-American 
worker named Nicholas Carnes, who became Michelson’s second-in-com-
mand during the strike and eventually became an important leader of the 
department store unions.21
 Workers faced even more obstacles during this second Ohrbach’s strike 
than during the Klein’s-Ohrbach’s strike. This was partially because of the 
smaller number of strikers, and partially because—once again—Benjamin 
Goodman promised to handle the fundraising activities and then proved 
either unable or unwilling to do so. Nonetheless, the workers—after close to 
two hundred arrests during a nine-month strike—created enough of a distur-
bance in Union Square to force Nathan Ohrbach to agree to meet personally 
with Michelson and a representative group of strikers by the fall of 1936. On 
October 2 Ohrbach and Michelson reached a settlement that became the cause 
of much controversy and eventually resulted in the split between Local 1250 
and the national RCIPA. The terms of the settlement were fairly straightfor-
ward: the picket line would be withdrawn, and the strikers would get back pay 
of $5000, to be divided amongst themselves as they saw fit. Ohrbach, while 
he promised to stop discriminating against union employees and to rehire the 
strikers, again refused to recognize the union. Michelson and Ohrbach agreed 
to settle the strike on those terms, and the workers, some of whom had been 
on strike, on and off, for almost two years, voted to accept the settlement at a 
meeting the next day, on October 3.22
 Only after workers accepted the contract and officially ended the Ohrbach’s 
strike did Benjamin Goodman involve himself in the strike, to the great annoy-
ance of Michelson and the Ohrbach’s workers alike. Though Michelson and 
the strikers both insisted that they had invited him to attend the negotiations 
as well as the meeting where the workers ratified the agreement, Goodman 
chose not to attend either event. Instead, two days after the strike ended, on 
October 5, Goodman sent out a strongly worded statement to the press and 
to elected officials calling the agreement a “sell-out” and a “deal” rather than a 
true settlement. He also pointed out (correctly) that, in the end, much of the 
money from the agreement would go to fees for lawyers who had been present 
during the negotiations. That same day, as though to place the union under 
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his control by sheer force, Goodman removed all the union’s records from 
the union offices, as well as the union’s petty cash and personal items which 
various strikers and organizers had left in the office. Whether Goodman was 
merely attempting to force Michelson to back down in her continuing fight 
with the national RCIPA leaders or whether he sincerely believed that she had 
betrayed the workers is impossible to determine with any certainty, but given 
his lack of involvement in the union up until that point, it seems unlikely that 
his concern over the agreement was genuine.23
 Whatever Goodman’s motives actually were, Michelson and the strikers 
quickly responded to his charges. On October 12, they began a union hearing 
on Goodman’s actions. Participants from both the Ohrbach’s and the May’s 
strikes offered statements concerning Goodman’s involvement—or lack of 
involvement—in the union. The Ohrbach’s workers whom Goodman had 
ostensibly been trying to defend were bewildered by Goodman’s actions. 
Some, like Anne Little and Anne Friedman (the two workers who had sat 
in at the Waldorf-Astoria the previous year), had participated in the earlier 
strike under Michelson’s leadership and viewed Michelson as a friend and ally, 
whereas Goodman was a comparative stranger. They, like other Ohrbach’s 
workers who attended Goodman’s hearing, used the hearing as an opportunity 
to voice their trust in Michelson, stating for the trial record that Michelson 
had been “empowered . . . with full rights” to make any deal she could make to 
get them their jobs back. Other workers pointed out that it had been they, and 
not Michelson or the lawyers, who had decided on the distribution of funds. 
Not one member of the trial committee voiced any defense for Goodman, and 
not one striker ever came forward to publicly challenge the settlement. At the 
end of the proceedings, the trial board voted to dismiss Goodman from his 
post at Local 1250.24
 By this time, of course, the damage had been done, and the failures at May’s 
and Ohrbach’s were only the most glaring among many. During these years, the 
union continued to hold chapters throughout New York City, at nearly every 
store where workers later won contracts, and even held some chapters where 
workers never won union recognition. Altman’s, Abraham and Straus (A&S), 
Alexander’s, Bloomingdale’s, Gimbel’s, Hearn’s, Macy’s, Namm’s, Oppenheim 
Collins, Loeser’s, Saks Fifth Avenue, Stern’s, and Wanamaker’s, among others, 
all had chapters of Local 1250. But the existence of the union seems to have 
had little effect on the lives of most workers within these stores.
 To make matters worse, rather than expanding their network of allies, the 
formation of Local 1250 seems to have limited the number and types of allies 
that the union had. As we have seen, during the years in the OWU, the depart-
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ment store unions had been linked to the “Don’t Buy Where You Can’t Work” 
campaign through Michelson’s activity in both struggles. Tenuous though this 
connection had been (the leaders of the “Don’t Buy Where You Can’t Work” 
campaign refused to support the Klein’s-Ohrbach’s strikers, for instance, unless 
the strikers took a stand on racial discrimination in hiring, something neither 
strikers nor strike leaders apparently ever considered), there had least been 
an attempt to find common ground. With the formation of Local 1250 and 
the transformation of the LSNR into the National Negro Congress (another 
result of the United Front strategy), however, these attempts ended, and for 
the remainder of the 1930s the unions would do little to agitate against racial 
discrimination in the department stores.25
 The overall weakness of Local 1250 in these years was a direct result of 
the alliance with the RCIPA. Throughout 1935 and 1936, Local 1250 had 
virtually no money, receiving no money from the national union and collect-
ing only small amounts for dues payments. The union was also desperately 
understaffed; thanks to Goodman’s lack of involvement, Local 1250’s support 
for workers basically consisted of one union organizer, Clarina Michelson. 
In addition, the union had few long-term members. Many workers, even at 
upscale stores where turnover was a less serious issue, moved through both 
union and stores very quickly, often within a matter of months. As a result, the 
union, lacking funds, staff, and a solid membership base, could be a factor in 
workers’ lives only after large numbers of workers were on the verge of strik-
ing. The union’s inability to win a solid victory during these early strikes meant 
that even at stores where workers did strike, the union had no future once the 
strike ended.26
 By early 1937, after almost two years as a local of the RCIPA, Local 1250 
leaders had determined that the benefits of RCIPA membership were negli-
gible. The RCIPA affiliation had not won department store workers a single 
contract. Union leaders had lost one important strike they had organized, at 
May’s, and even Michelson’s strongest supporters admitted that the settlement 
at Ohrbach’s, their only other major strike during these years, was a weak 
settlement at best. The union was underfunded, and had only a handful of 
members who stayed in the union for more than a few months. And, especially 
considering that the union leaders had agreed to join the RCIPA in search of 
greater legitimacy and respectability, Goodman’s attack on Michelson and the 
union had created an unacceptable scandal.
 Luckily for Michelson and Local 1250, at this time, early 1937, the lead-
ers of other New York City RCIPA locals began to reject the national union’s 
policies and leadership as ineffectual and corrupt. On February 18, 1937, the 
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various dissident locals met at the Manhattan Opera House. Amidst some 
interruptions by Local 1125 leaders, who continued to support the national 
RCIPA leadership, the dissidents formally banded together as the “New Era 
Retail Committee” in an open revolt against the RCIPA’s national leadership, 
choosing Local 338 President Samuel Wolchok as the New Era Committee’s 
leader.27
 The New Era Committee was a diverse but weak coalition of dissidents. 
Despite the important role played by Communists in Local 1250, most of 
the leaders of the New Era Committee were anti-Communists. Wolchok 
himself, for instance, was a liberal Democrat and a strong supporter of 
President Roosevelt and the New Deal. He was also a particularly strong anti-
Communist, who sometimes went so far as to claim that he had confronted 
Communist aggression physically. One acquaintance of Wolchok’s remem-
bered that “Wolchok carried a . . . scar on his face, and always claimed that 
he got that scar from a knife wound that [a TUUL leader] had inflicted on 
him.”28
 Despite his anti-communism, Wolchok and the radical organizers of 
Local 1250, of whom Michelson was still by far the most important, joined 
together in the New Era Committee. They united largely around a common 
enemy, namely, the national RCIPA leadership. Of course, the United Front 
policy may have had a role to play in this alliance as well, but if the United 
Front called for alliances, as seen in Gussie Reed’s letter to Michelson, it was 
Michelson and others in Local 1250 who would decide who those allies would 
be, not the party bureaucrats. Wolchok, at least at the moment, seemed like a 
logical choice. Organizers in the department store unions had attempted creat-
ing unions without AFL affiliation during the OWU years, and had met with 
little success. If anything, things had gotten worse during their merger with 
the RCIPA. Now Wolchok’s offer of an alliance gave rise to what seemed like 
an explanation for why the RCIPA merger had failed that did not require con-
demnation of the Communist party policies: namely, that the national leaders 
of the RCIPA were themselves too corrupt to function as legitimate union 
officials. The New Era Committee therefore offered a United Front strategy 
which was more acceptable than alliance with the RCIPA: Local 1250 leaders 
could work with honest, if less radical, labor leaders, who were willing to take 
a stand against corruption.29
 Wolchok, well aware that he was dealing with Communists, was extremely 
tactful when he addressed the issue of what this alliance would mean for the 
department store union’s future. He emphasized to Michelson that, if nothing 
else, the department store union would have more autonomy under the New 
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Era Committee than they had under the RCIPA. To Wolchok’s credit, he faith-
fully lived up to this promise, allowing Local 1250 to remain autonomous and 
intact throughout the existence of the New Era Committee.30
 Wolchok agreed to work with Local 1250, and even agreed to grant them 
autonomy, because he badly needed the Communists’ support. As the leader of 
a dissident union, Wolchok was singularly ill equipped, with neither the mem-
bers nor the funds to present a serious challenge to the RCIPA. Immediately 
after forming the New Era Committee, he and the committee were so without 
options that they applied for membership in the AFL, as a separate union 
from the RCIPA. In order for this request to even be considered, he would 
need as many locals as he could possibly get to join the New Era Committee. 
And Local 1250, while hardly the most successful local in the RCIPA, at least 
had a leader who was willing to take a chance on Wolchok’s committee. (Even 
with Local 1250, no record exists of a response from the national AFL on the 
request for a charter.)31
 The New Era Committee’s decision to apply for a new AFL charter is partic-
ularly significant since the committee apparently made no attempt to make an 
alliance with the newly formed Committee of Industrial Organizations (CIO). 
In general, most CIO leaders in these early years were men like Wolchok, 
who rejected the policies and practices of certain AFL leaders as corrupt and 
ineffectual. In addition, the CIO leaders often had political beliefs similar to 
Wolchok’s; most of them, like Wolchok, were liberal Democrats. Finally, CIO 
leaders were strong supporters of industrial unionism, the practice of organiz-
ing all workers in a shop or a factory into a single union, regardless of either 
skill level or of particular job description. According to retail industry ana-
lysts, this policy was the best one for organizing within department stores and 
other retail establishments, where salespeople, cashiers, elevator operators, 
and stock people all worked within the same building.32
 The CIO and the New Era Committee, both increasingly dissatisfied 
with AFL policies in these years, remained separate due largely to the types 
of workers each organized. The New Era Committee’s decision to avoid the 
CIO, at least initially, is best explained by the CIO’s strong connections to 
blue-collar workers; the CIO, after all, was centered in the mining, rubber, 
automobile, and garment industries. To lead a union of white-collar workers, 
Wolchok sought instead the support of the mainstream AFL, which had long 
supported organizing white-collar workers. For their part, CIO leaders appar-
ently showed no interest whatsoever in early 1937 in using Wolchok’s New Era 
Committee as the backbone of a CIO-affiliated retail union, something which 
would come to pass later that same year.
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 In February 1937, as they left the RCIPA to join the New Era Committee, 
the leaders of Local 1250 discovered that the legitimacy they had sought in 
joining the RCIPA remained illusive. To the extent that the RCIPA provided 
any sort of legitimacy at all—as seen by the actions of the Teamsters, the LWS, 
and Mayor LaGuardia—this legitimacy was offset by the corruption, scandal, 
and conflict rampant within the RCIPA. By early 1937 Local 1250 and the 
department store workers represented by this union had yet to demonstrate 
the legitimacy of their cause to the city and the country at large. Instead, the 
Communist leaders of Local 1250 were forced to take the rather slim chance 
that Wolchok and the other dissidents in the RCIPA would at least be more 
supportive of the department store unions than their former allies in the 
national RCIPA had been.
Counter Girls s. the Countess, Spring 
The spring of 1937 found Local 1250 weakened and relatively isolated, with 
strong ties neither to the AFL nor to the emergent CIO. Their sole affiliation, 
the New Era Committee, was at best a weak alliance with a few other retail 
workers’ unions around New York City. But it was at that moment of the 
union’s weakness that department store workers won the legitimacy that union 
leaders had long sought. Three factors would play major roles in the workers’ 
victory. The notoriety of Woolworth’s heiress Barbara Hutton, the increasing 
controversy around chain stores, and the rising tide of unionization in blue-
collar industries all contributed to the department store unions’ first major 
successes in New York City, in the sit-down strikes of March 1937.
 The mid-1930s were busy years in the life of Woolworth heiress Barbara 
Hutton. As the department store unions were still reeling from the struggle 
with Benjamin Goodman and the defeat at Ohrbach’s, the twenty-four-year-
old heiress had divorced her first husband, Prince Alexis Mdivani, and was 
entering her second marriage to impoverished European nobility, this time to 
the Count Haugwitz von Reventlow. Hutton was an infamous figure, described 
by one paper as “the sure-fire sensation of the tabloid, glamour girl of the roto-
gravures, and American whom two foreign marriages have converted into a 
foreigner.” Hutton made news both through her marriages and by spending 
immense sums of money on lavish parties.33
 With many Americans unemployed and going hungry, wealthy women like 
Hutton were prominent negative symbols in American culture in the mid 1930s. 
In 1934, Dashiell Hammett’s popular novel The Thin Man attacked the rich, 
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particularly rich women like Hutton who bought and paid for their foreign hus-
bands. Much of the social content was erased when the novel was transformed 
into a screwball comedy in 1935, but other film comedies were less subtle. In 
1936, as newspapers reported that Hutton had spent $1,200,000 on gems once 
owned by Napoleon, William Powell, the star of The Thin Man, appeared in 
My Man Godfrey, perhaps one of the most negative portrayals of rich women 
in mid-1930s film. In My Man Godfrey heiresses like Hutton are portrayed as 
wasteful, foolish, and generally immoral, paying little if any attention to the 
needs and concerns of others while they spend their time and their parents’ 
money finding all sorts of foolish amusements, all pointless and some cruel.34
 These sorts of negative images of wealthy women as extravagant, waste-
ful, and unfeeling were especially prominent among leftists. Nowhere was 
Communist party member and novelist Mike Gold’s work more brutal than 
when he described the wife of his father’s boss. In “a large gaudy room glow-
ing with red wallpaper, and stuffed like the show window of a furniture store 
with tables, chairs, sofas, dressers, bric-a-brac” the boss’s wife “lay on a sofa. 
She glittered like an ice-cream parlor. Her tubby legs rested on a red pillow. 
Her bleached yellow head blazed with diamond combs and rested on a pil-
low of green.” Fat, lazy, stupid, and constantly whining, the boss’s wife was, 
in Gold’s work and in much of Communist literature of the 1930s, the sheer 
embodiment of the bosses’ wealth, barely distinguishable from the gems and 
rich furnishings surrounding them. As such, these women were the symbols of 
exploitation, and attacks on them could have tremendous rhetorical power.35
 If Hutton and her ilk were powerful negative icons in the mid-1930s, so 
too were Woolworth stores themselves. Beginning in the early years of the 
Depression, with a 1931 Supreme Court decision legalizing prohibitive taxes 
on large chain stores, some politicians began to argue that large chains like 
Woolworth’s were damaging to small retailers and therefore bad for the coun-
try’s economy as a whole. Chain-store owners immediately launched counter-
campaigns through the National Chain Store Association and the American 
Retail Federation to “give the public a clearer understanding of just what the 
chain store meant in terms of superior merchandise at lower cost,” even going 
so far as to prepare a “comprehensive Debaters’ Manual, covering every phase 
of the chain-store subject” for use in high school and college debates.36
 This debate over chain stores reached its height in 1935, when Representative 
Wright Patman of Texas led a congressional committee to
investigate the American Retail Federation, its capitalization, its mem-
bership, its objectives, the sources of its funds, its financial connections 
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and its officers and agents and to investigate the record of stock divi-
dends, officers’ salaries, profits, interlocking directorates and banking 
affiliations of all corporations directly affiliated with, or contributing to, 
the said American Retail Federation.37
By 1937, when the committee’s findings came out, anti–chain store activists 
had assembled a long list of accusations against chain-store owners, including 
“undercover organizations, expensive ‘influence,’ . . . state organizations mas-
querading under misleading names . . . Millions of dollars are being poured 
into undercover propaganda to sell the American people the idea that the 
chain store system is an economic blessing,” for the benefit of “a few men in a 
few little offices in New York,” while small retailers paid the price. These activ-
ists had also succeeded in passing the Robinson-Patman Act, making it illegal 
for manufacturers to sell at a discount to large retailers.38
 Anti–chain store activists and department store union organizers always 
remained separate. Anti–chain store spokespeople saw themselves primarily 
as supporters of small retailers rather than workers at large retail establish-
ments. Yet there was an attempt by at least some anti–chain store activists to 
suggest links between the workers’ struggles against the stores and what these 
activists viewed as the overarching issue of “absentee ownership.” In his anti–
chain store manifesto, Wells of Discontent, Charles Daughters, a close ally of 
Patman’s in the struggle against chain stores, claimed that “employees fall heirs 
to one of the greatest evils of absentee ownership” in the lack of job stability, 
low wages, and long hours which these employees had to work. Daughters’s 
claim, it should be noted, has little factual justification. Active owners like 
Samuel Klein and Nathan Ohrbach, for instance, were often present within 
the stores they owned, yet, if anything, their presence seems to have been an 
additional burden for their employees, adding another level of supervision to 
an already oppressive environment.39
 Despite this division between the unions and the anti–chain store activists, 
the presence of these activists played a major role in the workers’ 1937 strikes 
at five-and-dime chain stores. By calling these chains’ legitimacy into question, 
anti–chain store activists helped set the stage for workers’ challenges to chain-
store managers’ control in 1937.
 The final factor which played a major role in the victories in 1937 was the 
rising tide of strikes and unions in factories. The massive sit-down strikes 
in Flint and Akron introduced a new tactic to the labor movement, and the 
sit-down strike was an incredibly effective tactic, since it allowed workers to 
seize control of the factories and prevented managers from using scabs. As a 
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result, this tactic quickly spread to other workers, including other assembly 
line workers, hospital workers, janitors, teachers, and even blind workers in 
pencil factories. Throughout the early months of 1937 sit-down strikes were 
becoming a new and extremely important facet of American life.
 As sit-down strikes grew in importance, managers at Woolworth’s and 
other five-and-dime chain stores continued to exploit their workers. Like the 
managers of other downscale stores, five-and-dime store managers relied on 
quick turnover, large numbers of customers, and low overhead and labor costs 
for their profits. As a result, managers forced all the labor possible out of their 
workers, forcing them to work “one girl to more than one overcrowded, busy 
counter,” as one worker described it. Here, as at the other downscale stores, 
workers complained of the constant supervision, where “professional shoppers 
[are] paid to spy and antaganize [sic] . . . to see whether they answer politely.” 
For working in these conditions, five-and-dime store workers drew only 
slightly higher pay than workers at other downscale stores, making around 
$10 to $11 a week as opposed to the $7 to $8 a week Klein’s workers made, for 
instance.40
 Workers at the five-and-dime stores had some problems not shared by 
workers at other downscale stores. For one thing, there were no employee 
lunchrooms at the small Woolworth’s stores. Employees at these stores gener-
ally ate in the filthy storage rooms. Woolworth’s managers also kept the work-
ers long after the stores closed in order to give them pep talks to encourage 
morale. Finally, unlike in most stores, managers required Woolworth’s workers 
to wear uniforms; workers not only had to buy their own uniforms, but they 
also had to pay to keep these uniforms clean and in good condition.41
 In response to these conditions and the increasing popularity of sit-down 
strikes among workers throughout the city, five-and-dime store workers in 
Detroit went on a sit-down strike in March 1937. Woolworth’s managers used 
what may have been their most powerful weapon in response. Woolworth’s 
was a large national chain, and managers could therefore afford to have stores 
in any one area shut down, at least temporarily. They threatened to do so 
throughout Detroit if the workers did not end the sit-down strike immedi-
ately. Similar actions had worked in the past for chain-store owners. In 1934, 
for instance, managers at A&P grocery stores in Cleveland had closed all the 
stores in response to a strike there, and had forced workers to withdraw their 
picket lines.42
 Closing all the stores in Detroit was a powerful threat, but if managers 
could draw on their regional and national presence to solve a local dispute, 
in 1937 workers could do the same. Woolworth’s workers in other Detroit 
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stores walked out in sympathy with the sit-down strikers, defying the bosses’ 
threat, and in New York Clarina Michelson immediately called for a boycott 
of all New York Woolworth’s stores until the strike was settled. In addition, 
this threat by Woolworth’s management drew greater attention to the situa-
tion of Woolworth’s workers in the rest of the country, including those in New 
York. Local 1250 released a statement in response to this threat noting that, 
in New York, “most workers received $10, $11, or $12 [a week], and no pay 
for overtime,” in conditions that caused the union to suggest that the situa-
tion of Woolworth’s clerks in New York City were “as bad or worse than those 
in Detroit.” Like Woolworth’s itself, the labor movement was increasingly a 
national movement, capable of at least attempting to act on a national scale.43
 Whether the threat of a New York boycott was a factor or not, by the time 
Local 1250 began mobilizing to support the Detroit workers’ sit-down, the 
strike was already nearly over. By March 5, only two days after Local 1250 
began calling for a New York boycott, Woolworth’s managers gave in to the 
strikers’ demands, offering a contract like none of Woolworth’s workers had 
ever seen. Workers won 20 to 25 percent pay raises, time-and-a-half for over-
time (after a 48-hour work week), half-pay for the time they’d been on their 
sit-down strike, free uniforms, and the right to be hired through the union, not 
the company.44
 If Woolworth’s managers settled in the hope of preventing the development 
of other strikes, their gambit failed. By the time the strike was over, New York’s 
department store union organizers and union members alike were all thinking 
about a sit-down strike of their own. Early in March 1937, Local 1250 released 
a set of rules entitled “What To Do In Case Of a Sit Down,” where the rules for 
sitting-down were carefully laid out: “Upon receiving the signal, you will finish 
whatever you may be doing at the moment. Then you will stay at your post, 
fold your arms, and inform any customer who may want to be waited on that 
you are on strike.” A Daily Worker reporter who interviewed New York City 
Woolworth’s workers during the Detroit strike announced that “every one of 
them knows about the happenings in Detroit. . . . One girl said, ‘Just wait till 
this thing breaks in New York, we’ll even show Detroit how to sit down.”45
 Workers and union organizers in New York City got their chance. On March 
14 workers at five different five-and-dime F&W Grand stores in different parts 
of New York City began sit-down strikes. Workers at two Grand stores in Far 
Rockaway, Queens, at stores in Park Slope and Bay Ridge, Brooklyn, and at 
one store on Fourteenth Street in Manhattan, just off Union Square, went on 
strike simultaneously. Later that day, workers sat down at a Grand store on the 
Upper West Side of Manhattan, and strike supporters began to picket another 
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Grand store on West 14th Street, much to the delight of the sit-down strikers. 
The strike quickly spread to other five-and-dime stores. By March 17 work-
ers at two Woolworth’s stores—one in Brooklyn, and one on 14th Street—sat 
down as well, and their actions made the front page of the New York Times. 
The strike was now in full force.46
 As it had been two years earlier during the Klein’s-Ohrbach’s strikes, 14th 
Street, the location of three of the struck five-and-dime stores, again became a 
battleground between police and strike supporters. Unlike during the Klein’s-
Ohrbach’s strikes, here much of the support was initially on a personal level, as 
families and friends of the strikers set up picket lines outside the stores. Other 
supporters, however, quickly emerged. The picket lines greatly expanded, to 
include hundreds of other working-class New Yorkers, and prominent union 
leaders also sanctioned the sit-down strikes. William Green, the president of 
the American Federation of Labor, immediately announced his support for the 
strike, as did Wolchok and other New Era Committee members. Not everyone 
issued statements, however; the national leaders of the RCIPA remained con-
spicuously silent on the sit-down strikes.47
 Wolchok in particular used the sit-down strikes as an opportunity to show 
his support for Local 1250. Knowing that Michelson and Nicholas Carnes, 
who was present in the Grand store on 14th Street during the sit-down strike, 
were already working very closely with the sit-down strikers and their sup-
porters, Wolchok did not attempt to interfere with their efforts. Instead, he 
concentrated on setting up negotiations between store management, him-
self, workers, and Michelson. The Grand store managers agreed to negotiate 
within three days of the beginning of the strikes, and never attempted to use 
force against the sit-down strikers. They did, however, prove so intractable in 
negotiations that Michelson threatened to call for a strike in all Grand stores 
in New York City if negotiations did not improve. After Michelson’s threat, 
Grand store managers began negotiating in earnest.48
 Managers at Woolworth’s responded in a far more confrontational and vio-
lent manner. On the very first night of the strike, Woolworth’s managers hired 
agents of the Burns Detective Agency, which specialized in breaking strikes, 
to invade the store and ensure that nothing was touched. In addition, follow-
ing the advice in an editorial in the Dry Goods Economist, one of the retail 
industry’s trade publications, Woolworth’s managers had city police stand in 
front of the store to make certain that the strikers received no food, cots, or 
blankets.49
 The workers turned the ban on food into a tremendous opportunity for 
drama, by declaring themselves on a hunger strike. This decision was made 
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entirely by the strikers. When the news came that no food would be allowed 
into the Woolworth’s stores, Michelson suggested that the workers simply 
buy food from the store, which she felt was legal so long as the workers paid 
for anything they took. One of the women strikers, Michelson remembered, 
looked at her in disgust. “‘Buy food from a store that’s on strike?’” the striker 
asked her, apparently astonished that Michelson would suggest such a thing. 
The Woolworth’s workers were determined to make this strike a memorable 
one, even if it meant some personal discomfort.50
 Begun late on March 17, the hunger strike lasted only a few hours, due pri-
marily to the actions of the supporters in the streets outside. By 1:30 a.m. on 
the morning of March 18, a large crowd gathered to form a picket line in the 
streets outside, since the strikers’ families, friends, and other supporters had 
gotten word of the ban on food and the resulting hunger strike. Some of these 
picketers sneaked around to the back of the store and formed a human lad-
der, with strike supporters standing on top of one another’s shoulders to reach 
the store’s windows. Inside, workers—having been informed of this action in 
advance—climbed the shelves to open the windows. The supporters outside 
immediately began passing food, blankets, and even cots to the strikers. When 
the goods were received, the strikers officially declared the hunger strike over 
and began eating.51
 The store managers’ ploy of banning food had therefore failed twice. First, 
the ban had created the opportunity for the hunger strike. By declaring the 
hunger strike, workers used managers’ own tactics to draw attention to their 
plight. Second, by allowing strike supporters to sneak food into the store 
regardless of the ban, managers had effectively created the necessity for strike 
supporters to be alert and present in front of the stores at all times.
 The presence of supporters in the streets outside also greatly benefited 
the strikers when store managers adopted a new tactic. The night after the 
hunger strike, managers had police evict the sit-down strikers at both strik-
ing Woolworth’s stores, charging them with disorderly conduct. While police 
refused to take this action in response to sit-down strikers in other cities, in 
New York police entered the stores and arrested the strikers. Doing so was 
no simple matter, however. By the time of the police raid, huge crowds had 
gathered around the Woolworth’s stores, including representatives from the 
Communist-led International Workers Order, as well as the radical seamen’s 
and bakery workers’ unions. Upon hearing of the imminent eviction, these 
supporters gathered around the police wagons and the store entrances, try-
ing to block the police from leaving the store with the strikers. The police 
fought their way through the crowd and headed back to the station with the 
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prisoners, only to find another demonstration of several hundred people, yell-
ing, “Woolworth’s strikers must go free!” The sit-down strikers were released 
after a brief arraignment in night court. After they were released, the strikers 
immediately went back to the store and sat down again. The next day, again, 
Woolworth’s management charged the strikers with disorderly conduct, result-
ing in another round of arrests, street protests by supporters, arraignments, 
and then the strikers’ return to the store to sit down again.52
 The Woolworth’s strike was quickly becoming a cause for extensive 
Communist-led working-class protest, and there is no telling how long it 
might have continued or how the strike would have developed had Mayor La 
Guardia not intervened. This time La Guardia advised both the company and 
the union that “labor controversies in your stores have reached a point where 
the public is obviously involved,” and he then offered his services as mediator 
in order to bring an end to the strike and the protests surrounding it.53
 After La Guardia stepped in, the strikes ended quickly. Workers had gone 
into the strike demanding union recognition, paid vacations, and better 
working conditions. In both Woolworth’s and the Grand stores, the work-
ers received a 10 percent increase for all workers earning $20 or less, with a 
minimum weekly wage of $15.60, an end to any mandatory overtime, and 
paid vacations. Managers signed one-year contracts at all New York City 
Woolworth’s stores. In short, the strike was, for the first time in the union’s 
history, a stunning clear-cut victory.54
 In addition, workers, union leaders, and supportive journalists all identified 
the five-and-dime strikes as part of a national labor movement. Communists 
in particular quickly identified the strikes as part of the United Front and 
therefore part of an international movement against capitalist exploitation and 
inequality. Harry Raymond’s description of the sit-down strikers’ St. Patrick’s 
Day celebration in the Daily Worker, ostensibly a passage designed to demon-
strate how happy the workers were, also shows the way in which Communist 
journalists linked the strike to the United Front:
We were given a real St. Patrick’s Day surprise. France Czechoshi, a 
Polish girl, did an Irish reel . . . Eddie Summers, Negro kitchen man 
. . . stepped off a fast tap dance. There was another hot dance by Honey 
Cohen and Dave Levitt . . . And we won’t forget those three dark-eyed 
Italian girls for a long time . . . They sang “La Luna Mezza Mare” (“The 
Moon in the Middle of the Ocean”).55
The wide variety of ethnic and racial forms of celebration was a clear reference 
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to the Front, as workers of all races and ethnicities came together to struggle 
against the bosses. Other Worker articles also emphasized this interethnic and 
interracial aspect of the strike. For example, the Worker reported, “one of the 
songs most popular among the sit-down strikers . . . is the following . . . [version 
of a] familiar Negro song of protest . . . ‘We Shall Not Be Moved:’ ‘Clarina is our 
leader/ we shall not be moved; / . . . Just like a tree, / standing by the water, / 
We shall not be moved.” Workers actively accepted this link to the international 
movement, even including as one of their demands (one of the first that they 
negotiated away) that Woolworth’s boycott all German-made goods.56
 While only supporters invoked the narrative of the United Front, both 
opponents and supporters attempted to place the strike into familiar gender 
narratives. Observers who criticized the strike and strikers, such as New York 
Times reporters, identified the strike as a moment of “hysteria on the part of 
women workers.” Later in the same article, the reporter also referred to “at 
least a half a dozen girls” who “gave way to hysteria during the first excite-
ment,” while noting that “one [girl], Julia Myers, fainted, and was taken to a 
first-aid room in the basement.” The women were, in fact, mere “pawns” in the 
hands of unnamed union leaders, as a judge who presided at their arraignment 
(and who was quoted in the Times) described the situation. These sorts of 
descriptions in the Times represented a fundamental negation of the strikers’ 
agency as well as a powerfully gendered narrative. The Woolworth’s workers 
during the sit-downs were simply, in this analysis, women acting as women, 
that is, fainting and being hysterical. Union leaders, presumably men, were 
then able to take advantage of these hysterical women, at least in the imagina-
tion of the judge and of the Times reporters.57
 The Communist press, on the other hand, addressed the strikes with typical 
confusion around gender, often recognizing the agency of the women strikers 
while belittling women’s actions. Daily Worker reporter Harry Raymond, who 
stayed inside the Grand store on 14th Street during the sit-down, recognized 
the agency of the strikers, describing the sit-down as “a glorious strike [that] 
these 85 sales girls are conducting.” Similarly, Esther Cantor, who wrote a 
series of Daily Worker articles about the sit-down strike in the Grand store on 
Pitkin Avenue in Brooklyn, similarly described the strikes as the act of militant 
workers: “The 36 girls who began a sit-down strike here . . . are now pushing 
cots . . . against the front door to keep out . . . store executives.”58
 Despite recognizing the agency and militancy of these women, however, 
the Communist press combined celebration with condescension. Daily Worker 
journalists did so in part through their constant use of the term “girls,” a term 
which observers seem to have used universally when discussing these strikes 
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conducted by women who were mostly in their twenties. In addition, many 
of the descriptions suggested that these sit-downs were rather light-hearted 
affairs in many ways. According to one sub-headline in Harry Raymond’s arti-
cle, the girls “Are Firm, Disciplined, and Merry in F.W. Grand Sit-Down.”59
 Strike supporters also had another gendered symbol at their disposal: the 
wealthy heiress, Barbara Hutton. Such a symbol not only allowed the work-
ers at Woolworth’s a chance to make clear that they shared nothing with the 
negative stereotypes of women that dominated the era; it also allowed them 
an easily identified and generally hated enemy. Michelson, as soon as the sit-
down strikes broke out at Woolworth’s, began using Hutton’s name by making 
a speech to the strikers announcing that “their employer was cruising about 
the world amidst barbaric splendor while her employees were fighting for a 
$20 weekly wage.” In response, strikers proposed to send Hutton a transat-
lantic cable, informing her that “hunger strikers in New York store ask your 
intervention for a living wage.”60
 Workers also used Hutton’s “barbaric splendor” as a recurrent theme in 
their songs and chants. In both the Detroit and New York strikes, strikers 
adapted a popular song of the day, “Mademoiselle from Armentieres,” as a 
strike song: “Barbara Hutton has the dough, parles vous, / Where she gets 
it, sure we know, parles vous.” In addition, in New York, workers invoked 
Hutton’s name in one of their more imaginative chants, making the contrast 
between their own economic status and Hutton’s more explicit still: “Barbara 
Hutton, she gets mutton! Woolworth’s workers, they get nothin’!”61
 Daily Worker journalists placed even more emphasis on Hutton’s role in 
the strike. The Worker ran Barbara Hutton’s picture twice during the sit-down 
strikes, along with two separate articles, one of which was entitled “Counter 
Girls Vs. The Countess.” One of the two photographs was captioned in terms 
which heavily stressed Hutton’s wealth: “Countess Barbara sits down over 
champagne and looks on aghast.” Al Richmond, who wrote “Counter Girls 
Vs. The Countess,” was equally clear in the text: “Enough of those dimes 
[made by sales in the store] have gone to Babs Hutton for trading in worn-out 
Mdivanis for later model Haugwitz von Reventlows.” And reporters claimed 
“the [Woolworth’s] strikers were sarcastic yesterday when a news dispatch 
from Cairo, Egypt, where the multi-millionaire Woolworth’s heiress is revel-
ing in luxury, stated that she said she was ‘powerless to take any action in the 
sit-down strikes.’ ”62
 Even less radical journalists emphasized Hutton’s connection to the strike. 
The liberal New York Post, for instance, printed a story about Hutton (ironi-
cally entitled “Babs Sits Down Also—After Swim, Sun Bath”) right next to a 
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story about the Woolworth’s sit-downs: “41 More Arrested In Woolworth’s 
14th Street Sit-Down.” Hutton, the Post reported, “lazes through the days here 
[in Cairo] at her hotel overlooking the desert.” She “usually takes a long swim 
and sun bath in the morning . . . The afternoons are mostly devoted to long 
drives through the country with her husband and in the evening they dine 
quietly together at the hotel.” The contrast was a remarkable one: the useless, 
lazy Hutton, the epitome of negative stereotypes about wealthy women, basked 
in luxury while Woolworth’s workers took up the tactic of other workers, the 
sit-down strike, and fought for the rights other workers had demanded.63
 On one level, the attacks on Hutton that accompanied the strikes were justi-
fied: Hutton’s wealth was, as these workers charged, the result of exploitation; 
and the contrast between Hutton and the Woolworth’s workers was a power-
ful one, to say the least. At the same time, Hutton was no longer the strikers’ 
employer. As Hutton herself was quick to point out, even though her inheri-
tance had originally come from Woolworth’s, she had no real control over 
the way in which the stores were run, since her family had long since sold off 
much of her Woolworth’s stock. The amount of emphasis placed on Hutton’s 
wealth and title during the strike was therefore not an attack on management, 
but rather a way of allowing the women retail workers to recast the strikes 
as having a recognizable class- and gender-specific opponent: the wealthy 
woman.64
 Through the five-and-dime sit-down strikes and the ways in which they 
were described, workers and their supporters made Local 1250 and the New 
Era Committee an integral part of the national labor movement. Like other 
workers of the day, retail workers had launched sit-down strikes, and they 
had done so against none other than the infamous Barbara Hutton, whom 
the rest of the labor movement could condemn with tremendous fervor. The 
strikers’ success also made the unions a permanent factor in New York City’s 
department stores. In the weeks and months after the sit-down strikes, both 
the unions’ supporters and their detractors would recognize the unions’ new 
permanence and legitimacy.
 The fastest reactions to the strikes came not from supporters, but from the 
opponents of retail unionism. Store managers throughout the country found 
the events in Woolworth’s troubling signs of things to come. In response to 
the Detroit sit-down strikes, the Dry Goods Economist published an editorial 
condemning sit-down strikes, offering a fierce defense of the employer’s right 
to use industrial espionage against unions. “The employer is supposed to sit 
twiddling his thumbs while plans are being perfected to attack his interests,” 
the Dry Goods Economist editors complained. “He may suspect, but he is not 
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allowed to find out what special type of gehenna is being worked up against 
him. Utterly regardless of the things that are being said about labor espionage 
in committee chambers, any store owner who these days does not fix up for 
himself an underground for keeping track of what is going on is inviting the 
same sort of surprise” as the Woolworth’s store managers.65
 Other retail industry analysts found different lessons in the sit-down 
strikes. The editors of New York University’s prestigious Journal of Retailing 
focused the April 1937 issue of the Journal, the first since the five-and-dime 
sit-down strikes, on personnel problems in retailing, specifically focusing on 
the issue of unionization. The journal’s editors, not surprisingly considering 
that it was written primarily for an audience of store managers, deplored 
what they saw as the collapse of “the American concept of equality of oppor-
tunity,” and its replacement by “the European concept of class conscious-
ness” among store workers. Most deadly of all these European ideas, John 
Wingate and O. Preston Robinson suggested in a Journal of Retailing article 
on “Unionization in Retailing,” was the sit-down strike: “This type of strike 
has provided workers with a powerful weapon that employers cannot help 
but heed. Strikers can be replaced . . . but it is proving much more difficult 
to oust sit-downers.” If the editors of these publications were clearly opposed 
to the new atmosphere of unionism and strikes, they and their audience now 
had to acknowledge strikes and unions as major factors in running a retail 
store, something which no trade journal had been willing to admit before 
the spring of 1937. It was a strong indication of the permanence of retail 
workers’ unions.66
 More supportive reactions were also forthcoming. Late in 1937, the musi-
cal revue Pins and Needles opened on Broadway. Since it was the International 
Ladies’ Garment Workers Union which produced this long-running hit, the 
revue was basically a combination of two different types of songs: songs about 
garment workers and songs about the news of the day (the rise of fascism in 
Europe, the split between the AFL and the CIO, and government attacks on 
labor, among other subjects). To this already eclectic mix, however, song-
writer Harold Rome added a sketch about the plight of department store 
workers, “Chain-Store Daisy.” This song, ostensibly about a college-educated 
woman who winds up working in Macy’s, could also be seen as symbolic of the 
department store worker’s new position as part of the working class: “I used to 
have the Honors Seat. / Now I sit down with pains in my feet / I used to be on 
the daisy chain / Now I’m a chain-store daisy.” In Rome’s eyes, if retail workers 
had once been relatively privileged members of the working class, they were 
now just as exploited as workers in other industries, and could justifiably share 
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the same stage with factory workers. For Rome, who began rehearsals of Pins 
and Needles two years earlier, long before the Woolworth’s sit-down strikes, 
these lyrics may have had almost nothing to do with the sit-down strikes or 
the department store unions, and the potential double meaning of “sit[ting] 
down with pains in my feet” may have been nothing more than a lucky coin-
cidence. Yet the opening of Pins and Needles a few months after the sit-down 
strikes mirrored a new awareness of department store workers among labor 
activists.67
 The most important indication of this new role of retail workers in the 
labor movement came from the leaders of the New Era Retail Committee. In 
May 1937, the committee sent a letter to John L. Lewis, formally requesting 
a CIO charter. The letter spent some time decrying the RCIPA leadership for 
their failure “to react to organizational opportunities” as well as the way in 
which the international leadership “has hindered and . . . virtually sabotaged 
the organizational efforts of its affiliated locals,” including attacking locals 
“in the midst of important strike activities,” an open reference to the debacle 
during the May’s strike nearly a year earlier. The committee spent most of the 
letter discussing the New Era Committee’s own successes, first among them 
the “agreements with the Woolworth’s and Grand five-and-dime stores in New 
York City.”68
 John L. Lewis, in many ways the de facto leader of the sit-down strike 
wave, responded warmly to the New Era Committee’s request. He granted the 
committee a CIO charter under the name of the United Retail Employees of 
America (UREA), and granted the new union jurisdiction over “all employees 
engaged in or about retail establishments.” In the letter announcing the new 
charter, he also wrote that he was “certain that under the inspiration of your 
affiliation with [the] CIO, your efforts will ultimately result in the complete 
unionization of the industry.”69
 Lewis’s optimism seemed well founded. The department store unions in 
New York City were now at the forefront of a national movement that might 
well be able to organize all workers in the retail industry. It was an amazing 
transformation from the unions that had been crumbling only months earlier, 
and it boded well for the unions’ immediate future.
Conclusion
The failures of 1935 and 1936 and the tremendous victory of 1937 are highly 
telling about the role of retail workers in American labor history. The events 
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of the spring of 1937 demonstrate that white-collar workers were an impor-
tant part of the industrial union movement of the 1930s. Their entrance into 
the CIO that year indicates that despite the emphasis—both at the time and 
since—on the CIO as a movement of male blue-collar workers, it was actually 
a far more complex and diverse movement than such descriptions allow.
 The unions’ history in these years also demonstrates yet again the criti-
cal role played by Communists in American labor history. Unlike in other 
sit-down strikes, here the strikers had full support from their Communist 
union leaders, who coordinated and negotiated the strikes that the workers 
conducted. By both acknowledging—again—the critical role women workers 
could play in the labor movement and by supporting workers’ determination 
to take the lead in the union, the Communist leaders of Local 1250 again 
demonstrated how important radicalism was to the labor movement of the 
1930s. Without these Communist leaders’ support, without their recognition 
that workers themselves would be the most important labor leaders, the strikes 
that won the CIO charter for the retail workers’ union would almost certainly 
not have been as successful.
 Finally, the unions’ history in these years is telling about what legitimacy 
actually meant for the labor movement of the 1930s. Legitimacy was not, as 
Michelson and other Communist organizers initially believed, necessarily the 
same thing as becoming less radical. Certainly that was their way of follow-
ing the Communist party’s United Front policy, but in the sit-down strikes 
of 1937, workers demonstrated that finding legitimacy could mean just the 
opposite of such a policy. In these strikes, the most militant and aggressive 
challenges against store managers in the unions’ entire history, workers found 
the legitimacy that organizers had sought to gain through moderation and 
compromise. The alliances that union leaders created in 1935–36 certainly 
played a role in the strike’s conclusion, but it was the five-and-dime store 
workers themselves who won these strikes, and in the process forced the CIO 
to take notice of the existence of retail workers.
 These years resulted in a great victory for New York City’s department store 
unions, unions that had finally won the legitimacy that leaders had long sought. 
The sit-down strikers had won a groundbreaking one-year agreement with 
Woolworth’s and Grand’s. Clarina Michelson, Nicholas Carnes, and the other 
leaders of the department store unions had won a certain stature within the 
city’s left-wing movement; Michelson in particular won extensive public praise 
for her leadership of these strikes from ex-IWW organizer and Communist 
party leader Elizabeth Gurley Flynn. And, in an event that had massive impli-
cations for the unions’ future, Samuel Wolchok, the anti-Communist leader 
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of the New Era Committee, won the presidency of the UREA. For the next 
decade the complicated relationship between anti-Communist national lead-
ers like Wolchok and Communist local leaders would be a defining factor 
in the history of New York City’s department store unions, as these unions 
expanded into New York City’s famous upscale department stores.70
Chapter 3
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Introduction
New York City’s department store unions expanded rapidly throughout the 
late 1930s, primarily in upscale stores. Between the sit-down strikes of 1937 
and the beginning of World War II, managers signed contracts at many of the 
city’s largest and most famous stores, including both Macy’s and Gimbel’s. 
These upscale stores would continue to represent the union’s strongest base 
throughout their history.
 The upscale stores presented different challenges from any that union orga-
nizers had encountered in their earlier struggles. In the upscale stores on 34th 
Street, workers with highly diverse educational, racial, ethnic, and geographic 
backgrounds waited on wealthy white customers. The process of consumption 
forced workers and customers in these stores into very close and often antagonistic 
contact; unlike in the downscale stores where customers were at least sometimes 
quite supportive of unionization efforts, in the upscale stores the union would find 
customers to be outspoken critics of workers and their unions. Managers, mean-
while, offered workers substantial benefit packages, winning the loyalty of many 
workers and making organizing a union even more challenging.
 If these stores were difficult places to organize, however, they were well 
worth the effort. The upscale stores were the logical step for a union that now, 
due to the 1937 sit-downs, had a certain amount of legitimacy. Unlike in the 
downscale stores where union organizers had been struggling for years against 
the rapid turnover, many workers in upscale stores viewed their jobs as per-
manent careers rather than brief stints. These workers tended to stay at their 
jobs longer, meaning that a union might have a far greater chance of lasting 
at the upscale stores than at the downscale stores. Additionally, these stores 
were far better known: managers of Macy’s, for instance, proudly advertised 
that it was the world’s largest store, and to win a union contract there would 
be a tremendous demonstration of the union’s power. If the unions could win 
at these upscale stores, they would have a future.
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 Additionally, the late 1930s was an ideal time in which to attempt organiz-
ing unions in the upscale stores. In these years midtown Manhattan was a 
tremendously complicated neighborhood. The stores may have dominated a 
small section of 34th Street, but they were right in the middle of New York’s 
chaotic garment district; unemployment demonstrations, May Day marches, 
and strikes all infringed upon the sanctity of the area in the later years of the 
Depression. These disruptions outside the store made managers’ control over 
the stores more difficult to maintain, and made their jobs somewhat analogous 
to the jobs of the managers of the Union Square stores where the union had 
begun its history. Here, as in Union Square, managers did what they could to 
insulate the stores against the working-class crowds outside, but union activ-
ists were always ready to disrupt these efforts.
 Communists again played a key role in the union drive at these stores, 
and became the leaders of most of the local unions that formed at the upscale 
department stores. As a result, these unions participated in the Popular Front, 
as members and organizers alike welcomed Communist authors as guests at 
union events, sang the spirituals and other folk songs that were sung through-
out the Popular Front, and helped raise money for the Abraham Lincoln 
Brigade in the Spanish Civil War.
 Non-Communists also took part in the creation of these unions. The local 
leadership of these unions, though Communists predominated, was politically 
quite diverse. Additionally, the non-Communists in the national union leader-
ship were critical to the local unions’ successes. Samuel Wolchok, in particular, 
earned tremendous respect from store managers and other business leaders 
for his moderate politics and his willingness to compromise with store manag-
ers. As war approached, however, this support emboldened Wolchok to seek 
more control over the affairs of the radical local unions.
 Everything that union organizers dealt with between 1937 and 1941—the 
antagonism between customers and store workers, the cultural and political 
alliances formed during the Popular Front, and the role of non-Communists 
like Wolchok in the unions—exploded late in 1941 into a huge strike at 
Gimbel’s. The largest strike that the unions had led up until this time, the 
Gimbel’s strike grew out of the conflict between Wolchok and the Communist 
leaders of the Gimbel’s local. Once the strike began, the Popular Front coali-
tion that had come to be so important to the unions emerged to support them, 
and workers and customers attacked one another, sometimes literally, in and 
around the Gimbel’s store.
 As the unions extended their power and finally won permanent union 
contracts at these upscale stores, they demonstrated again the importance of 
 Chapter 
Stability? –
these unions to American labor history. Again, Communists demonstrated 
a willingness to work closely with white-collar workers in the retail industry 
and to encourage these workers, men and women alike, to take the lead in 
their own struggle. And, again, local union leaders found their power within 
these unions challenged by store managers and national union leaders alike. 
The different groups were heading toward a collision, with investigations and 
charges flying between local leaders, national leaders, store managers, and 
the government. But before any final confrontation between these different 
groups could take place, the bombing of Pearl Harbor brought the Depression, 
and the height of the department store unions’ power, to an end.
The Streets Outside
Union Square had long been a center of radicalism and working-class con-
sumption, but midtown Manhattan, only a mile or so away, was a different 
neighborhood altogether, and generally a more chaotic and complex one. On 
West 34th Street, stores designed for wealthy shoppers nestled against gar-
ment factories and wholesale merchants, blocks away from the city’s West 
Side docks. Store managers fought, aided by city officials, to gain some sort of 
control over the complicated neighborhood outside the stores, but unlike in 
Union Square, here the battle was not for a public park, but for the behavior 
of people on streets and sidewalks. Store managers were only a small part 
of the world of midtown Manhattan, and their control of the streets outside 
the stores was always tenuous at best. On 34th Street as in Union Square the 
Communists challenged managerial control of public space before the depart-
ment store unions entered the picture, raising the constant possibility of a 
dangerous challenge to managers’ tenuous control of the streets outside.
 Along with Fifth Avenue, West 34th Street was one of the prime locations 
for upscale consumption in New York City. On this one street were Macy’s, 
Gimbel’s, Oppenheim Collins, McCreery’s, and Saks-34th Street. The sheer 
size of these stores allowed them to dominate 34th Street to an extent. At the 
same time, the stores were never isolated. All around the 34th Street shopping 
district, stretching as far south as 12th Street and as far north as 40th Street, 
and covering more or less the entire West Side of midtown Manhattan, lay the 
garment district, where wholesale merchants gathered up both clothing made 
in the city’s garment factories and clothing that was shipped into New York, 
and prepared it to be sold to stores all over the country.
 Although there were obvious advantages in having wholesale businesses so 
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close to the stores, there were equally important disadvantages. The garment 
district was a far less genteel area than store managers might have wished. 
Traffic clogged the streets as trucks stopped anywhere they could to load and 
unload goods. Streetcar peddlers, wandering through the neighborhood sell-
ing fruit and other goods, made matters even worse, and at least sometimes 
the sidewalks were packed from edge to edge, making movement difficult if 
not altogether impossible.1
 Like congestion, labor strife contributed to the disorder that dominated 
the garment district in the 1930s. In November 1934, elevator operators and 
building service workers in the garment district staged a highly disruptive 
strike before forcing landlords there to back down. (The garment district’s 
Figure 2
Shoppers on 34th Street, 1936. The chaos of 34th Street in the 1930s is brilliantly cap-
tured by Berenice Abbott in this photograph. Just outside stores that provided a refined 
and elegant upscale shopping experience were streets that were crowded, complex, 
and largely outside of managers’ control. The chaos in the streets outside greatly aided 
workers in their efforts to create unions. (Berenice Abbott, Herald Square, West 34th 
Street and Broadway, August 16, 1936. Courtesy of the Museum of the City of New York, 
Federal Arts Project, “Changing New York”)
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labor troubles reached new heights that year shortly after the elevator strike 
ended, when the guards hired to protect the warehouses during the strike did 
not get paid promptly and immediately staged a march through the garment 
district, demanding justice from the detective agency that employed them.) If 
anything, the labor problems in the garment district got worse in succeeding 
years. In 1935, during a strike of shipping clerks on 38th Street, a Western 
Union messenger simply going by the picket line was shot, and in 1936 and 
1937 strikes of thousands of building service workers once again hit the gar-
ment district.2
 Labor troubles and congestion in the garment district were complemented 
by industrial accidents and the activities of the Communist party. At least a 
few factories were located in the garment district, some of them on 34th Street. 
And like many factories in these years, safety standards here could be dismal. 
In a single week in early 1941 dozens of workers from two different garment 
factories had to go to the hospital for carbon monoxide poisoning. To make 
matters worse still, the May Day protests that began in Union Square went 
straight through the garment district. At least one day a year, therefore, the 
neighborhood streets were crowded not only by trucks and pushcarts, but by 
protestors actively calling for an end to capitalism.3
 Perhaps most disruptive of all the factors around the 34th Street stores were 
the actions of unemployed workers. In the late 1930s Communists and other 
unemployed workers staged repeated protests in front of the Works Progress 
Administration (WPA) offices a few blocks south of the stores, on West 23rd 
Street. When the WPA began in 1935, workers initially met the program with 
great enthusiasm, and willingly stood on line for hours at the WPA’s city offices 
trying to get jobs. By the spring of 1936 things had changed dramatically. 
Congress voted to cut much of the WPA funding, and workers met the news of 
the cutbacks with what historian Barbara Blumberg describes as “tremendous 
protest and resistance,” with “almost daily picketing of WPA headquarters in 
the Port Authority Building,” a few blocks south of the stores. In March 1936 
the furor reached a boiling point when demonstrators staged a sit-down pro-
test. After police attacked the protesters who were sitting down, and dragged 
them—through a hostile crowd—to waiting patrol cars, “the demonstrators 
reverted to mass picketing outside. On many days two thousand to three thou-
sand persons congregated on the street below the central offices, shouting and 
chanting.”4 Unemployed workers staged even larger and more militant protests 
over a year later, in the aftermath of the 1937 sit-down strikes, when Congress 
announced a new round of cuts. Some workers set up mass picket lines; other 
workers again staged sit-ins in the WPA offices, only to be removed by police 
 Chapter 
again. “Still other protesters attempted to seize and destroy personnel records 
so that the WPA could not tell how long anyone had been on work relief.” Most 
dramatic of all, however, and most important for the history of the department 
store unions, were the protests of the Workers’ Alliance, which led a symbolic 
“mass job hunt. Wearing white tags that read ‘WPA dismissed worker looking 
for a job,’ they visited firms” in the surrounding area. “At all the establishments 
they heard the same thing—no jobs available.”5
 There is no way to tell at this late date whether the workers conducting this 
mass job hunt stopped at the great 34th Street department stores. Certainly it 
is likely—there were many unemployed white-collar workers among unem-
ployed New Yorkers in this era, and, as discussed further below, white-collar 
workers frequently viewed department store work as a way to tide them over 
between more prestigious jobs. But whether unemployed workers ever actu-
ally entered the stores or not, these actions in the streets outside certainly 
threatened the pristine and elegant world that department store managers 
worked so hard to create.
 Managers did what they could to control the chaos outside, but they had 
little success. May Day was a particular concern for them, and store manag-
ers even went so far as to sit in on conferences between the police and May 
Day parade organizers to ask that the parade routes be moved further from 
the stores. But these negotiations, at which managers’ requests were flatly 
denied, only served to demonstrate that managers lacked the ability to control 
the streets outside, and were forced instead to negotiate for control of these 
streets. On 34th Street managerial control was limited to the store buildings 
themselves. The palaces of consumption, as other historians have aptly named 
them, were supposed to be areas where the chaos of the streets was invisible, 
where class struggle held no sway. Unfortunately for managers, creating such 
an environment on 34th Street was all but impossible; to get to the stores, 
customers had to trek through the chaos outside, and managers could do little 
to change that. In this situation, where control of the stores was all managers 
had, workers’ efforts to form unions, especially unions that were allied with 
the Communists who presented such troubles in the streets outside, were even 
more threatening. If workers began a serious union campaign, or went on 
strike, they would threaten managers’ already tenuous control still further.6
Organizing in Upscale Stores
Upscale department store workers faced some, but not all, of the same chal-
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lenges blue-collar workers faced when trying to form unions. The department 
stores, unlike the mass-production factories that have dominated the literature 
on union organizing in this era, were spaces designed for wealthy women’s 
consumption, greatly complicating the question of control over the workplace 
that is so central to labor history. At the same time, workers in department 
stores faced many of the same challenges that blue-collar workers faced when 
creating unions. In the department stores, as in other fields, organizers had 
to contend with managers’ efforts to control workers through both benefits 
packages and close supervision.
 By far the biggest complication union organizers faced in the upscale 
stores was the role of customers. Upscale department store managers had 
always attempted to allow wealthy customers, particularly women, spaces 
for consumption which were protected from workers and from class unrest. 
From their very origins, department stores had therefore been spaces reserved 
for the bourgeoisie. The department stores’ architecture marked these spaces 
accordingly. In the mid-nineteenth century, A. T. Stewart’s store, generally 
considered the first department store in America, was sometimes referred to 
as the “marble palace” for its extraordinary architecture. Throughout the early 
twentieth century, store managers became ever more elaborate in their efforts 
to make the stores pleasant environments for wealthy women. Everything 
became more ornate and extravagant, as managers replaced wooden floors 
with marble or stone, and increasingly embellished the walls and floors with 
mirrors and elaborate ornamentation.7
 These decorations not only stimulated customer interest in goods; many of 
them also worked to establish shopping as a form of leisure. Most important 
among the decorations that served both functions were the window displays. 
By the late 1930s department store windows had become highly dramatic, with 
some windows depicting actual events of the social season, like opera open-
ings, flower shows, and Broadway plays. Windows by this era had become “so 
significant, so lively . . . that stores report regular ‘window fans’ who check 
each change of display.” The windows were “like movie stars,” Women’s Wear 
Daily reported; each store window had its particular devotees, who kept track 
of the changing displays.8
 Like the luxurious decorations and displays, many of managers’ tactics not 
only made shopping convenient but also worked to emphasize the connec-
tions between shopping and leisure, by making the stores more pleasant places 
for potential customers to spend time. They also provided customers with a 
wide range of complementary services, including, in the words of historian 
Susan Porter Benson, “public telephones, parcel checkrooms, lost and found 
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services, shopping assistance, free delivery, waiting rooms, gift suggestion 
departments, mail-order departments, telephone order departments, accom-
modation bureaus, barber shops, restaurants, post offices, hospitals, radio 
departments, bus service, and shoe-shining stands.” Some store managers also 
set up lectures, live musical performances, and services for shoppers’ children 
including nurseries, children’s theater, and even miniature indoor zoos. All 
of these services created a space where shopping was accompanied by other 
pleasant pastimes, where opportunities both for consumption and for leisure 
were available at the same time, and in the same location.9
 Advertisements made this combination of leisure and shopping even more 
explicit. As a Macy’s advertisement from the 1930s boasted, “Lots of people 
come to Macy’s [just] for the view. . . . They claim the sprightly tempo does 
their spirits good. . . . One matron we know of refuses all social engagements 
for Thursday evenings—says she has a better time seeing life at Macy’s.” 
Another Macy’s advertisement featured a customer riding an escalator back-
wards, telling her companion, “I always go up backwards so as not to miss the 
view.” In these advertisements managers encouraged customers to come to the 
store to sightsee as much as to make purchases: as with the display windows, 
advertisements meshed consumption and leisure.10
 Perhaps most important of all the cultural programs provided by the store 
managers were those that were open to all people in New York City rather than 
just store customers, like the Macy’s Thanksgiving Day parade. Beginning in 
1924, the parade gave store managers a chance to entertain customers and 
noncustomers alike, with marching bands, circus performers of all sorts, caged 
wild animals, parade floats, and, in case any onlookers had forgotten about the 
holiday shopping season, Santa Claus. The planning and costs for the event 
were enormous, but the Macy’s parade was an excellent opportunity for man-
agers to encourage workers, customers, and community alike to have pride 
and admiration for the store that every year provided the joyous spectacle. 
Again, managers worked to connect consumption and leisure, making the two 
as interchangeable as possible.11
 The buildings and free services were only two of many tools at manag-
ers’ disposal in their quest to merge consumption and leisure. Store workers 
served a similar function. Workers’ jobs in these stores were to see to custom-
ers’ every need. To some extent, this was a racialized process: well-educated 
and well-trained white men and women waited on customers to help them 
make purchases, while in the elevators and the lavatories, uniformed African 
American workers waited to accede to white customers’ requests. As in many 
other places in American society of the 1930s, African American workers 
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functioned in part as a way to allow whites to experience yet again the privi-
leges of whiteness and to make white customers feel pampered and at ease.12
 The meshing of leisure and consumption, with its racial overtones, was 
only one important factor that defined upscale shopping; there were others. 
Most important, managers fostered a complex relationship between custom-
ers, store workers, and merchandise, one far different from the relationships 
between these factors in downscale stores. Kenneth Collins, who had been a 
vice-president at both Gimbel’s and Macy’s, described the process of upscale 
consumption in 1940: “The history of most stores in the past fifty years has 
included innumerable steps by which customers have been pushed farther 
and farther away from the temptation to buy freely.” By the beginning of the 
Depression, Collins wrote, managers increasingly kept “gloves, hosiery, shoes, 
underwear, neckwear, and similar articles hidden behind fixtures or under 
counters, so that the customer cannot even see, much less feel, the merchan-
dise.”13
 Upscale store managers denied customers direct access to goods for several 
reasons. For one thing, managers determined that this tactic would decrease 
customer shoplifting, a serious problem in upscale stores. Separating goods 
from customers also allowed the managers to surround customers with 
ornately decorated paneling rather than racks of goods, enhancing the cre-
ation of an upper-class environment. Most important, managers could create 
and control a relationship between customer and salesperson through arrang-
ing the stores in this manner. As Collins wrote, “the customer is better served 
when a clerk is available to meet her promptly, to analyze her needs, and to 
dig out from a hidden stock the goods the clerk thinks will satisfy.” Through 
arranging the storage and presentation of goods so that the customer would 
have to deal directly with a salesperson, store managers at upscale stores 
forced customers and store workers into close contact.14
 Managerial tactics therefore placed great emphasis on the abilities of the 
salespeople. Even more than in the downscale stores, sales clerks were essen-
tial actors in the upscale store managers’ presentation to the customers. To 
ensure a favorable impression, managers required neat appearance and good 
manners from salespeople. They also required highly trained and competent 
salespeople: without the salespeople’s knowledge of the stock on hand and 
their ability to provide customers with acceptable merchandise, the stores 
would immediately cease to operate, since customers could not gain access to 
goods without the intervention of a salesperson. Unlike those in the downscale 
stores, the workers in the upscale stores were skilled workers, whose expertise 
and training were highly valued.15
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 These practices left managers in a paradoxical position. In order to cre-
ate what they viewed as an ideal environment for upscale consumption, an 
environment for leisure that was free from the chaos and class struggle that 
dominated the streets outside, upscale store managers had to employ thou-
sands of workers and place them in close contact with wealthy customers. 
These workers included not only skilled salespeople, but also workers who 
were responsible for the stores’ numerous other services, some of them far less 
skilled: elevator operators, gift wrappers, cafeteria workers, and, in the credit 
and billing departments, office workers. These department store workers, in a 
sense, were at once both the most vital agents in creating the stores’ exclusive 
culture of service and refinement and also, throughout the stores’ existence, 
the biggest potential threat to that environment should they become dissatis-
fied.16
 The paradox was a dangerous one for managers, particularly due to the 
often antagonistic relationship between store workers and store customers. 
Some customers resorted to treating store workers as they would their ser-
vants, the only other workers with whom wealthy people might have come 
into close contact on a daily basis; but in an era when domestic servitude was 
considered the most degrading job possible, this sort of treatment could eas-
ily lead to informal protests on the part of department store workers. Benson 
found that saleswomen would allow particularly condescending customers to 
stand in the store for hours before waiting on them, or could escort the dif-
ficult customer to a dressing room and then simply abandon them.17
 There is no record of this sort of conflict between customers and workers 
in the downscale stores. While it is possible that such conflicts simply went 
unrecorded, it is more likely that the peculiar situation of workers in upscale 
stores meant that there was greater potential for conflict between customers 
and workers. At Klein’s, Ohrbach’s, and May’s, most customers shared class, 
neighborhood, and ethnic ties with store workers. At the upscale stores, how-
ever, while workers lived in a variety of different places, few if any lived in the 
expensive neighborhoods from where many of the stores’ customers came.18
 Workers in these upscale stores found customers to be a nuisance, an 
additional grievance for which they were not adequately rewarded, and this 
conflict drove at least some workers towards the union. When asked why he 
joined the union, for example, former salesperson and union organizer Irving 
Fajans launched into a lengthy speech about the various types of customers 
whom he had to serve. The types included, according to Fajans, “the kind 
who tells you she knows exactly what she wants, and then takes two hours to 
make up her mind . . . The ‘match it’ type [who will] come in with a smudge 
Stability? –
of lipstick on a piece of paper, for instance, and want you to match it exactly in 
the article,” and “the customer who will place a C.O.D. order for a large amount, 
sometimes hundreds of dollars, to impress the clerk, and then the merchandise 
is returned the next day.” While Fajans’ comments on customers were not all 
gender-specific, most of his comments indicated that the customers whom he 
disliked the most were female. Other workers went even further in their gen-
dered depictions of the hated customers, with one worker attacking customers 
in verse as those “ladies of leisure / who always dally, way after the closing 
bell,” which of course meant extra work for the salespeople waiting on these 
customers.19
 This antagonism between workers and customers greatly complicated the 
task of organizing unions. On the one hand, the workers who did find custom-
ers’ behavior intolerable often found common ground with union organizers, 
particularly considering the strong rhetorical attacks on wealthy women that 
had proved such a powerful weapon during the 1937 sit-down strikes. At the 
same time, workers who dared attempt to organize a union at these stores 
would find that, at the upscale stores, they could not count on customer sup-
port during conflicts with management.
 If customers were one factor that union organizers could count on to drive 
workers towards the union, there were others. The various forms of discrimi-
nation that existed within the stores drove some workers to support union-
ization. The workforce at the upscale stores was more heterogeneous than at 
stores like Klein’s and Ohrbach’s. While workers at the downscale stores almost 
universally lived in the city’s immigrant communities, workers at the upscale 
stores tended to live in many different neighborhoods, ranging from these 
immigrant communities to the Upper West Side and Harlem. While at the 
downscale stores a large majority of the workers were Jewish, in the upscale 
stores only around half of the employees were Jewish; Irish, African American, 
Italian, and white Protestant workers also worked at these stores.20
 Store managers had several means of controlling this complex workforce. 
First, they instituted a system of rigid ethnic and racial segregation. As Macy’s 
worker and union organizer Charles E. Boyd later wrote,
Hiring was controlled by department heads and some would hire no 
Jews while others would hire no Catholics or no Protestants. Some 
would hire only Irish; others would hire no Irish. Discrimination was 
practiced somewhere in the store . . . against almost any group, but one 
general rule was observed throughout the store. Except on passenger 
elevators, blacks were not visible.
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Additionally, there was significant gender discrimination within the stores. 
Although stores made public their willingness to promote women from within 
the stores into managerial positions, women salespeople in the 1930s were 
generally restricted to relatively low-paying departments, such as women’s 
garments and notions. The highest-paying jobs, such as those in the furniture 
department and the toy department (both of which were paid by commission, 
and considered very lucrative) were reserved for white men.21
 Discrimination may have driven some workers towards the union, but it 
also served to complicate the task of organizers. The divisions among workers 
at upscale stores made it even more difficult to organize workers into a single 
entity, like a union. Certainly there is no evidence that large numbers of white 
workers objected to the discrimination against African American workers in 
the stores. And the union itself was hardly a paradigm of anti-racist activism; 
they continued to ignore the “Don’t Buy Where You Can’t Work” campaigns 
going on further uptown, and their actions against job discrimination were 
minor at best. Despite the unions’ massive gains in the late 1930s and vocal 
commitment to racial equality, unionization did nothing to challenge the rac-
ist hiring practices that existed within the stores.
 If many white workers accepted discrimination, they objected to other 
aspects of store work. In one early CIO publication, a Macy’s worker described 
the feverish pace of store work: “the frantic rush from subway to store—the 
mad dash to put away your stock—the brusque appearance of the section 
manager.” Workers spoke also of the overly short “half-hour lunch—the long 
wait in line at the cafeteria—[and] the attempt to swallow your food with one 
eye on the clock.” Additionally, working in these stores could be incredibly 
dehumanizing. Fiction writer Shirley Jackson worked at Macy’s for a short 
time during this era, and in a story for The New Republic she described Macy’s 
as bureaucracy at its most bewildering, where people were essentially replaced 
by numbers:
I enjoyed meeting the time clock, and spent a pleasant half-hour punch-
ing various cards . . . I went and found out my locker number, which was 
1773, and my time-clock number, which was 712, and my cash-box 
number, which was 1336, and my cash-register number, which was 
253, and my cash-register-drawer number, which was K, and my cash- 
register-drawer-key number, which was 872, and my department num-
ber, which was 13. And that was my first day.22
 However, if working conditions could be strenuous and unpleasant, they 
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were decidedly better than in the downscale stores. Managers at upscale stores 
placed great pride and emphasis on their training programs for sales work-
ers, investing extensive time and money into training each worker. Managers 
at these stores therefore encouraged workers to remain with the store for as 
many years as possible, despite the various drawbacks of working in these 
stores. Upscale store managers had all sorts of ways to gain workers’ loyalty: 
they paid workers well, with salaries for sales workers averaging around $15 
a week rather than the $7 to $12 a week workers received in the downscale 
stores. In addition, upscale store managers offered workers numerous benefits 
and cultural programs. Macy’s serves as an excellent example. Macy’s workers 
later remembered that the store provided free turkeys at Thanksgiving, and 
even a house upstate where workers could go during their vacations. Macy’s 
managers also provided limited health insurance, through the Macy’s Mutual 
Aid Association (MMAA). Like many other department stores in New York 
City, Macy’s participated in the Greater New York Department Store Baseball 
League, allowing workers to represent the store where they worked, and 
encouraging them to identify themselves as part of the store’s team. And, while 
it does not appear to have been a factor at Macy’s, other city department stores 
also offered workers opportunities to perform in plays, setting up dramatic 
clubs for their employees.23
 These tactics worked to gain the loyalty of at least some employees, 
but caused others to resent the managers’ interference in their lives. Jane 
Spadavecchio remembered the benefits packages (especially the free turkeys) 
very fondly, proudly stating years after working in the stores that she was still a 
“firm Macyite.” Yet some of these practices were extremely intrusive. Managers 
took money for the MMAA, for example, directly out of workers’ paychecks, 
even if workers never used the MMAA’s services. In addition, the MMAA was 
responsible for sending the personnel office “a list of all the people employed 
. . . who have been rated ‘poor risks’ by the hospital,” and managers often fired 
these people first during the much-feared post-Christmas round of layoffs. 
Union organizers raised this issue wherever possible, labeling the MMAA 
“Macy’s Public Enemy Number 1,” and issuing frequent demands for “infor-
mation about the administration of the funds collected . . . for its maintenance” 
in order to remind workers that they were paying for this program. Union 
supporters also claimed that the funds were being spent “in planning artistic 
murals” and “in purchasing non-break swivel chairs for the doctors” at the 
MMAA infirmary rather than in improving workers’ health.24
 Besides keeping workers satisfied through high pay and good benefits, 
managers had other means of controlling their workers, most important 
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among them an elaborate system of supervision. With an extremely wealthy 
group of customers without direct access to goods, managers at the upscale 
stores regarded workers rather than customers as the most significant group of 
potential shoplifters. As managers did at Klein’s and Ohrbach’s, upscale store 
managers hired large numbers of store detectives. In addition, managers at 
some of these stores, like Macy’s, required workers to leave all their personal 
possessions in lockers throughout the day, so that if detectives did find any 
goods in a worker’s possession, managers could then demonstrate that worker’s 
guilt. Macy’s managers also attempted to control their employees’ shoplifting 
by resorting to searches of all workers, a practice which workers strongly dis-
liked. In an OWU publication from the early 1930s, one Macy’s worker wrote 
indignantly of the intense scrutiny: “Are we prisoners who have to be searched 
before we go to our departments?” the anonymous worker asked, complaining 
of the security department’s demands “that we shake out newspapers, packages 
and books before the eyes of the guards and leave them under surveillance all 
day.” The ironies of these sorts of security measures were inherent: one article 
in the union paper pointed out that the “head of the Protection Department 
at Macy’s is paid $50,000 a year to see that $10,000 worth of merchandise isn’t 
stolen.”25
 Despite their dislike of the store security procedures, union organizers did 
not endorse shoplifting as a legitimate way for workers to supplement their 
wages. If shoplifting was an important form of personal and informal protest, 
union organizers held, almost by definition, that formal protests like unioniza-
tion would be a more powerful way to resist exploitation. On the other hand, 
contributors to the union papers also avoided condemning shoplifting. One 
anonymous contributor even offered a mild defense of the practice, suggest-
ing that it was mere “petty theft,” the elimination of which “does not depend 
upon a prison-like supervision, but on the establishment of a decent standard 
of wages.” The message of this article was determinedly ambiguous: shoplift-
ing might not be the best way to combat store managers’ exploitation, but 
the author of this article clearly felt that for many workers shoplifting was a 
method of self-help, of informal resistance against low wages.26
 At least some upscale store managers employed security measures that 
went far beyond simple searches. A detective at one unnamed upscale store 
in New York City, Alfred Gerrity, claimed that the store employed “‘informa-
tion employe[e]s’ in almost every department [who] receive $2 a week extra 
for reporting anything unusual they observe,” thus combining the jobs of 
preventing shoplifting and keeping an eye out for anyone prone to union orga-
nizing. Gerrity also described the way in which “at night, we turn the lights 
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off in the elevators and run them from floor to floor, observing the actions of 
maintenance men, stock clerks, and porters [the lowest-paid workers in most 
stores] through the little windows.” Store detectives would also attempt to trap 
employees by “plant[ing] merchandise to tempt employees to steal.”27
 These sorts of security practices were of special concern to union orga-
nizers, since pro-union workers were frequently targets of security sweeps. 
An anonymous department store worker and union organizer recalled in an 
interview with WPA interviewer May Swenson, “When I first started there, 
they were just beginning to try to organize, and everything pertaining to the 
union had to be on the q.t. If you were caught distributing leaflets, or other 
union literature around the job you were instantly fired.”28
 But workers in the upscale stores persisted in organizing unions, despite the 
efforts of managers to quash such activities. This was especially true of non-
sales workers, who were in a decidedly worse position than the salespeople. 
Since nonsales workers did not have to undergo as lengthy a training process, 
managers were much less concerned about turnover. As a result, nonsales 
workers worked for much lower salaries and often worked longer hours. 
Cashiers at Macy’s, for example, made only $8 a week during the 1930s, com-
parable to what workers made in downscale stores. Managers also required 
many of these nonsales workers to work seven days a week, and to do so even 
on some holidays.29
 Managers, as already noted, strongly and successfully opposed workers’ 
efforts to form unions throughout the early 1930s. Despite their need for 
trained sales workers, managers at the upscale stores fired both nonsales 
workers and highly skilled sales workers who attempted to join the union in 
the early 1930s; several of the first leaders of the local unions became full-time 
organizers after being fired by managers for union organizing.30
 As a result of this scrutiny, union organizers in the upscale stores, 
Communists and non-Communists alike, resorted to extremely inventive tac-
tics in order to recruit other workers to the union. Many of these tactics made 
the perpetrators almost wholly undetectable, no matter how many spies store 
managers employed. The worker Swenson interviewed remembered,
Sometimes we’d insert the leaflets into the sales ledgers after closing 
time . . . In the morning every clerk would find a pink sheet saying: 
“Good Morning, how’s everything . . . and how about coming to Union 
meeting tonight . . .” . . . we [also] swiped the key to the toilet paper 
dispensers [in] the washroom, took out the paper and substituted 
printed slips of just the right [size]! . . . We also used . . . store chutes, 
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and when sending down a load of merchandise, would toll [sic] down 
a bunch of leaflets with it, while the super had his back turned. They’d 
all scatter out on the receiving end, and the clerks would pick them up 
when they handled the stock. The floorwalker might be coming along 
and see those pink sheets all over the place—he’d get sore as hell—but 
what could he do?
The workers involved in these sorts of anonymous organizing activities were 
able to spread the word about union actions, without making themselves vul-
nerable to managers’ counterattacks. 31
 Anonymous or not, the organizing was eventually successful. With 
Communists and other activists laying claim to the streets outside, and with 
a growing number of their employees lobbying for the right to join the union 
that had led the Woolworth sit-down strikes only months before, the manag-
ers of the 34th Street department stores found themselves in desperate need of 
greater stability. In the late 1930s Samuel Wolchok and the other national lead-
ers of the CIO’s retail workers union, the UREA, offered those employers who 
were willing to sign union contracts the stability that managers so anxiously 
sought.
Stability with the CIO, –
Samuel Wolchok’s greatest achievement in the UREA’s early years was to create 
a situation where upscale store managers came to view him as a stable, respon-
sible, and relatively conservative alternative to the increasingly powerful radi-
cals who took over most of the local unions in New York City’s department 
stores. In order to secure Wolchok’s support in their struggle against local 
leaders and gain the stability that he promised, at least some store managers 
signed contracts with the UREA.
 When the CIO officially granted the UREA a charter in May 1937, no one 
could have imagined that the union would grow as quickly as it actually did. 
When it was created, the UREA was an extremely small union of just under 
15,000 members, and it was almost entirely confined to ex-RCIPA locals from 
New York City. By the end of 1937 the union, now with 40,000 members, 
represented a beachhead for the possibility of a labor stronghold in the retail 
industry.32
 This numerical growth greatly strengthened the union’s left wing. The larg-
est new sector where the union organized was in wholesale firms, firms which 
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sold to retailers rather than to the general public. In particular, the UREA 
recruited a large number of left-wing union leaders in the New York City 
wholesale trade when these locals joined the union as UREA Local 65. After 
this, the name of the union was immediately changed to the United Retail and 
Wholesale Employees Association (URWEA).33
 Another major change also took place between the sit-down strikes and 
the December 1937 convention: the CIO set up a special organization, the 
Department Store Organizing Committee (DSOC), to organize department 
store workers. Wolchok had played a key role in DSOC’s creation, and in so 
doing had further cemented his place as the leader of the new organizing 
drive in the retail industry. In September 1937, months before the convention, 
Wolchok again wrote to John L. Lewis, asking Lewis for help with a new orga-
nizing drive. As Wolchok envisioned it, the new drive would be
a uniform drive throughout the various states, in organizing the 
Department Store workers. I am firmly convinced that if we could 
have such a unified drive, placing a given number of organizers in this 
field, that remarkable progress could be made. . . . Place at our disposal 
fifty organizers for the next four months—to concentrate a drive in the 
Department Stores.”34
 Wolchok might have known, even while writing this letter, that no amount 
of statistics on nonunionized department store workers was likely to convince 
Lewis to grant his request. The four months’ of organizing that Wolchok pro-
posed would have cost the CIO $40,000 at a time when Lewis had just loaned 
the UREA $5000 at Wolchok’s request. In addition, Lewis had already assigned 
twenty CIO organizers to help Wolchok and the UREA. Whatever Wolchok 
thought would happen as a result of his letter, Lewis provided neither addi-
tional funds nor the organizers whom Wolchok had requested.35
 If it was therefore unlikely that Lewis would grant Wolchok’s request, it 
was nonetheless possible. The two union leaders had apparently been close 
allies from the beginning of their acquaintance, in the summer of 1937. One 
of Wolchok’s strongest supporters in the UREA, Vice-President John Cooney, 
reported that during the first actual meeting between Lewis and Wolchok, 
“Lewis clearly indicated that he recognized in Brother Wolchok a leader, a man 
of courage, a man of executive ability.” While Cooney is hardly an objective 
observer, Lewis himself indicated his strong personal admiration for Wolchok. 
At one point during the early years of the URWEA, Lewis sent Wolchok a 
telegram announcing that Wolchok was “personally entitled to great credit” 
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for the “splendid achievement[s]” of the UREA, and Lewis gave particular 
reference to Wolchok’s “able handling of negotiations.”36
 Perhaps because of their mutual respect, Lewis agreed to bring the subject 
of DSOC up at the national CIO meeting in October 1937, and suggested that 
Wolchok attend. Wolchok immediately began work on a report of the UREA’s 
accomplishments, calling their work (quite accurately) “a spring-board for 
further progress” despite the “meagre funds at our disposal and the limited 
number of organizers available,” and ending with an appeal to Lewis and the 
CIO Executive Board to reconsider his request. Wolchok also insisted, at the 
end of the report, that the retail clerk was actually
the most effective medium of CIO propaganda, contacting as he does 
thousands of persons in his establishment, his store . . . The SALESMAN 
of America is the most ARTICULATE type of worker and a CIO button 
on his lapel means a standing, ever-present symbol of labor unionism 
to untold populations.
This report illustrates more than Wolchok’s abilities as an organizer, which 
would later be called into serious question. It also suggests the continuing 
importance of gender within the CIO leadership. Many of the department 
store workers whom Wolchok spoke of organizing in this drive were women; 
yet these workers were conveniently unmentioned in Wolchok’s strongly 
gendered description of the articulate salesman wearing a CIO button “on 
his lapel.” Wolchok’s immediate assumption of workers as men was one way 
in which he reaffirmed his commonalties with Lewis and other CIO leaders. 
As Elizabeth Faue has demonstrated, gendered assumptions like these bound 
labor leaders together in the 1930s, giving them even more common ideologi-
cal ground than they already had.37
 Wolchok got almost exactly what he requested at the October meeting 
where he presented his report. On October 17 the CIO Executive Board 
approved both funding and organizers for DSOC. The Executive Board agreed 
that Wolchok would serve on the board of DSOC, as would John Cooney. 
Neither Wolchok nor Cooney, however, was placed in charge of DSOC. That 
responsibility went to CIO co-founder and Amalgamated Clothing Workers of 
America President Sidney Hillman. For a few days at least it looked as though 
Hillman, and not Wolchok, would take charge of organizing the nation’s 
department store workers. Circumstances intervened, however; Hillman 
became severely ill almost as soon as DSOC was formed, and Wolchok 
stepped in to take control of DSOC. By November 1937, barely a month 
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after the Executive Board had created the organizing committee, Wolchok, 
not Hillman, was leading the drive to unionize department store workers in 
America.38
 By the URWEA’s first convention, in December 1937, the union was there-
fore in a very favorable situation for a massive and successful organizing drive. 
They had a new vehicle for organizing in DSOC, one with additional funding 
and organizers. They also had a readily identifiable and notorious enemy, 
since the issues raised by the anti–chain store activists were still fresh in the 
national imagination. In one reference to the discussions surrounding chain 
stores, an ally of Wolchok’s named Henry Fruchter reminded the delegates to 
the 1937 convention that “the corporations in ownership of department and 
chain stores are the most ruthless in the world. They command tremendous 
financial resources, they control the reactionary press, they are in league with 
corrupt politicians, they will stop at nothing to check the onward stride of 
labor.”39
 Perhaps most important, in Samuel Wolchok, the URWEA also had a 
leader with a growing national reputation among business leaders as a moder-
ate and responsible union organizer. Wolchok’s rise to national prominence 
in many ways mirrored the URWEA’s own rise. As a result of the successful 
sit-down strikes and the union’s earliest contracts signed by store managers 
in New York City and throughout the country, Wolchok became a figure of 
some importance in the CIO in the late 1930s. In 1938, for instance, Wolchok 
became the vice-president of the New York State Industrial Union Council, the 
CIO’s New York State governing organization; he also was invited to speak at 
an international labor congress that same year.40
 Like CIO leaders, business leaders also had a high opinion of Wolchok’s 
abilities. Louis Broido, the vice-president in charge of personnel relations at 
Gimbel’s, held Wolchok in such high regard as a union leader (and held such 
little respect for local leaders) that Broido insisted on negotiating exclusively 
with Wolchok, much to the annoyance of the local leaders. In addition, an 
article on retail unionism in Business Week showered praise upon Wolchok, 
suggesting that Wolchok “had jumped into the Class A rating of union lead-
ers,” and going on to claim that Wolchok was “no longer in the shadow of 
Lewis and Hillman, but was instead rising to power in his own right.”41
 While to employers Wolchok emphasized his willingness to compromise 
and negotiate, at the union’s convention Wolchok and his allies portrayed the 
union’s president as a picture of rugged masculinity. As Henry Fruchter put 
it: “Our leader [Wolchok] is a simple man, with a background of vast labor 
experience. . . . He is much more at home in a world of strife,—strikes, pickets, 
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organization. The limelight and glory of a few hours do not go to his head, nor 
do they arouse an exaggerated sense of superiority. . . . a man of character, of 
rugged strength, of vast human experience in the battle for labor.”42
 In the late 1930s Wolchok had at least two contradictory reputations: 
among managers, he had a reputation as someone willing to compromise, 
while, among his supporters in the union, he had a reputation as a militant 
fighter for workers’ rights. Faced with this combination, department store 
union delegates to the 1937 convention supported Wolchok’s bid for the 
presidency, declining the right to put up any more-radical candidate for the 
office. At the same time, the Communist leaders of the department store 
unions retained some reservations about their own lack of representation in 
the national leadership. One Local 1250 delegate, for example, sponsored a 
resolution during the convention calling for a “Vice-President, who shall be 
drawn from the ranks of those actively organizing in the department store 
field, and who shall be designated to the task of directing and coordinating the 
organization of the department store field.” This position was not created, but 
the resolution itself, particularly with its qualification of someone “drawn from 
the ranks of those actively organizing,” was enough to suggest that department 
store union leaders were concerned about how much control they would have 
over the new organization.43
 Wolchok’s leadership attracted the support of many retail managers besides 
Louis Broido. By February 1938 some industry experts in fact were beginning 
to suggest that capitulation to unionism might be the retailer’s best option. 
That month, in an article in the Journal of Retailing, M. D. Mosessohn and 
A. Furman Greene wrote that “the most [employers] can hope for is peace in 
the ranks of organized labor with the elimination of jurisdictional conflicts.” 
To secure this peace, the wise employer “dare not, by word or act, intimidate, 
coerce, or discourage” workers from joining the union, since, due in part to 
the new labor laws, the employer “must proceed with collective bargaining 
and must continue to bargain” in order to keep the store running with any 
semblance of order. Not coincidentally, “peace in the ranks” and “the elimina-
tion of jurisdictional conflicts” were goals which Samuel Wolchok offered as 
his own, so long as store managers signed union contracts.44
 With local organizers willing—for the moment—to follow Wolchok’s lead, 
many store managers did sign contracts. The managers at the Hearn’s store, 
a large downscale store on 14th Street, became the first in New York City to 
sign a collective bargaining agreement when they signed an open-shop con-
tract with the New Era Committee in April 1937, only a few weeks after the 
Woolworth-Grand strikes. Local 1250, still led by Clarina Michelson, with 
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former Ohrbach’s worker Nicholas Carnes as her second-in-command, came 
to represent the union at Hearn’s as well as several other stores, most important 
among them Loeser’s, one of the large downscale stores on Fulton Street.45
 Shortly after Wolchok’s emergence as the leader of the URWEA and DSOC, 
other store managers began to sign contracts as well. In February 1938 Macy’s 
managers signed a contract with Local 1-S, the local covering all Macy’s work-
ers who worked within the Herald Square store. (Locals 1 and 1-A covered the 
warehouse and delivery workers respectively.) Local 1-S was extremely unusu-
al among department store unions, in that the local leadership was politically 
diverse from the union’s very beginnings. The single most important leader of 
Local 1-S was Samuel Kovenetsky, who began leading the local union as the 
business manager in the late 1930s, and continued to do so throughout much 
of the union’s history. Kovenetsky himself, though he worked closely with 
Communists, was a liberal Democrat rather than a Communist. Among his 
fellow leaders of Local 1-S, however, were several Communists. Most impor-
tant among these was Marcella Loring, a white woman from the Midwest who 
served, on and off, as the union’s vice-president and sometimes even president 
over the next decade.46
 In March 1938 DSOC won another important success: Gimbel’s Local 2 
finally won a contract, after fourteen weeks of negotiating and years of orga-
nizing at Gimbel’s. As at Macy’s and Hearn’s, the union’s contract at Gimbel’s 
guaranteed workers at that store significant wage increases and somewhat 
shorter hours. Like most of the other locals, Communists led Local 2, most 
important among them an ex-furniture salesman named William Michelson, 
who, like Loring, Carnes, and Clarina Michelson, was probably a member of 
the Communist party, and was at the very least a strong supporter of CP poli-
cies. William Michelson, who eventually married Marcella Loring, would, like 
Samuel Kovenetsky and Nicholas Carnes, remain a major figure in New York 
City’s department store unions for the next several decades.47
 Many store managers, however, held out somewhat longer. At Bloomingdale’s, 
at the time a somewhat less upscale store that sat under the Third Avenue elevated 
train, store managers adamantly refused to negotiate, despite having a majority 
of their employees support unionization. On October 27, 1938, Bloomingdale’s 
employees voted to give management a choice: negotiate with the union or face 
a strike. The workers gave management two days to make up their mind, and 
the store managers, faced with more than 1500 workers threatening to strike, 
quickly capitulated. By December 12 not only was the union victorious, but 
Bloomingdale’s managers had agreed to a closed shop and wage increases which 
totaled $150,000 a year among the 3000 employees at Bloomingdale’s.48
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 Besides the huge success that this contract represented for the union, the 
Bloomingdale’s negotiations represented a crucial moment in the unions’ 
history. It was during these negotiations that union leaders first made use of 
the Labor Relations Board formed by the 1935 Wagner Act. Legislators had 
originally intended the Wagner Act as a substitute for the NIRA, which the 
Supreme Court had declared unconstitutional in 1935. The Wagner Act was 
somewhat more complicated than the NIRA, since it called for the creation of 
a permanent and extremely powerful National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), 
which would be responsible for handling negotiations between workers and 
employers. Unlike the NIRA, the Wagner Act was strongly and explicitly 
pro-union, and offered no real benefits to employers beyond a faint hope that 
it would stabilize the labor movement. In order to achieve this stability, the 
Wagner Act established the right of workers to hold fair and federally medi-
ated union elections, once the union received NLRB certification. While the 
Wagner Act was a tremendous victory for labor, the events at Bloomingdale’s 
illustrate that the NLRB’s intervention was the beginning, not the end, of 
workers’ struggles to get a union. Despite the NLRB’s decision in the union’s 
favor at Bloomingdale’s, it was the workers’ decision to strike, not federal inter-
vention, which forced the Bloomingdale’s management to capitulate.49
 Both the Bloomingdale’s local and the local at the 42nd Street Stern’s store, 
where managers succumbed to unionization in 1939, became additional 
strongholds of radicalism within the URWEA. The Bloomingdale’s local, Local 
3, was led by Lowell Morris, a former cafeteria worker. Morris was at least 
close to the Communist party, though it is not clear if he was ever actually a 
member. Radical ex-saleswoman Sadka Brown became the leader of Stern’s 
Local 5.50
 These leaders of the new department store unions—Clarina Michelson and 
Nicholas Carnes at Local 1250, representing Hearn’s and a few other down-
scale stores, William Michelson at Gimbel’s Local 2, Samuel Kovenetsky and 
Marcella Loring at Macy’s Local 1-S, Lowell Morris at Bloomingdale’s Local 3, 
and Sadka Brown at Stern’s Local 5—quickly formed a solid bloc within the 
URWEA. While they united primarily around their shared Communist poli-
tics (except for Kovenetsky), other factors also served to unite them. The lead-
ers’ youth served as a strong bond between these leaders; except for Clarina 
Michelson, these men and women were all still in their twenties when the 
union formed. All of the younger leaders also had learned much of what they 
knew about organizing from their participation in RCIPA Local 1250 under 
Clarina Michelson, who was still a major influence within all of the depart-
ment store union locals. In addition, they had all worked in department stores 
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themselves, although several of them had been fired from their jobs for union 
organizing before managers capitulated. Finally, all seem to have been person-
ally very popular with union members, despite the fact that few members 
shared their leaders’ radical politics.51
 Wolchok devised several responses to these local leaders’ presence as 
an oppositional bloc within his organization, trying both to control and to 
appease the new coalition of Communists who now led the URWEA’s largest 
locals. Wolchok’s attempts to control these leaders took several forms. First, he 
established a rule, similar to that which had driven the unions from the RCIPA, 
that every local would have one vote on issues of national union policy, regard-
less of the size of the local. As a result of this rule, the large radical department 
store unions got the same number of votes as the other locals, many of which 
were much smaller and much less radical. In addition, Wolchok’s decision to 
break up the department store union into a separate local at each store, the 
new leaders of department store union organizers believed, was an attempt to 
divide and therefore to more easily control their unions.52
 Wolchok’s attempt to appease the New York City local leaders eventually 
created even more trouble for the URWEA’s future. After local union orga-
nizers came to the conclusion that the creation of the separate locals was an 
attempt to control them, they demanded some sort of structure binding the 
separate locals together. Their most common demand in the late 1930s and 
early 1940s was the right to form a Joint Board, a formally recognized, united 
group of locals within the union. This board would allow the local unions a 
certain amount of autonomy from the national union, and—more importantly 
perhaps—would allow them to remain formally linked. The establishment of a 
Joint Board, however, required the national union leaders’ consent, and, while 
Wolchok repeatedly promised the New York City local leaders that they would 
receive their Joint Board at some point, he was unwilling to make it a priority, 
focusing instead on organizing more locals outside of New York City.53
 Department store union organizers responded to this delay by soundly crit-
icizing Wolchok among themselves and at local union meetings. Particularly, 
by the late 1930s these leaders complained that Wolchok’s conciliatory attitude 
towards management was a poor strategy to win workers the best contract 
they could win. William Atkinson, an African American union member at 
Macy’s who would become a leader of Local 1-S in the 1940s, remembered 
years later that Wolchok’s attitude when dealing with management “was a beg-
ging attitude.” To Atkinson, Wolchok’s efforts simply were not as powerful as 
the far more confrontational bargaining tactics, including strike threats, which 
were increasingly favored by the local leaders in these unions.54
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 The two sides nonetheless maintained an uneasy unity through the rest of 
the decade, a unity that had extremely positive effects for the union. Wolchok’s 
so-called “begging attitude” beautifully complemented the local union orga-
nizers’ more confrontational style. Where Wolchok could not convince man-
agers to sign a contract through negotiations, as at Bloomingdale’s, the work-
ers, with the support of the local leaders, could scare managers into signing by 
threatening to strike.
 Despite their powerfully complementary strategies, there were certain 
stores where neither local nor national department store union leaders seemed 
able to win. Two areas in particular eluded union organizers in the 1930s. First, 
union organizers made no headway against the upscale stores on Fifth Avenue. 
Facing none of the disruptions and chaos in the streets with which 34th Street 
store managers had to contend, the promised stability of unionization was not 
a particularly pressing issue for Fifth Avenue store managers. Additionally, the 
unions had relatively few successes in the downscale stores. Most important 
among their failures in the downscale stores was Alexander’s, the large down-
scale chain, where union organizers continually tried, and failed, to create 
unions. While Local 1250 did lead a two-week strike at Alexander’s, they lost 
an NLRB election there after an extensive anti-union propaganda campaign by 
store managers. Somewhat ironically, the union also never gained a real foot-
hold at Ohrbach’s and Klein’s, having never gained a written contract at either 
store. Despite their tremendous successes in the late 1930s, the department 
store unions were not gaining ground where managers were at their most 
exploitative, and where the union had initially had its strongest roots. The 
only downscale stores where the union was able to win—Hearn’s, Loeser’s, and 
Bloomingdale’s—were the stores where managers gave up before the workers 
had to go on strike.55
 There were several reasons for the URWEA’s weakness in downscale stores. 
First, the anti-customer rhetoric that worked so well as an organizing tool 
in the upscale stores had little relevance in the downscale stores. As already 
noted, customers and workers at downscale stores had much more in common 
than at upscale stores. Perhaps more importantly, downscale store managers’ 
employment practices doomed most unionization campaigns to failure at 
these stores. As we have seen, downscale store managers employed large num-
bers of unskilled workers for relatively short periods of time. If turnover was 
a factor in upscale stores, there were people working there who viewed selling 
as their career; indeed, most of the people who wound up leading local unions 
at these stores had been working in the upscale stores for several years before 
they began organizing, a situation which would have been highly unusual 
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at the downscale stores. At Alexander’s, Klein’s, Ohrbach’s, May’s, and other 
downscale stores throughout the city, only a small minority of workers had 
any intention of making their job in the store a lifelong commitment. Working 
in these stores was a job to be taken for only a short time before moving on, 
either to a better job or, for some of the women workers, to marriage. For those 
workers in downscale stores who were looking for a more permanent posi-
tion in retailing, there were jobs which offered better wages, with or without 
unions, in upscale stores. Career salesperson and union activist Irving Fajans, 
for example, worked in Ohrbach’s, May’s, and several five-and-dime stores 
before getting a job at Macy’s, where he stayed to help organize the union. 
Similarly, Jane Spadavecchio, who worked at Macy’s from the age of 19 until 
she was 35, had already worked in a five-and-dime store before getting her job 
at Macy’s.56
 Despite their inability to establish permanent union locals at most down-
scale stores and on Fifth Avenue, the years 1937–39 were years of success for 
union organizers within New York City’s department stores. In these years the 
uneasy unity between national and local leaders, workers’ willingness to strike 
if provoked, and the federal government’s support for unions forced managers 
at New York City’s upscale department stores to sign union contracts. By doing 
so, they established these stores as centers for the growing white-collar seg-
ment of the CIO. But they also realized that if they were to continue winning 
struggles, they would need to establish alliances. If the struggles at Klein’s, 
Ohrbach’s, May’s, and the five-and-dime stores had taught these organizers 
anything, it was that powerful alliances could easily be deciding factors in 
conflicts with management. In the late 1930s store workers and union organiz-
ers turned to the growing network of activists around the Communist party’s 
Popular Front for support.
Creating the Popular Front
Within the upscale stores, organizers faced two major obstacles to powerful 
unions. First, many store workers still regarded managers with tremendous 
respect, due to the extensive benefits programs in place in these stores. 
Second, without the promised Joint Board, department store union leaders 
found themselves divided into separate union locals. In the late 1930s depart-
ment store union leaders attempted to solve both these problems and gain a 
broad-based coalition of support by establishing a wide-ranging set of cultural 
programs, many closely connected to the Communist-led Popular Front.
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 Like store managers, union organizers used sports as a central part of the 
unions’ cultural programs. Organizers created a number of different sports 
programs, including a Swim/Gym program, which began as a swimming and 
basketball program at a local high school. Organizers expanded the basketball 
activities from the Swim/Gym, originally a Local 1250 program, into part of 
a city-wide women’s basketball league, with teams from each store’s union 
competing with one another and with other local teams once a week. These 
events were critical in forming the sorts of attitudes that the union needed if 
it was to thrive. If store managers could allow workers a chance to play in a 
store-sponsored baseball team, the unions now offered similar opportunities. 
In addition, workers who took part in the union sports program would spend 
their leisure time not only with union members in their own local, but also 
with workers from other local unions around the city, hopefully forging bonds 
of class solidarity in the process.57
 Organizers put equal effort into other cultural and social activities. Within 
Gimbel’s Local 2, for example, workers not only set up a local union library 
but also launched a forum and lecture series where union members were 
encouraged to engage in what the union newspaper described as “a sparkling 
exchange of opinion” between various union members. Furniture salesmen 
at Gimbel’s, who were the highest-paid employees in the store, also set up 
parties at their homes, to allow workers to temporarily escape to larger and 
presumably more comfortable homes. Other union organizers followed their 
examples, setting up “beach parties, boat parties, house parties, and boat 
rides.” Union organizers were very explicit in their belief that these sorts of 
activities were designed to do more than offer workers a chance to socialize. 
To organizers in the department store unions, these activities were “valuable 
organizing tools,” ways not only to unite workers, but to unite them as union 
members.58
 In addition to fostering alliances between workers employed within the 
same store, these social and cultural activities served to unite members of 
different department store union locals. Many of these activities, such as the 
sports league, were established by the department store unions’ Joint Activities 
Committee, which was in charge of the social and cultural aspects of the 
various union locals. If the union leaders wished to continue emphasizing 
the unity of the now-separate locals, the Joint Activities Committee was an 
excellent way to accomplish this. It was also a way to make sure that workers 
understood the shared nature of their struggle.
 Perhaps even more importantly, these social activities allowed the members 
of the various department store locals to create alliances outside the stores. 
Stability? –
Many of these activities drew upon the culture of the Popular Front, the broad 
anti-fascist coalition which the Communist party called into creation in the 
late 1930s. Union members who joined Local 1250’s “Song Shop,” for example, 
printed booklets of Popular Front standards like “Solidarity Forever” and “We 
Shall Not Be Moved,” songs which were sung both by department store work-
ers and by participants in other Popular Front struggles around the country. 
By placing these songs in the union’s songbook, the Song Shop members 
emphasized the unity between the department store unions and the other 
struggles going on throughout the country.59
 Like the songs in the union songbooks, parties and dances also served to 
emphasize the unity between department store union members and others 
involved in left-wing causes. Particularly in the late 1930s union organizers 
frequently sought to connect dances to the Spanish Civil War, one of the issues 
attracting the most attention and admiration to the Communist party. For 
the Allies in the Spanish Civil War, at least according to the Communists, the 
Popular Front was real: in Spain, leftists of all stripes literally fought against the 
Fascist threat. And the department store unions worked the Spanish Civil War 
into many of their activities, by using union parties and dances as fund-raisers 
for the war effort or for American veterans of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade. 
While there is no record of how large these parties got, organizers did manage 
to attract some quite famous entertainers, including bandleader and radio star 
Rudy Vallee.60
 Similarly, the union’s Counter Carnival, which took place in April 1939, 
both brought union members together in a social setting and provided links 
with important supporters. In addition to fortune tellers, balloons, masks and 
confetti, and a skit featuring a “mock marriage between capital and labor,” 
several “Guests of Honor” attended the carnival, among them Popular Front 
figures like Leane Zugsmith, Ruth McKenney, and Mike Quill. Zugsmith, of 
course, had long been involved with the department store unions, and by 1939 
that involvement had gained her and her work national recognition, includ-
ing favorable reviews of A Time to Remember in the New York Times, the New 
Republic, and other major publications around the country. While earlier 
Zugsmith had supported department store workers as a fellow white-collar 
worker and, later, as a member of the League of Women Shoppers, now her 
role changed yet again: she would now be a fellow supporter of the Popular 
Front.61
 For Zugsmith these changes may well have been merely rhetorical, but 
the other supporters who attended the carnival were new supporters of the 
unions, and demonstrated in some ways the value of the Popular Front. 
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Zugsmith’s fellow guest of honor, Ruth McKenney, was an excellent example of 
this. By the time of the carnival McKenney’s work on the contemporary labor 
movement was already very popular in left-wing circles. In 1938 and 1939, 
for instance, the left-wing American Writers Congress awarded McKenney its 
annual prize for nonfiction. Like Zugsmith, McKenney was probably a mem-
ber of the Communist party in the late 1930s, and was a regular contributor 
to the Communist literary magazine The New Masses. But unlike Zugsmith, 
McKenney had never before associated herself with the department store 
unions. Now she was part of their coalition. Perhaps most important of all the 
carnival guests was Mike Quill. Like McKenney, Quill had shown no interest 
in the department store unions before the establishment of the Popular Front. 
One of the most prominent figures in the city’s labor movement, Quill served 
on the city council and was a leader of the large, militant, and very progressive 
Transport Workers Union of America (TWUA), one of the largest left-wing 
unions in New York City at the time. Like in many such cases, it is not known 
for sure whether Quill was ever a member of the Communist party, but in the 
late 1930s he certainly supported many of the CP’s policies, the Popular Front 
among them.62
 The Counter Carnival, with these guests of honor, in some ways exempli-
fied the department store unions’ cultural programs of the late 1930s. Like 
other cultural programs in these years, the carnival brought workers from 
all the different stores together as union members in a recreational setting. 
In addition, particularly with the guests of honor whom the union chose to 
invite, the carnival allowed union members and leaders to reinforce the alli-
ances to the city’s radical movement that had proved so valuable in their earlier 
struggles.
 In creating these cultural programs, union leaders were more than mere 
participants in the Popular Front; they were the creators of one small segment 
of the Popular Front. The Popular Front, after all, was essentially a network 
between different American radicals, precisely the sort of network that formed 
around the unions in these years. As some historians of communism have 
always claimed, Russian policy actively called for and supported the sorts 
of alliances which department store union leaders formed in the late 1930s. 
On the other hand, the decision to abide by this policy or not to abide by it 
was not made in a vacuum, but was instead made by activists on the ground. 
The unions’ Popular Front policies reflected Communist party policies, but 
Communist organizers in the department store unions adopted the Popular 
Front not simply to follow CP policy. They adopted the Popular Front as a 
valuable tool for making this union an integral part of workers’ lives, one that 
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further solidified union leaders’ connections to the rank and file and that fur-
ther solidified the unions’ connections to the city’s radical movement. And, 
even as the Popular Front policy disintegrated in 1939 with the Hitler-Stalin 
Pact, the alliances formed through the Front would continue, with important 
results for New York City’s department store workers.
Making the World of Tomorrow:  
Managers on the Attack, –
If workers were forging alliances in the late 1930s, managers had their own 
tactics with which to respond to workers’ efforts. In 1939 store managers 
participated in a massive effort by American businesses to reestablish a favor-
able public image at the New York World’s Fair. At the same time, the new 
Parkchester housing development in the Bronx presented an alternative plan 
for public space, one that eliminated the sort of contests over that space that 
dominated 34th Street. Both developments would set the conditions for the 
unions’ future decline.
 As early as 1935 New York City businessmen, including Macy’s manager 
Percy Straus, and local government officials began plans for a massive World’s 
Fair in New York. In keeping with the vision of its organizers, when it opened 
in 1939 the fair was largely a paean to American business. Ford, General 
Motors, AT&T, RCA, and the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company all set 
up exhibits at the 1939 World’s Fair, reminding visitors of the tremendous and 
productive role big business played in American life, and implicitly respond-
ing to the massive rhetorical attacks on big business that were so much a part 
of Popular Front culture. Each exhibit was planned separately, and extolled the 
virtues of its particular sponsor. Thus the RCA building, built in the shape of 
a radio tube, educated the public about the glories of broadcasting and elec-
tronics, including one of the first public exhibits of television broadcasting. In 
another of the exhibits, gas corporations joined forces to set up the Gas Exhibit 
Building, where visitors could learn of the important roles gas power played in 
modern life.63
 Store managers played a particularly central role in the fair’s development, 
and were featured prominently at the fair. Macy’s managers opened up Macy’s 
Toyland in the amusement area, a building full of toys for young people to go 
and observe in wonder. Toy manufacturers paid a hefty sum to lease exhibits 
within Toyland in order to inform parents of the latest product. Not to be 
outdone, Gimbel’s opened a building in the amusements area as well, where 
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children could take a ride and see models of attractions from around the 
world. And many store managers (especially the managers of the large depart-
ment stores) cooperated in setting up the Consumers’ Building, designed both 
to display the latest fashions and to encourage customers to visit the various 
stores supporting the fair’s exhibits.64
 Managers also proclaimed their connections to the fair at the stores them-
selves, further emphasizing the connections between shopping and leisure in 
the process. In Macy’s windows fair visitors could find examples of appropriate 
outfits for the city’s numerous attractions, and managers also opened a fair vis-
itor’s bureau within the store. Over at Gimbel’s managers erected scale models 
of World’s Fair attractions in the display windows, reminding customers not 
to forget the Gimbel’s exhibits. Even Klein’s, down on Union Square, expected 
and prepared for greater crowds due to the fair, suggesting that visitors “have 
heard a great deal about the store” and might wish to “satisfy a curiosity to 
visit this unique establishment.” In typical downscale fashion, however, Klein 
refused to put up any special display windows, instead joking with reporters 
that he might take down all the windows and put up doors instead in prepara-
tion for the greater crowds.65
 In addition to its links to the city’s retail and business communities, the 
1939 World’s Fair held two alternative visions of cities of the future. The first, 
and the one which attracted the most attention, was Democracity, a huge 
diorama of a future city. As one observer described it, the “strange, inspiring 
vision of Democracity” was that of an ordered paradise where people had “tri-
umphed over chaos,” and were free from any struggles to control public space. 
It was
a mighty metropolis, done in model scale. Factories stand in special 
areas, and around the city itself are rows of garden apartments. The 
daylight wanes and thousands of lights appear in the city . . . Men of 
all degrees stride forward in those legions of tomorrow. Miners with 
lamps, engineers with blueprints, teachers with books, farmers, busi-
nessmen—all looking forward to the city waiting to receive them. With 
arms upraised, faces shining in the blaze of color, the paraders sing the 
hymn of tomorrow. In matchless precision this great throng advances 
until at last a circle of heroic figures is formed under the vault of 
heaven . . .66
It was a far cry from areas like the garment district, dominated as they so often 
were by conflict and struggle.
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 The second vision of the future was in some ways more important, because 
it was based not on a vision of the distant future but rather on a plan already 
in motion. Metropolitan Life’s building at the fair came complete with a 
model of a new housing development, Parkchester. When planning began on 
Parkchester in 1938, Met Life officials envisioned the new development as 
a “self-contained city of perhaps 40,000 people.” The largest private housing 
project ever built, it would have not only 51 apartment buildings, but also a 
theater, churches, a fire house, a police station, public schools, a post office, 
parks and playgrounds, and retail stores.67
 Its self-contained nature made the Parkchester development relatively 
unique in the city’s history; so too did the amount of control that Met Life 
would exercise in Parkchester. Like Democracity, Parkchester would rep-
resent a public space where no conflict was allowed. The company would 
exercise tremendous control over tenants’ behavior: a private security force 
issued warnings and fines for everything from walking on the grass to climb-
ing the trees in the community’s courtyard. The company would make sure 
that the families who would move into Parkchester would have control only 
inside their apartments; all the public space would be under the corporation’s 
domain.68
 Even more important than the control Met Life exerted at Parkchester 
was the class and racial identity attached to living in the new development. 
Observers constantly remarked upon the middle-class nature of the apartment 
complex. As the development finally opened in 1941, New York Times reporter 
John Stanton hailed this as one of the most wonderful aspects of the project 
in his Sunday magazine feature on Parkchester: “there are no extremely rich 
people in Parkchester to be lived up to, nor extremely poor people to be tucked 
out of sight . . . In Parkchester . . . they have taken to nodding and saying hello 
to one another in the elevators, to playing badminton with one another in the 
parks, to organizing clubs and teams and even symphony orchestras.” It was a 
description that could have been made a decade later about the postwar sub-
urbs: class conflict (and indeed class itself) was all but invisible, and everyone 
was expected to be friendly and pleasant with one another. Like the postwar 
suburbs Parkchester was to be, at least in concept, a conflict-free haven, where 
values of community and civility served as a bulwark against a bewildering 
and troubled world. And while few observers remarked on it at the time, 
Parkchester’s new community had racial limits as well. Like the department 
stores themselves, Met Life managers set up Parkchester, as they did some of 
their later housing developments, for white tenants only.69
 The vision of the future offered by Parkchester was extremely important 
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to the unions’ future, for at Parkchester, department store managers would 
find themselves a new market. In 1939, as the Fair opened, Macy’s managers 
announced a planned branch store to service the middle-class residents of 
Parkchester, and in October 1941 the Parkchester branch store opened to great 
fanfare. Met Life President Frederick Ecker, Bronx Borough President James 
J. Lyons, and Macy’s President Jack Straus all assembled at the ribbon cutting 
ceremony. As with Parkchester itself, the new Macy’s branch store was a sign of 
things to come; Macy’s Parkchester branch, a success virtually from its begin-
nings, was a forerunner of the explosion of suburban branch stores that would 
follow World War II, a store within a middle-class community designed to 
service the residents of that community.70
 If Parkchester and the World’s Fair had the unintentional result of weaken-
ing the unions’ position against store managers (there is no evidence to demon-
strate that either was an intentional challenge to the unions), Macy’s managers’ 
other great project in the early months of the 1940s was a far more obvious 
attack on the power of workers at the upscale stores. Late in 1940 Macy’s 
managers announced the opening of a branch store in Syracuse, in upstate 
New York. By expanding into this new market, managers accomplished two 
goals. First, they created an alternative source for profits, one that they could 
draw upon in case of strikes at the New York City stores. Far more important, 
however, managers at Macy’s sought to change the operations of the Syracuse 
branch store to require fewer workers, changing the store to what they called a 
“semi-self-service” store. By this, store managers meant that salespeople would 
be available to assist customers, but only if customers specifically requested 
assistance. Not only did this mean the elimination of many of the sorts of 
services which store managers had come to offer their customers over the 
years, but it meant that the number of workers could be significantly reduced, 
and that a strike would quite possibly have less serious effects on the store’s 
day-to-day operations. Managers at Macy’s, in short, envisioned their new 
branch as something similar to a downscale store, with few services and as few 
employees as possible. Later, managers would call the store “a laboratory to test 
the possibilities of limited service units operated in connection with our New 
York store.” In other words, if self-service could work in Syracuse, it just might 
work in New York City.71
 The Syracuse experiment was a disaster for Macy’s managers from its very 
beginnings. Customers simply didn’t seem interested in a downscale version 
of Macy’s in 1940. With no intention of continuing to fund a losing venture, 
Macy’s managers wrote the Syracuse experiment off as a failure by the end 
of 1941, but left the possibility of self-service retailing on the table, insisting 
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in public statements that the store “is being closed without prejudice,” and 
announced that “it is possible that with the return of favorable times further 
experimentation with limited service units will continue.”72
 Between 1939 and the end of 1941 managers gained the tools to retake 
control over the city’s streets and the stores alike. The celebration and cre-
ation of communities free from class conflict at Parkchester and the World’s 
Fair, as well as the Syracuse branch store, with its tentative leanings towards 
self-service at upscale stores, would prove critical in managers’ efforts to 
destroy unions in the late 1940s and early 1950s. But in the later years of the 
Depression, these efforts still seemed relatively minor. Not until the late 1940s 
would workers and union organizers face the new social order that these 
developments signaled. As managers moved to strengthen their position, in 
fact, union organizers faced a series of rapidly changing circumstances that 
would culminate in a massive struggle for the eight-hour day.
A Matter of Respect:  
The Struggle for the Eight-Hour Day
Nothing demonstrated the newfound power of the leaders of New York City’s 
department store unions as did the Gimbel’s strike of 1941. In this strike the 
unions once again assembled a large number of supporters to lay claim not 
only to 34th Street, but to the store buildings themselves, and forced depart-
ment store managers and Wolchok alike to recognize the strength in the local 
unions.
 The relationship between local and national leaders got progressively worse 
between 1939 and 1941. In January 1939 the differences between local and 
national union leaders became far clearer as the union contract at Macy’s 
came up for renewal. Wolchok quickly moved to renew the contract, to 
ensure the stability of the union. Kovenetsky and other Local 1-S organizers 
opposed renewal, hoping to renegotiate and thereby get more workers into 
the contract, as well as to gain more favorable agreements concerning wages 
and hours. Workers voted to authorize a strike and, on March 30, 1939, they 
formally rejected Wolchok’s proposed settlement. Under pressure from Mike 
Quill, Mayor LaGuardia stepped in to negotiate a new settlement, and, with 
LaGuardia now present at negotiations, store managers made a better offer, 
making concessions on union membership, wages, and hours. Local leaders 
and workers accepted the new settlement. By making this better offer to the 
local leaders, Macy’s managers gave local leaders a much stronger position 
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within the union, since it had been the Local 1-S leaders and not Wolchok or 
the national leaders who had pressed the issue, and had won important con-
cessions on all fronts: union membership, wages, and hours.73
 Macy’s was not the only example of the local unions’ new and more strident 
tactics. At Hearn’s, despite the fact that the store operated at a loss of $265,000 in 
1938, the union demanded raises and reduced hours for 1939. Here, too, manag-
ers backed down, agreeing to arbitration and eventually giving the union most of 
what negotiators had demanded. Here, too, the union had scored a tremendous 
success, and here, too, negotiations were carried on by local leaders, not by the 
national union. The lesson for local leaders was clear: ignore national leaders’ 
conciliatory tactics, and they could win far better contracts.74
 As the union gradually descended into conflict, national events also worked 
to shift the balance of power between the unions and store managers. By 
February 1939 AFL leaders, judges on the Supreme Court, and congressional 
conservatives (both Democrats and Republicans) launched a full-scale attack 
on the NLRB and the CIO. Roosevelt quickly retreated to what he thought was 
a safer position, assigning William Leiserson, a professional mediator with 
no strong pro-labor sympathies, to head the NLRB. Leiserson’s appointment 
meant that the board moved to the right, and the critics, feeling strengthened, 
renewed their attacks, behaving, in the words of historian Melvyn Dubofsky, 
“like a herd of rogue elephants off on a destructive rampage.” By the summer 
of 1939 Congress created a committee to investigate the NLRB, and Roosevelt, 
apparently willing to let it slip away, made no move to defend the board. 
Without the NLRB’s support for unions, Wolchok’s “begging attitude” would 
simply not be effective; only strident demands, like those the local leaders were 
willing to present, would be able to force managers to back down.75
 One more event in 1939 worked to worsen the relationship between local 
and national union leaders. In October of that year Clarina Michelson retired 
as the Organizer of Local 1250. While her reasons for leaving are not entirely 
clear, her departure deprived the other department store union organizers of 
their longtime mutual mentor and ally, and created an even greater need for a 
formal structure binding the unions together.76
 It was a dramatic series of events in a relatively short time: Wolchok had 
now demonstrated he was not strident enough in his demands on management, 
the department store unions found themselves without a recognized leader, 
and the government could no longer be relied upon to support workers. More 
disturbing still, news came from Russia of the Hitler-Stalin Pact. American 
Communists, having long denied any rumors of an alliance between Hitler 
and Stalin, now suffered their worst embarrassment ever, losing face with 
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many of their former Popular Front allies and abandoning the struggle against 
fascism that had been the centerpiece of the Popular Front.
 For whichever of these reasons, or indeed for all of them, the younger local 
leaders of the department store unions decided they needed a stronger alliance. 
Losing all patience with Wolchok’s repeated promises, these younger leaders 
created their own Joint Council without Wolchok’s permission. Though it was 
never officially recognized by the national union, the local leaders regarded 
the Joint Council as a permanent organization, and even created a newspaper 
for the new council, the Department Store Employee. The Department Store 
Employee, which was written by and distributed to members of New York 
City’s department store unions, quickly became a major thorn in Wolchok’s 
side, as contributors to the paper attacked his policies and practices, and called 
for a more vigorous defense of workers’ rights than Wolchok was willing to 
present.77
 At least initially, Wolchok was unaware of how serious a challenge the Joint 
Council actually was. Far from being alarmed, in fact, he seemed to be at least 
somewhat supportive of the organization’s existence. In a 1939 letter Wolchok 
not only acknowledged the council’s existence but also stated that he and other 
URWEA leaders had “sat in on their meetings on various occasions.” If the 
Joint Council was critical of Wolchok’s leadership, he did not seem to respond 
to this criticism until the end of 1939.78
 Wolchok was far more hostile toward the local leaders at the union’s 
December 1939 convention, the first of many conventions racked by conflict 
and struggle between the radicals and liberals within the union. At the 1939 
convention Wolchok devoted part of his opening statement to a warning to all 
of his political opponents that “those who have political axes to grind will be 
compelled to grind them outside of our ranks.” At times during the conven-
tion it seemed as if Wolchok was attempting to bait the local leaders into a 
fight. At one point Wolchok declared that “the big industrialists who own and 
run the department stores have come to respect our union and to consider it 
a responsible organization . . . [due to] a great deal of my time and energy,” 
since local leaders were, in his words, too “immature or inexperienced” to gain 
this sort of respect. At another point Wolchok found occasion to mention that 
“although in 1937, Local No. 1250 secured a contract with the F.W. Woolworth 
Company, when recently the Five and Dime Organizing Committee took over 
this division, we found that we did not have a single member,” attributing the 
union’s few successes in the five-and-dime stores solely to his own willingness 
to work on these issues rather than to the effort put in by Local 1250 organiz-
ers or the sit-down strikers.79
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 Despite Wolchok’s barbed comments, the delegates from the Communist-
led department store unions simply refused to respond during the convention. 
Their reasons for remaining silent are somewhat unclear; they may have been 
attempting to forestall any future attacks, or perhaps felt they were not yet 
strong enough to challenge Wolchok. For whatever reason, however, the del-
egates from the left-wing New York City locals, the department store unions 
as well as Local 65, seem to have limited their participation in the convention 
to issues which were relatively free from controversy, including resolutions 
for national health care, expanded old age insurance, and federal funding for 
housing.80
 Left-wing delegates did raise at least one new issue during the conven-
tion, by sponsoring a resolution against the growing war in Europe. As other 
historians of communism have repeatedly suggested, Communists in the 
department store unions probably favored peace in 1939 due to the signing 
of the Hitler-Stalin Pact and the Communist party’s subsequent opposition 
to American war preparations. Even here, however, they were outdone by 
Wolchok’s supporters. Sidney Hillman, for instance, whom Wolchok invited to 
speak at the convention, called for peace in far stronger terms than the depart-
ment store union delegates:
What is happening abroad is the tragic culmination of lack of leader-
ship, of failure to find a real solution for the things that troubled man-
kind over there. . . . we propose to keep out because there is no good 
that we can possibly do, neither [sic] to ourselves nor to the suffering 
peoples abroad, by participating in war.81
 At the December 1939 convention, despite all the increasingly apparent 
divisions, department store union organizers still made an effort to avoid 
outright conflict within the URWEA. In 1940 department store union leaders 
went so far as to join Wolchok in his request to the CIO Executive Board to 
disband DSOC and officially place the department store unions back in the 
URWEA under Wolchok’s leadership. Department store union leaders sent 
several telegrams to the CIO Executive Board in pursuit of this cause, as did 
Wolchok; and in 1940 the CIO Executive Board voted to disband DSOC and 
reunite the department store unions into the URWEA, renamed yet again, 
this time as the United Retail, Wholesale and Department Store Employees of 
America (URWDSEA).82
 The cooperation which brought about this jurisdictional change was not to 
survive the merger. In fact, less than a year later, the internal disagreements 
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which had been brewing for the previous two years finally came out into the 
open, and the union fell into utter disarray. The Gimbel’s strike of 1941, one 
of the URWDSEA’s greatest successes, marked the end, at least temporarily, of 
the alliance between the local leaders of the department store unions and the 
national URWDSEA leadership.
 The Gimbel’s strike was in many ways a surprise to all concerned. The union 
at Gimbel’s was not particularly strong. Bea Schwartz, a union organizer and 
office worker at Gimbel’s, remembered that at the time of the strike the union 
was so weak that it was still just beginning to make inroads into the office 
division. In addition, the Gimbel’s management was unusually union-friendly. 
As already mentioned, Louis Broido, vice-president in charge of personnel at 
Gimbel’s, was one of the strongest supporters of the union among store man-
agers, and he repeatedly emphasized that unionization would bring greater 
stability to the retail industry. In his search for unionization accompanied by 
stability, Broido had found a strong ally in Samuel Wolchok. Because of this, 
Wolchok and Broido had gotten into the habit of negotiating the union’s con-
tract on a one-on-one basis, without rank-and-file participation and, at least 
in 1941, without direct input from any of the local leaders.83
 In some ways the pro-union sympathies of Louis Broido were a key cause 
of the strike. On August 8, 1941, Samuel Wolchok went into negotiations with 
Broido to demand a $2/day wage increase and a 40-hour workweek. While the 
wage increase was important, it was the 40-hour workweek that department 
store workers and union leaders regarded as key in 1941. Many American 
workers had already won the long-demanded 40-hour week in 1938, as a 
result of the passage of the federal Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). The FLSA 
did not, however, guarantee the 40-hour workweek to all workers. The FLSA 
specifically exempted, among others, “any employee engaged in any retail 
or service establishment the greater part of whose selling or servicing is in 
intrastate commerce.” Legislators, in other words, specifically exempted many 
retail workers from the rights which other workers had already won. Because 
of this clause and its exemptions, both department store workers and retail 
labor leaders had to fight to make the 40-hour workweek a standard in the 
retail industry. Workers viewed the 40-hour workweek as a matter of “respect,” 
strike supporter Annette Rubinstein later remembered, since it meant achiev-
ing conditions equal to those that other workers had. Even Wolchok, far 
removed as he was from working in the stores, was aware of the importance 
of this cause. As late as July 1941, only weeks before entering into negotiations 
with Broido, Wolchok told a reporter that he was “anxious to extend [the 40-
hour, 5-day week] to all eastern department stores.”84
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 Despite Wolchok’s official support for the 40-hour week, he immediately 
accepted Broido’s offer of a 42-hour workweek accompanied by a raise of 
$1.50 a day, taking the contract directly back to the workers for their approval. 
Considering Wolchok’s already tenuous relationship with the local union 
leaders, it was a mistake on his part to give in so easily, and a second mistake 
not to at least consult with local union organizers before doing so. William 
Michelson, the leader of Gimbel’s Local 2, refused to accept the settlement 
without the 40-hour week, and instead called for a strike. The workers agreed 
with Michelson, and on August 25, Local 2 officially voted to strike.85
 Despite the fact that the workers had rejected his settlement and declared 
a strike against his express wishes, Wolchok nonetheless officially moved to 
support the strike. Broido was astonished, both at Wolchok’s support and at 
the strike itself; to Broido, the strike was evidence that he had miscalculated, 
that the local leaders could destroy Wolchok’s promised stability any time 
they chose to do so. Broido and the other Gimbel’s managers chose the rather 
dangerous tactic of keeping the store open despite the strike, having managers 
double as salespeople and using what few scabs there were to try to service any 
customers brave enough to cross the picket line.86
 During the Gimbel’s strike, the department store workers found themselves 
in an unusually favorable position, one far different from the earlier strikes 
at large stores, such as the Klein’s-Ohrbach’s, May’s, and Ohrbach’s strikes. 
Unlike in these early strikes at downscale stores, during the Gimbel’s strike 
the overwhelming majority of workers were active participants in the strike. 
Out of the 2100 workers employed in the store, the union had 1500 workers 
on strike, making it by far the largest single strike in the union’s history up to 
that time.87
 There were also new obstacles which the strikers had to face, most impor-
tant among them the dreaded customers. During the Gimbel’s strike, for the 
first time in the unions’ history, there was nearly as much animosity between 
customers and workers as there was between workers and store management. 
Out of the thousands of charge customers at Gimbel’s, for instance, fewer than 
200 were even willing to attend a customer tea hosted by the strike committee. 
Although several of those who came were supportive (one even gave the strik-
ers enough money to pay for the tea), it was a far different situation from the 
strike at May’s, for example, when members of the League of Women Shoppers 
became the strikers’ strongest allies.88
 Gimbel’s customers bitterly attacked the strikers in letters to Mayor Fiorello 
LaGuardia. One Gimbel’s customer named R. T. Harnie who described her-
self as “a gray-haired woman of seventy” wrote to LaGuardia complaining 
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vaguely of the “disgraceful treatment” at the hands of the picketers. Another 
Gimbel’s customer, Miss E. T. Newell, had a more constructive suggestion for 
the mayor; Newell complained that the picketers “march with a constant roar 
all day. Could not this come under nuisances—city noises—which you have 
done so much to eliminate?” Still another customer, Miss M. Dun, wrote of 
her annoyance at the amount of traffic the picketers caused, complaining that 
“at times it is impossible . . . to walk on the sidewalks along the entrances” 
to Gimbel’s. In the most direct reversal of the role played by the League of 
Women Shoppers during the May’s strike, Dun even went so far as to suggest 
that because it was an election year, the police—under LaGuardia’s orders—
were being too lenient when dealing with the strikers.89
 The customers had several reasons for their opposition to the Gimbel’s 
strike. In addition to the adversarial relationship between workers and cus-
tomers, the strikers directly challenged the customers’ understanding of what 
upscale department stores were meant to be. Managers had designed upscale 
department stores as spaces reserved for the bourgeoisie, spaces for leisure 
and relaxation free from the chaos of the streets outside. During the strike, 
store workers showed no hesitation about invading these spaces, often betray-
ing their own animosity towards customers in the process. On one occasion, 
striker Helen Jacobson splashed a customer’s clothing with bright red ink, and 
was immediately arrested for assault. Other strikers were more circumspect 
in their attacks on customers. As in the Klein’s-Ohrbach’s strikes, workers 
again resorted to setting a box of white mice free in the store. In addition, to 
the great frustration of Gimbel’s managers and customers alike, the strikers 
somehow managed to smuggle a flock of pigeons into the store. And in what 
was almost certainly the most dangerous moment of the strike, someone even 
released a swarm of bees into the store, though this seems more likely to have 
been the act of an agent provocateur rather than a striker, and no union mem-
ber was ever arrested for it.90
 As they had done in earlier strikes, workers also assembled a number of 
powerful allies, many as a result of the union’s participation in the Popular 
Front. Annette Rubinstein, at the time a high school principal and local politi-
cal activist, was greatly intrigued at the news of the strike, because she had 
recently read Leane Zugsmith’s A Time to Remember and viewed this strike as a 
chance to see the activists Zugsmith wrote about in action. It was Rubinstein’s 
suggestion to call together the charge customers who supported the strike. 
Other contacts organizers made in the 1930s played equally important roles 
during the strike. Representatives from Mike Quill’s Transportation Workers 
Union came and marched with the strikers, and along with the strikers, they 
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took the picket line inside Gimbel’s, completely shutting down the store’s busi-
ness for a day. In another throwback to the Klein’s-Ohrbach’s strike, actors 
also supported the strike at Gimbel’s; they helped to pay for the strike’s soup 
kitchen, which was literally the only way some strikers had to get food, since 
the local union had no money for a strike fund.91
 The combination of this wide range of allies and the workers’ willingness 
to use militant strike tactics resulted in a terrifying situation for Broido and 
other department store managers. The carefully ordered world inside the store 
was now under attack, and instead of the promised order, unionization had 
brought, in Broido’s eyes, nothing less than class warfare. As he later described 
the Gimbel’s strike before a state legislative committee, the strikers “did every-
thing possible . . . to make the employer understand that they expected to use 
the forces of . . . mass movement to gain their end. . . . The line between that 
mass demonstration . . . and civil commotion, the line between that mass dem-
onstration and revolutionary mass action, is so fine that nobody can say where 
one starts and the other stops.” Broido no doubt exaggerated his own fears of 
working-class revolution somewhat for the committee’s benefit. At the same 
time, his comments indicate that the workers were causing enough disruption 
in and around Gimbel’s to throw Broido and the other Gimbel’s managers into 
a panic. 92 
 As a result of the amount of disruption they caused, the strikers emerged 
victorious. Broido, aware now of the strength of the vast array of forces 
brought to bear against him, re-opened negotiations only a month after the 
strike had begun. With local representatives now present at the negotiations, 
Broido granted the workers the 40-hour week and a small salary increase for 
nearly all full-time employees.93
 Department store workers throughout New York City shared the benefits 
of the victory. Within days of the end of the strike, managers of the nonunion-
ized A&S store announced that workers there would work the 40-hour week. 
Managers at Lord and Taylor’s and at McCreery’s, a nonunionized 34th Street 
store, also instituted the 40-hour week in the strike’s aftermath. Those stores 
which did not immediately offer workers the 40-hour week in the aftermath 
of the strike announced that they would do so within a few months. None of 
these managers acknowledged the importance of the Gimbel’s strike in mak-
ing the eight-hour day standard, but there can be little doubt, considering the 
timing of managers’ decisions to institute the 40-hour week, that these changes 
were results of managers’ desire to avoid a repeat of the Gimbel’s strike.94
 The strike was also a major victory for the department store union lead-
ers. It showed that the local unions were strong enough to win a strike called 
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against the advice of the international leaders. The strike also demonstrated 
that the allies with whom the local union leaders had joined forces during 
the Popular Front era were strong enough to gain the workers a victory even 
against store managers as powerful as those at Gimbel’s. Finally, the strike 
demonstrated that militant and disruptive tactics were in some ways even 
more effective against upscale stores than they had been against the downscale 
stores.
 Samuel Wolchok took a different lesson from the strikes: the local lead-
ers were too powerful. Early in October 1941, in union hearings, he charged 
William Michelson with “conduct unbecoming a union leader.” In particular, 
Wolchok charged that Michelson was associated with an unauthorized subdi-
vision of the union, the Joint Council. Wolchok’s decision to attack Michelson 
as a representative of the Joint Council rather than for picketers’ actions dur-
ing the Gimbel’s strike is in some ways difficult to explain. Certainly, consid-
ering Wolchok’s earlier favorable statements on the Joint Council, he could 
hardly have been shocked at the organization’s existence in late 1941. And, 
equally certainly, the timing of the charges and the decision to use Michelson 
as the target for these attacks both indicate that Wolchok’s attack on Michelson 
was a response to the Gimbel’s strike. Yet there are at least two key reasons 
that Wolchok would have found it difficult to attack Michelson for the strik-
ers’ often-illegal actions at Gimbel’s. First, Wolchok had no evidence that 
Michelson was involved in or even aware of the strike tactics. Second, these 
tactics had led the Gimbel’s workers to a victory which had eluded Wolchok: 
the 40-hour work week at Gimbel’s. It was a victory that Wolchok saw no need 
to publicize further. 95
 Wolchok used more devious means of attack against the department store 
union leaders as well. When the Local 1-S contract with Macy’s came up for 
negotiation again in October 1941, Wolchok offered the Local 1-S Executive 
Board a bargain. He would put his support behind a contract covering the 
entire store rather than just the portions of the store that Local 1-S had already 
organized, on two conditions. “The price for his aid in securing such a contract 
would be the expulsion of Miss Loring as organizer” as well as the payment 
of union dues directly to the international. Loring, upon hearing of Wolchok’s 
condition, willingly offered her resignation, but, instead of accepting it, the 
Executive Board created a committee “to go and see Mr. Wolchok to show him 
that Ms. Loring is a valuable asset to the organization and to discuss his spe-
cific reasons for not desiring Miss Loring to remain in our employ.” Wolchok, 
the committee reported upon returning from their meeting, was unable to 
give any “other reason for wishing us to discharge Miss Loring except ‘her 
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connections,’” namely (though no one said so outright), her connections to the 
Communist leaders of New York City’s other department store unions.96
 As Wolchok staged careful and somewhat veiled attacks on the Communist-
led department store unions, Broido and other store managers launched a 
more strident campaign against these same unions. On December 5, at the 
urging of store managers, conservative New York State Assemblyman Irving 
Ives began hearings on picketing tactics in New York City. Though the hear-
ings were ostensibly focused on cross-picketing (one union’s picketing of a 
business in order to oppose another union, a common and much-criticized 
result of dual unionism), the hearings quickly turned into a discussion on the 
tactics employed by department store union members and leaders in New 
York City. Broido, as well as speakers from Macy’s management and even a 
representative from the Downtown Brooklyn Association who spoke on behalf 
of the management of May’s, all attended to give testimony.
 Together, these managers complained of the tactics employed by the 
department store union leaders. Broido, the star witness, went into great detail 
on the various tactics used during the Gimbel’s strike, declaring not only that 
the department store unions practiced cross-picketing (a charge for which 
he offered no evidence), but also that these unions practiced “other kinds of 
picketing and activities hitherto unknown in New York.”97
 Despite the vague relationship between Broido’s testimony and the osten-
sible subject of the hearings, Ives responded to Broido’s complaints with great 
enthusiasm. By the time the hearings ended, Ives openly voiced his opposition 
to the sort of tactics that the union leaders allowed. Ives concluded the hear-
ings by suggesting that this was the sort of disruptive activity that led Fascists 
to demand state power:
We are seeing something today which we might expect to see in Nazi 
Germany, or might have seen in Germany before it was Nazified, in the 
late 20’s, in the very early 30’s, before Hitler took power in 1933. You 
have something here which perhaps might have taken place in Russia 
at one time or other. . . . I would like to know a little bit more definitely 
how much of this business originated from sources outside the United 
States. . . . If you want to bring about the kind of conditions you have in 
Europe, the kind you have in Nazi Germany, for instance, at the present 
time, that is the way to do it.
With these brief but incredibly prescient comments, Ives captured many of the 
most common themes of anti-communism of the 1940s and 1950s. Not only 
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did he emphasize (without even suggesting that any evidence for the claim 
existed) the supposedly foreign origins of the unions’ policy and tactics, but 
he also brought Nazi Germany and Russia together as being in some sense 
equivalent.98
 All of these attacks, the ones by Wolchok as well as those by Broido and 
Ives, came to a sudden halt, primarily due to the rapidly changing interna-
tional situation. The cross-picketing hearing took place on December 5, 1941. 
Japanese pilots bombed Pearl Harbor two days later, on December 7. As a 
result, the disciplinary hearings scheduled for William Michelson, along with 
any plans Ives had for the department store unions’ future, were immediately 
canceled. America’s entrance into World War II delayed, for a time at least, the 
attacks on the department store unions.99
Conclusion
In May 1941, only a few weeks before the Gimbel’s strike, Republic Studios 
released The Devil and Miss Jones, a film about a labor dispute in a New York 
City department store. Based in part on the labor struggles at the five-and-
dime stores years earlier, The Devil and Miss Jones is a remarkable treatment of 
these department store workers. The tale of a store owner who goes undercov-
er as a store worker to spy on labor agitators, it portrays the department store 
unions as a noble enterprise, one that even the store owner comes to support. 
In the process, it allows glimpses of many relatively realistic aspects of both the 
stores and the unions (including one scene where a worker chains himself to 
a pole and makes a speech). One of only a small handful of mainstream films 
to celebrate industrial unionism, The Devil and Miss Jones is a remarkable his-
torical document, one that suggests just how successful the department store 
unions seemed in the late 1930s. Today, setting a film about labor unions in a 
department store would be an odd choice at best, but at the end of the Great 
Depression, with the Woolworth sit-downs still in recent memory and retail 
workers’ unions still on the ascendant, it seemed as though the entire country 
would be able to understand and sympathize with the plight of the department 
store workers.100
 Of course, The Devil and Miss Jones is a Hollywood film, and not a par-
ticularly accurate one. In particular, communism goes entirely unmentioned 
in this film. The labor organizers in the department stores are fine upstanding 
young men and women, who are radicalized purely by their experiences in the 
stores. There is no hint that the radicalism within the stores was in any way 
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connected to any larger movement, nor any suggestion that the streets outside 
the stores were a factor in the unions’ formation.
 These flaws are important. Without understanding the struggles going on 
outside the stores, and without understanding particularly the role of com-
munism as a way to link the union to these conflicts over public space, we get 
only a very partial picture of the development of New York City’s department 
store unions. The department store unions would not have been anywhere 
near as successful as they were had it not been for the remarkable struggles 
going on in the streets outside, or had it not been for the allies they were able 
to recruit through the Popular Front. The result of the Gimbel’s strike—the 
eight-hour day for retail workers in New York City—is directly attributable to 
these causes.
 Despite their incredible successes, in some ways The Devil and Miss Jones 
was quite an accurate depiction of the unions. Like the film, the unions avoid-
ed race whenever possible; and, like the film, the unions increasingly avoided 
the subject of women’s rights or the need for women leaders. Despite their 
tremendous power during the later years of the Depression, in fact, there is 
no evidence that the unions considered launching a sustained struggle against 
racial hiring practices in the stores. As happened in other unions in this era, 
department store union leaders and members alike seem to have ignored the 
racial hiring practices, focusing instead on issues that affected workers already 
employed, like pay raises and the eight-hour day. Additionally, with Clarina 
Michelson’s departure, the period where the unions were led by women came 
to an end, at least for a time. But Michelson’s achievements—her emphasis 
on recruiting workers into leadership, her ability to forge alliances, and her 
willingness to resort to imaginative and dramatic tactics—were nonetheless 
important legacies that came to fruition during the Gimbel’s strike.101
 The last years of the Great Depression were remarkable ones for American 
labor. Finally having established a foothold both in the retail industry and 
in the great assembly-line factories of the Midwest, the labor movement 
was on the rise, and seemed nearly unstoppable on the eve of World War 
II. As the nation entered the war, the Communist leaders of the department 
store unions had reason for hope, but there was also reason for caution. The 
anti-Communist alliance between national union leaders, the government, 
and store managers that had emerged in the aftermath of the Gimbel’s strike 
would reemerge with a vengeance after the war. And managers’ attempts to 
restructure the stores and expand their markets would continue throughout 
World War II, making these years some of the most challenging in the unions’ 
history.
Chapter 4
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Introduction
“Through the war years nothing had fundamentally changed in Manhattan 
. . . in many respects the 1930s had lingered on,” popular historian Jan 
Morris wrote in 1975. Morris’s contention is not strictly accurate either for 
Manhattan or for New York City: the city and its people had played numerous 
roles in the war effort, some of them extremely important to the conflict’s 
outcome. New York functioned as a leisure center for soldiers and sailors on 
leave; many of the great ships used in the war were made in the Brooklyn 
Navy Yard; even the experiments which led to the atomic bomb began at 
Columbia University in Manhattan. And, as in many other cities through-
out the country, a riot took place in New York in the riot-torn year of 1943, 
when Harlem residents lost patience with the absurdly high rents they were 
expected to pay for limited and segregated housing.1
 Despite its inaccuracy, Morris’s observation has some truth buried in it. The 
war years certainly were less dynamic than other periods in the city’s history 
had been. Many of the most striking images of wartime New York are not of 
the riots or even the bustling Navy Yards, but rather the dimout, where resi-
dents turned off all unnecessary lights, leaving the city virtually in darkness. 
As John Von Hartz observed, the dimout left New York “a somber ghost of 
its former nighttime self.” And, as though to accompany the darkened city, the 
political radicalism which had once been such a central part of New York City 
life, and which had given such vibrancy to the department store unions, had all 
but vanished with the arrival of the war. Morris wrote that since “the war had 
brought new prosperity to nearly everyone . . . the edge was off radicalism.”2
 If political radicalism had faded from the forefront of city life, this had little 
to do with prosperity. In fact, due to wartime rations, increased rents, and 
price gouging by resourceful retailers, many New Yorkers faced some form 
of economic distress during the war. But the Communist party, which had 
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previously led so much of the city’s radicalism, now held that all radical protests 
should be suspended to support the war effort. The Socialists had a somewhat 
more complicated attitude towards the war, but due to Socialist party leader 
Norman Thomas’s attempt to combine pacifism with support for the war, the 
Socialists had less than a thousand members nationwide by mid-1942. After 
the bombing of Pearl Harbor, it seemed as though radicals in New York had 
abandoned any effort at social change in order to fight the war.3
 Like the rest of the city, New York’s department store unions at least seemed 
relatively stable during the war. There were no wildcat strikes in New York 
City’s department stores, and there was plenty of evidence that workers and 
union leaders alike strongly supported the war. It was a far cry from the dramatic 
struggles exploding in the midwestern factory centers, where workers increas-
ingly felt alienated by their conciliatory union leaders and launched massive 
wildcat strikes in protest. Instead, in New York, the shared support for the war 
seemed to minimize if not eliminate the sorts of conflicts going on elsewhere 
in the country. In fact, as Governor Dewey proudly pointed out, in 1944 New 
York State lost only 15 man-days of work for every 100,000 such days, whereas 
the national average was approximately 73 lost days of work per 100,000. New 
York workers were determined to make “a great contribution toward the win-
ning of the war,” and most gave up the right to strike for that end.4
 The apparent stability masked tremendous structural and political changes 
taking place in and around New York City’s department store unions. The 
stores and the unions were both changing very rapidly, and the changes that 
took place during the war years would define the course of the unions’ history 
in the postwar years. The stores themselves were the site of some of the most 
dramatic changes. The end of the Depression meant an end to the easy vilifica-
tion of store managers that had so benefited retail workers’ unions during the 
Depression. The war led to new patterns of consumption, and store managers 
were in the best position to encourage proper wartime consumption. They 
took up this cause with great dedication, and during the war the department 
stores became patriotic centers as well as centers of leisure and consumption. 
Store managers also took advantage of the wartime labor shortage to change 
the costly labor practices that they had used during the Depression. They 
found self-service, in particular, to be a more attractive possibility now that 
labor was in short supply.
 Like store managers, national union leaders also took up the patriotic cause. 
During the war, Samuel Wolchok became a figure of great national impor-
tance, not only to the labor movement, but to the war effort as a whole. He met 
with government officials on both national and state levels and worked with 
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them to map out plans to ensure workers’ support for the war. And he did so 
while vocally supporting liberal reform, calling for a strong Fair Employment 
Practices Commission and even offering mild support (though no milder than 
most of the local leaders’ support) for women’s rights. Additionally, Wolchok’s 
favorite tactics, those of conciliation and compromise, were now the only 
acceptable tactics for organizing unions, thanks to the government’s active role 
in settling labor disputes through negotiation rather than strikes.
 In short, the two most visible enemies of the leaders of New York City’s 
department store unions were now no longer acceptable targets. National 
union leaders and store managers alike were virtually beyond reproach, and 
attacks on either would gain the local unions extreme unpopularity. Indeed, 
during the war, local union leaders seemed to retreat from their earlier criti-
cisms of Wolchok in particular. Wolchok, on the other hand, used his new-
found power to staunchly criticize the left-wing opposition that had been such 
a thorn in his side only months earlier.
 The only major issue around which the union divided found the left-wing 
leaders within the department stores decidedly in the minority. Arthur Osman, 
the leader of Local 65 and the unofficial leader of the URWDSEA’s left wing, 
severely criticized Wolchok’s willingness to allow workers to strike against 
Montgomery Ward, despite the fact that the government had approved this 
particular strike. Although no department store union or department store 
union leader publicly took a stand on the Montgomery Ward strike, the effect 
of Osman’s criticism of the strike and Wolchok were to make Osman a pariah 
within the union, and increase the power of conservatives. As the war drew to 
a close, everyone connected with the unions would be left scrambling, trying 
to ensure that their particular base of power—the left wing, the department 
store unions, the warehouse division, the national union leaders, or the stores 
themselves—would be preserved or even strengthened after the war ended.
Consuming War
Among the most remarkable of the changes which took place in New York 
following the attacks of September 11, 2001 were signs of new consumption 
patterns. As if by magic, American flags appeared everywhere. Goods with 
patriotic themes—ranging from still more flags to bumper stickers and coffee 
mugs—were available at city stores within a few days of the attacks, and com-
memorative items with images of the World Trade Center buildings on them 
could be found in almost any neighborhood of the city. Consumption was a 
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way—arguably the primary way—many people in New York and throughout 
the country confronted the day’s tragedies.
 It was not the first time that residents of the city had used consumption as 
a way of confronting a national crisis. Consumption changed dramatically in 
the aftermath of Pearl Harbor. Although overall business initially fell off due 
to the war, there was a rush for blackout materials; candles, flashlights, and 
dark fabrics sold in December 1941 at a pace unmatched in the stores’ history. 
Emergency goods were now a priority, and store managers hurried to make 
the appropriate adjustments, making sure that store clerks were educated as to 
where in the store customers should go to purchase materials to prepare for a 
blackout.5
 Consumption was central to the war effort in many different respects, 
and store managers became “the interpreters of a national and local policy” 
of proper wartime consumption, according to a professor of retailing at the 
University of Tennessee. Managers had good reasons to support proper war-
time consumption. For one thing, it was the wisest course: at a time when 
the public was expected to make massive sacrifices, if retailers refused to 
cooperate, they might well increase the public animosity towards big retail 
establishments. On the other hand, if retailers supported the war effort and 
demonstrated their patriotism, they could go a long way to winning back the 
public approval of big retailing that the government investigations and union 
activities of the late 1930s had destroyed. Additionally, their support for the 
war might convince some retail workers that their jobs were important enough 
not to leave the stores for factories that often offered higher pay and an oppor-
tunity to make a more direct contribution to the war effort.6
 If public opinion was one force driving retailers to support the war, the gov-
ernment was another. Government officials openly advocated an active role for 
retailers during the war. R. R. Guthrie, an official of the Office of Production 
Management, attended the 1942 annual meeting of the National Retail Dry 
Goods Association, the department store’s trade association. Retailers, Guthrie 
informed his audience, had a central role to play in the war effort: “We need, 
right now, a Victory Budget for the [average] family, a budget of essential war-
time needs, a budget which will enable the family to reach top efficiency as a 
group of war workers, but stripped of everything else. Upon retailers depends 
the responsibility . . . of securing acceptance of such a budget, hearty, willing 
acceptance of it, by American families.”7
 Store managers, with all this pressure to support the war effort, rose to the 
occasion. One of the primary ways they had of supporting the war was by sell-
ing products made of appropriate materials. Gimbel’s managers, for instance, 
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heavily advertised curtains and carpets made of bomber cloth, which they 
described as “a sturdy, non-priority fabric.” Gimbel’s also hosted a Civilian 
Defense Fashion Show, where customers could “learn to be comfortable while 
they work.” Several department store managers took part in the 1942 New York 
Times fashion show, which, as Mayor LaGuardia described it, would “show 
that even with substitute materials because of the emergency, it is still possible 
to have useful, attractive, and pretty clothes.”8
 While buying nonpriority materials and other practical goods was one 
important part of wartime consumption, managers also lauded purchases of 
patriotic items as a way to support the war. American flags, for instance, were 
sold at several stores. So were other patriotic goods. Macy’s managers—who 
were particularly adept at advertising their contributions to the war—offered 
customers a chance to purchase a film of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor: 
“Now, on your own home screen, you can view the actual bombing, the heroic 
American defense! Here is grim history, on film. Don’t wait to own this great 
movie of the beginning of our nation’s most tremendous fight for liberty!” 
Macy’s also sold films of Douglas MacArthur and the bombing of Manila.9
 Some patriotic goods had more practical applications. Macy’s and other 
stores offered customers a chance to buy food boxes for soldiers, pointing 
out that “he’s training for the fight of his life (and yours). Besides, it gives 
him terrific prestige among his buddies, when that food box comes through 
regularly.” Gimbel’s managers followed suit, offering customers a chance to 
buy “patriotic envelopes” and stamped envelopes “mailed from 17 American 
[military] bases.” Gimbel’s advertisements also encouraged customers who 
were “knitting like mad for that man of yours in the service” to buy yarn “in 
regulation colors,” conveniently available at Gimbel’s.10
 Many of the stores also offered customers a chance to buy war bonds and 
stamps. At Macy’s, for instance, managers set up a Victory Booth near the 
store’s main entrance, where customers could purchase war stamps. One 1942 
Macy’s advertisement reminded customers that “it takes only 75 twenty-five 
cent Stamps to become an 18.75 bond, which in ten years will net you $25.” 
Customers could purchase the stamps at the Victory Booth, or if they desired, 
take them in lieu of change after making purchases. The strategies for selling 
bonds were extremely effective. By December 1942 Macy’s proudly announced 
to potential customers that the store had sold “over $3,000,000 worth of war 
bonds and stamps.”11
 Even items that had only indirect connections to the war effort were adver-
tised in terms of the war. Customers, one Macy’s advertisement told the read-
ers of the New York Times, were buying their shirts “in double-quick time,” and 
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Macy’s furniture would be “as much at home in an army post in Vermont, as in 
a one-room apartment in Washington.” Gimbel’s offered customers a chance 
to purchase “Red Cross Nylon Stockings,” connected to the Red Cross, appar-
ently, only in that they were comfortable for women who were on their feet a 
lot. Stern’s sold women’s slacks by calling out to “air raid wardens” and “Red 
Cross” workers to buy them. And a Macy’s advertisement for women’s shoes 
described them as “sleek as an officer’s dress parade boot.” The same advertise-
ment went on to inform women workers that these shoes “mean comfort even 
if your war work means being on your feet a lot.” Many other advertisements 
throughout the war carried with them a small note encouraging customers to 
“buy United States savings bonds and stamps” or asked customers to give to 
the Red Cross.12
 Sales were one part of wartime consumption, but there were other aspects 
as well. Customers had to be taught not only to buy, but to avoid over-buying, 
to conserve goods and labor wherever possible. Twelve New York department 
stores participated in a joint advertisement condemning hoarding goods, 
reminding customers and employees alike that hoarding could lead to “great 
dissatisfaction among the millions of people who cannot afford to build up 
reserves of merchandise and who would be content to endure mild depriva-
tions if everyone were in the same boat.” Store managers also offered any 
number of suggestions as to how customers could avoid consuming too much. 
Bloomingdale’s devoted a display window to the cause in the spring of 1942, 
informing customers that “spring house cleaning” could “aid war production.” 
In store advertisements Macy’s encouraged customers to “carry home their 
purchases,” and save not only money, but also “rubber, gas, [and] paper.” Or, as 
another Macy’s advertisement reminded readers, “Your government wants you 
to buy only what you need—take care of what you own!” Likewise, Gimbel’s 
informed customers in one advertisement that “To Save Is To Serve,” and 
asked them not to throw away paper, rubber, scrap metal, or rags. Gimbel’s 
also emphasized the store’s accessibility by mass transit, reminding customers 
that “it’s easy to get to Gimbels [sic] without a spoonful of gas,” thus saving 
gasoline for the war effort. Other advertisements took advantage of the war to 
advertise lower prices. “We know it isn’t easy,” one Macy’s ad assured readers, 
“to be a breadwinner these days, and provide for both the family and Uncle 
Sam’s defense efforts. We know it takes budgeting, no matter how large one’s 
income. . . . Let Macy’s be YOUR Cash Conservation Corps.” Or, in a similar 
vein, a Wall Street Journal advertisement for Macy’s assured customers that 
“the world’s largest store is especially helpful in times like these, when the rising 
cost of living and mounting war taxes make everyone feel the need to save.”13
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 The most direct educational role managers played during the war was in 
Macy’s regular advertisement feature, “News On The Home Front,” a special 
column run in Macy’s ads which taught customers about the new rules of 
consumption. The first of these columns explained the advice column’s pres-
ence in an advertisement: “running your home efficiently and economically 
today is a bigger job than ever before. You’re trying to make everything you 
own give extra service and last longer . . . Here at Macy’s Home Centre . . . 
we’ll show you how to prepare easy, economical menus that add up to a lot in 
good taste and good health.” The feature became more formalized later on; by 
April 1942 it had become “The Home Front News,” and informed customers 
of sewing classes available at the store at a cost of $0.74 for two hours. Besides 
allowing customers a chance to save money by sewing their own clothes, the 
feature encouraged women to carry their own packages, and save their scraps. 
Some of the suggestions in “The Home Front News” are in retrospect almost 
comical: shoppers were offered detailed instructions in how to shine their own 
shoes, for instance, and later that year, another column taught customers how 
to “keep your curtains fresh and lovely longer!” But at the time, of course, 
all these suggestions were deadly serious. The April column concluded with 
a reminder: “Learning how to do for oneself is all part of this countrywide 
and patriotic determination to conserve the things needed by our Armed 
Forces.”14
 Store managers also found ways to use their control of the store spaces—large 
public spaces in high-traffic areas—for the war effort. In 1943, store managers 
throughout the city set up collection boxes in all their stores, asking customers 
to donate used books to be sent to soldiers overseas. Individual store managers 
also came up with many different additional ways to use store space to promote 
the war. Managers at Macy’s, for example, allowed the Red Cross to open a 
blood donation center within the store, where customers could also apply for 
free courses in “first aid, home nursing, water safety, accident prevention, and 
nutrition.” They also set up a Kids’ Day at their War Bond Center, allowing cus-
tomers and their children to come in and watch a team of experts assemble a 
jeep, watch exclusive war films, and see an exhibit of war photography. Gimbel’s 
managers allowed the Navy to set up a counter where customers could donate 
binoculars, and eventually set up a demonstration Victory Garden “to prove that 
two persons can grow all the vegetables they need for three months in a tiny 
plot.” Managers at Gimbel’s also set up a “Women’s Spring Offensive” lecture 
series, where they invited women customers to come and see “lectures, dem-
onstrations, and programs designed to acquaint the women of New York with 
the essential points of home defense.” Perhaps most ambitious of all, managers 
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at Hearn’s set up a “Win-The-War Show,” where customers could go and see 
displays about the war, including “a new dive bomber trap, . . . ammunition, 
gas masks, and other [war-related] material,” with the strong support of Mayor 
LaGuardia, who presided over the show’s opening ceremony. Upon seeing the 
success of the Hearn’s show, Macy’s immediately announced their own industrial 
exhibit to “create a better understanding and acceptance of the many amazing 
substitutes and improvements for civilian use.”15
 Similarly, during Labor Day weekend of 1942, when car trips were discour-
aged due to the gasoline shortage, store managers, with the full support of 
Mayor LaGuardia, threw a sale. LaGuardia himself praised the sale in a half-
page advertisement in the New York Times, telling potential customers that the 
Saturday of Labor Day weekend would be “one of the greatest bargain days in 
the history of the retail trade in New York City. Now is the time to prepare the 
children for school; to replace utensils and household articles that have been 
given to the Government in one drive or another, curtains, rugs, furniture, and 
better put in the supply for the Autumn and Winter clothing now!”16
 And, beginning in March 1943, store managers throughout the city gave 
up one of their display windows to advertise the Red Cross’s wartime achieve-
ments. Each store took a different aspect of the Red Cross’s functions: Gimbel’s 
displayed Red Cross workers “building morale” in Alaska; Hearn’s window had 
the Red Cross “aiding our allies” in China; and in Bloomingdale’s window the 
Red Cross was “providing aid to service men’s families” in Hawaii.17
 Managers also worked to make sure that their employees supported the 
war effort. At Hearn’s, managers set up a storewide “national defense corps” to 
prepare for a civil emergency, with both managers and workers as members. 
Managers took out huge display advertisements for the defense corps, one 
featuring a saleswoman standing helpfully behind a counter with the words, 
“Yes, Madam . . . We Sell Guns, Tanks, Planes!” The advertisement went on 
to preach a set of values that fundamentally expressed the challenges that the 
wartime ethos offered to unions:
We’re salesmen and saleswomen, porters and electricians, executives 
and stock clerks, shippers, carpenters, and cashiers . . . but we’re all 
ONE for national defense. . . . We’re ready, eager, and anxious to do 
our bit . . . we’ve trained ourselves in fire fighting and first aid. We’re 
Blood donors, we’re Air Raid wardens, we have our own knitting groups 
which supply wool and instructions. We’re bond sellers and stamp sell-
ers to the tune of $100,000 already . . . and we’ve just begun to sell! We’re 
like YOU! We love liberty and we love our country!
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The advertisement is remarkable in just how far it takes the concept of war-
time unity. Not only are all workers to be united, but they are united with 
executives and even, towards the end of the advertisement, with customers. 
Everyone, at least as far as managers were concerned, would indeed be united 
as “one for national defense.” Store managers throughout the city encouraged 
similar attitudes, sponsoring rallies and parades for their employees to encour-
age them to take their pay in war bonds. Other managers went even further; 
at Macy’s, managers set up a United Service Organization branch to encour-
age women working at Macy’s to become hostesses for soldiers on leave. 
Actions like these both demonstrated management’s support for the war effort 
and served in some ways as extensions of certain tactics that managers had 
engaged in before the war. Like the prewar bonus programs in upscale stores, 
these programs also served to emphasize the common interests of managers 
and workers, weakening workers’ ties to their unions in the process.18
 Managers’ support for the war was only one way that the war affected 
upscale department stores. The war also brought the loss of most of the male 
workers within the stores. Unlike many blue-collar jobs, the federal govern-
ment classified department store work as nonessential, and male workers 
were therefore eligible for the draft. The loss of nearly all the men working 
in the stores created a labor shortage; and the fact that many women were 
now leaving department stores to go to work in other jobs (the Brooklyn 
Navy Yard offered particularly tempting employment for women working 
in the New York City stores; banks also began employing women tellers at 
this time, drawing still more workers from the stores) made the labor short-
age even more acute. Managers therefore began searching for a replacement 
labor pool. Suddenly, all sorts of people became eligible to work in depart-
ment stores. Managers began searching for “extras, contingents, and part-time 
store employees . . . older men and women . . . [and] recent graduate of high 
schools,” as well as a few high school students. Their search was at least par-
tially successful. In New York City, store managers found many older men and 
women—some as old as sixty. These workers were a far cry from the people 
in their late teens and twenties who had taken sales jobs before the war. Store 
managers also began recruiting straight out of high schools. Bloomingdale’s 
worker John O’Neill began working in the store in 1944, when, as a junior 
in high school, he saw a list of jobs for students, including several stockroom 
positions at Bloomingdale’s.19
 Store managers also used other measures to take the place of the lost labor, 
some of which broke with prewar practices of discrimination. By 1942 women 
began working in the stockrooms of some department stores, and by 1943 
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some store managers allowed women to take jobs as delivery truck helpers. 
Despite these changes, managers continued emphasizing the importance of 
gendered divisions of labor throughout the war. Even as they began hiring 
women to make deliveries, managers assured the newspaper reporters cover-
ing the story that women would not be “required to tussle with heavy pieces of 
furniture and equipment,” but instead only to “deliver parcels light enough for 
the women to handle alone.” Perhaps more importantly, there is no evidence 
that women ever entered the highest-paying department store jobs, such as the 
coveted sales jobs in furniture departments.20
 Like white women, African American workers in the stores made a few 
gains during the war, as managers compromised their discriminatory hir-
ing practices to cope with the labor shortage. In this sense, the war economy 
accomplished what years of efforts by the “Don’t Buy Where You Can’t Work” 
campaign (and, in their almost nonexistent campaign, the unions as well) 
had failed to do: it won African American workers their first sales and office 
jobs in the upscale stores. During the war, African American women began 
to make some inroads in sales positions at Gimbel’s and office positions at 
Macy’s. Like advances made by white women, managers allowed only limited 
changes to their prewar system of job segregation. African American sales and 
office workers remained rare exceptions throughout the war era. In addition, 
African American workers typically received lower salaries than whites in the 
same jobs.21
 Just as African American workers began winning better jobs in these 
stores, the jobs themselves began to change. In perhaps their most historically 
important effort to meet the wartime labor shortage, store managers began 
experimenting with self-service forms of retailing, often eliminating jobs 
in the process. Managers had of course begun experimenting with self-ser-
vice even before the war, with the opening of Macy’s Syracuse branch store. 
However, considering the failure of the Syracuse experiment, New York store 
managers were very uneasy with the possibilities that self-service offered, 
and with some reason. If full-service shopping allowed managers tremen-
dous control over customers’ activities in the stores, managers had less direct 
control over a self-service operation, where customers interacted with sales-
people only if customers approached salespeople or vice versa. Nonetheless, 
with labor shortages threatening the industry, managers increasingly found 
self-service a necessity. Early in 1943, the NRDGA began sponsoring talks on 
how self-service would affect the stores. At one such talk Franklin Lamb, the 
president of a company that manufactured store shelving fixtures, reminded 
store managers that they had no real choice in the matter of self-service, at 
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least for the duration of the war. “To meet present conditions,” Lamb informed 
his audience, “it becomes necessary to deliberately break up the practice of 
forcing assistance on customers . . . The fewer salespeople on the floor simply 
do not have the time for anything but stock-keeping and giving asked-for help 
to customers.”22
 Despite the shortages, upscale store managers moved hesitantly towards the 
self-service system, often employing a full staff of salespeople while attempting 
to initiate the transition. Viola Sylbert, an industry analyst who wrote about 
the self-service experiments during the war, argued that the very hesitancy 
with which managers approached the new system doomed some of these 
early experiments to failure. Sylbert describes one such experiment in a shoe 
department at an unnamed upscale store in New York City: “All styles of shoes 
were piled on tables with the size and width clearly marked on large placards,” 
but “a complete selling staff [all paid by commission] was maintained on 
the floor” anyway. As a result, “shoe salesmen . . . very naturally disregarded 
instructions and approached customers whenever possible,” trying to make 
sales and increase their commissions.23
 Department store managers did eventually hit upon a more successful 
intermediate method of store organization by creating what Sylbert called 
“open-merchandise displays.” In these types of sales operations, sample goods 
were laid out for customers to examine without the intervention of sales 
workers. However, in order to purchase anything, customers still had to find 
a salesperson to get the item they wished to purchase from the stockroom. 
With this tactic managers continued to require salespeople and customers to 
interact, but at the same time they no longer needed quite as many salespeople 
to deal with customers. Salespeople in the stores now only had to carry goods 
back and forth from the stockroom, a practice that required both fewer sales 
workers and far less training for these workers.24
 All of these changes inside the stores strengthened the store managers’ 
position in relation to their workers, and the changes in the streets outside 
reinforced managers’ strength still further. The May Day parades which had 
once been a major challenge to store managers’ domination of the streets of the 
garment district were now suspended for the duration of the war. Communists 
tried to argue that there was a basic continuity between the prewar marches 
and the wartime cancellation of the marches: Daily Worker contributor Art 
Shields, for instance, argued that “again May Day this year is a day of interna-
tional solidarity, though the workers will demonstrate against fascism in the 
workshops instead of the streets. They will demonstrate against their main 
enemies by producing the weapons to destroy them.” To the Communist party, 
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arguably the central organization of the city’s radical movement, the war effort 
was a radical cause, one that directly benefited workers, and interfering with 
the war, or attacking those who supported it, would be a betrayal of the work-
ing class.25
 With the Communists ceasing their disruption of the streets outside the 
stores, the struggles over public space that had been a central cause of the 
unions’ victories before the war were now over, replaced by pro-war demon-
strations that often denied class conflict. In June 1942, for instance, only weeks 
after the Communists canceled their first wartime May Day parade, the city 
held a “New York at War” parade, where soldiers, their commanders, and—in 
the ultimate irony considering the open and sometimes violent class struggle 
that had been declared in those same streets only months before—“George L. 
Harrison, president of the New York Life Insurance Company, heading off-
duty production workers from the ranks of industry and labor.” Class struggle, 
the parade organizers attempted to argue by allowing Harrison to lead the 
workers in their support for the war, had been called off for the duration of the 
war. It was a message similar in many ways to the message of the 1932 Union 
Square centennial celebration, but during the war, with the Communists’ new 
policy, there was no attempt to answer this enacted call for an end to class 
struggle.26
 Similar changes in the tenor of the neighborhood took place throughout 
the war. As the Allied victory looked more and more certain in 1944 and 1945, 
union leaders throughout the garment district co-sponsored rallies with busi-
ness owners, in order to encourage workers to continue their support for the 
war effort. “The surging crowds,” Women’s Wear Daily reported, “cheered trade 
leaders, union representatives, and stage and radio celebrities in the most 
enthusiastic trade rally since the beginning of the war.” And this was nothing 
compared to the rallies in the aftermath of V-E day, when everything south of 
40th Street became “a beehive of activity” as “swatches, paper, and whatever 
else was handy flew through the air.” So far was the neighborhood’s atmo-
sphere from the former struggles that had dominated it that now dignitaries 
visiting the city paraded through the area. General Eisenhower, for instance, 
marched through the streets of the garment district upon his visit to New York 
in the summer of 1945, and was greeted by throngs of workers from garment 
factories and stores alike celebrating his victory against Germany.27
 If the changes in the garment district weakened any threat of disorder that 
the unions might once have used to their advantage, other developments in the 
city that took place during the war would more permanently affect the unions’ 
situation. Perhaps the most important was an act of tremendous foresight by 
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Met Life, the same company that had opened Parkchester shortly before the 
war. During the war, with encouragement from both Mayor LaGuardia and 
Robert Moses, Met Life executives began work on a huge housing project on 
the East Side of Manhattan, just a few blocks east of Union Square. Stuyvesant 
Town, as the new development was called, would play a central role in the 
city’s postwar development. So began what newspapers heralded as “the great-
est and most significant mass movement of families in New York City’s his-
tory,” as the working-class residents of the area east of Union Square began to 
move away from the site soon to be cleared for the new development. It would 
take several years before the effects of Stuyvesant Town would be felt on the 
department stores, but when they were felt, the effects would be devastating 
for the unions’ future.28
 If the effects of Stuyvesant Town were not immediate, the effects of many 
of the other changes taking place in the city were, as these transformations 
generally strengthened managers’ efforts to control their employees. As strong 
and visible supporters of the war, managers now ended the stigma attached to 
large retail firms that had been so powerful during the Depression. Thanks to 
self-service, managers also could now eliminate many of the workers who had 
once been so integral to the functioning of both the stores and the unions. 
While workers in other industries did go out on highly controversial wildcat 
strikes to protest factory managers’ wartime actions, there is no evidence that 
workers in New York City’s department stores considered this option. Far from 
it: workers and union organizers alike actively participated in management-
sponsored activities like war bond rallies and USO parties, demonstrating 
their own support for the war.29
 If there was no conflict between workers and union leaders during the 
war, there was plenty of wartime conflict within the unions. During the war, 
Samuel Wolchok found the support within the URWDSEA that had somewhat 
eluded him in the late 1930s. He would now set about solidifying his own base 
as a national union leader.
Unions at War, –
While store managers found themselves in a stronger position due to the war, 
New York City’s local unions were greatly weakened by changes within the 
retailing industry during the war. Changes in personnel and tactics seriously 
threatened the local union leaders who had once been so powerful within the 
URWDSEA. Local leaders’ strong support for the no-strike pledge, due in 
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some cases to their support for the Soviet Union, forced them to abandon the 
confrontational tactics that had served them so well during the Depression. 
As they shifted tactics, Communist and non-Communist local union leaders 
alike endorsed a double-V campaign, voicing their support for the war as they 
simultaneously called for campaigns against racism, sexism, and economic 
injustice on the home front. In doing so, these local leaders found them-
selves in close political agreement with Samuel Wolchok and other national 
URWDSEA leaders, even as national and local union leaders struggled for 
control of the union with even greater determination.
 The most immediate effects of the war upon the department store unions 
were the changes in union personnel. Several of the most respected lead-
ers of the local unions, Bill Michelson and Lowell Morris (the leader of 
Bloomingdale’s Local 3) among them, left the unions for the army. Morris 
subsequently died in combat, to be replaced in leadership by Bloomingdale’s 
sales worker Carl Andren. In addition, at some stores, a number of workers 
who had previously been union organizers were recruited for management 
positions, and thus were out of the union for the duration of the war.30
 This vacuum in leadership represented both a challenge to those local 
leaders who remained and an opportunity for those workers who had not 
been part of the union leadership before World War II. It was in part as a 
result of these changes in union personnel that women and African American 
workers advanced into important roles in union leadership during the war. 
Gimbel’s worker Anna Blanck, for example, became an important figure in the 
leadership of Local 2 partially because of William Michelson’s absence, while 
William Atkinson, a non-Communist African American elevator operator at 
Macy’s, advanced in the union ranks to become the vice-president of Local 1-S 
before Atkinson was himself drafted. Both Atkinson and Blanck would con-
tinue to play important roles in the union leadership after the war ended.31
 As African Americans and women advanced into union leadership, local 
union leaders became even more vocal about the need to combat gender 
discrimination. In a speech before the general membership of Local 1-S, for 
instance, Samuel Kovenetsky went on record in favor of women becoming 
“more active in the union and that gaps in the [local] leadership be filled 
by women in the event of the drafting of our male leaders.” Union organiz-
ers also became a little more outspoken in demanding rights for African 
American workers within the stores. Since retailing was not a defense industry, 
Roosevelt’s Executive Order 8802 did not apply, and the Fair Employment 
Practices Commission had no power to regulate the department store indus-
try. Union organizers nonetheless set up local anti-discrimination committees 
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in their first serious effort to end discrimination within the stores. In the 
same speech where he called for increasing the numbers of women workers 
in the union leadership, Samuel Kovenetsky declared that African American 
workers, now “in categories of work besides elevators and kitchens . . . have a 
right to be able to do the same work for the same salaries as their white breth-
ren.” Whether the anti-discrimination committees had any effect on African 
American workers’ winning jobs in sales and office work is less clear; as has 
already been mentioned, due to the labor shortage, African American workers 
likely would have won these jobs regardless of the unions’ support.32
 Organizers also made additional efforts to struggle against racism outside 
of the stores. The Executive Board of Local 1-S, for example, issued a for-
mal protest against segregated baseball leagues in 1942. In addition, the local 
unions’ newspaper, the Department Store Employee, published a number of 
articles against discrimination, particularly in the American South. According 
to the Department Store Employee, union leaders wrote multiple letters to their 
congressional delegates protesting African American citizens’ mistreatment 
throughout the South.33
 As these efforts to fight racism indicate, organizers increasingly worked 
around a wide range of issues, some quite removed from the day-to-day lives 
of department store workers. The Local 1-S Executive Board passed a resolu-
tion calling for the opening of the Second Front in Europe, a popular cause 
among those who wished to take some pressure off Stalin’s Red Army. Other 
issues around which the unions organized were closer to home. One article 
in the Department Store Employee, for instance, indicates that union mem-
bers focused on organizing campaigns to support the wartime price controls, 
designed to curb inflation and to thereby ensure that the wage freeze did not 
result in workers’ impoverishment. When Congress voted to allow even lim-
ited price increases, local leaders called on all union members to participate in 
a massive letter-writing campaign to protest this action.34
 Local leaders repeatedly attempted to connect these wartime struggles 
to the history of the unions before the war. They did so first by continuing 
many of the demands and practices that had begun before the war. The Local 
1-S Executive Board, for instance, issued a resolution in 1942 calling for “one 
department store local” in New York, rather than the multiple locals which 
then existed, a continuation of the union organizers’ prewar demands for the 
Joint Board. In addition, union organizers continued to use cultural programs 
as well as the unions’ newspaper as a way to bind the different locals together. 
By the end of the war not only did members of the department store union 
locals all share the same newspaper, but all participated in activities like those 
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begun under the Joint Activities Committee before the war began. Shop 
stewards in all the department store locals also participated in a single set of 
union leadership classes, since—as one article put it—the leaders of all “our 
local unions realized the necessity for training [stewards] in the problems that 
confront labor, in order to strengthen the internal structure of our locals.”35
 The local leaders also emphasized the connections between their wartime 
struggles and the pre-war history of the union by explicitly celebrating the 
local unions’ history. Nicholas Carnes, whose long presence in the union made 
him a de facto expert on the subject, published several articles on the depart-
ment store unions’ history in the Department Store Employee during the war. 
While at least one of these articles has been lost, in the articles that survived, 
Carnes recounted the union’s history as a grassroots movement, by remind-
ing his readers that it was “a few department store workers” who had “met 
together in the office of the Office Workers Union, independent” and thus cre-
ated “the parent body of our present union.” In Carnes’s history, these workers 
had led the strikes against Klein’s and Ohrbach’s, the five-and-dime stores, and 
Gimbel’s. And these workers had chosen to remain unified despite attempts on 
the part of the national URWDSEA leaders to divide them. Carnes’s history is 
interesting both for what he omitted and for what he included. For one thing, 
his strong celebration of workers’ grassroots militancy suggests that, contrary 
to the assertions of many historians, local union leaders during World War II 
did not in principle oppose workers’ militancy. To the contrary, Carnes cel-
ebrated the unions’ militant history, but nonetheless supported the no-strike 
pledge, apparently seeing no contradiction in this attitude. Additionally, in 
an act that had increasing importance for the unions’ future, Carnes omit-
ted any mention of the Communist politics that had played such a key role 
in the unions’ history. While this was not unusual (within the department 
store unions, as elsewhere, the word “Communist” was generally used only by 
anti-Communists, as a form of attack), it is nonetheless important for the way 
it allowed Carnes to construct the union’s history. In order to avoid any anti-
Communist attacks, Carnes created a history that gave communism no credit 
for the union’s achievements, and deprived the workers who had created these 
unions of their radical political beliefs.36
 Local union organizers celebrated their past militancy and continued cam-
paigning for various causes, while espousing a far less militant set of tactics 
during the war. Like the Communist party’s support for workers’ going to work 
on May Day, there may have been some political justification for not disrupt-
ing the war effort, but it nonetheless made the unions less radical, less militant, 
and ultimately less powerful. In response to both rising prices and segregation, 
Realignment, –
union leaders responded by issuing written complaints to federal officials and 
asking members to do the same. It was a far cry from the Depression, when 
they had called for a more confrontational approach to winning workers better 
contracts. And it was a tactic that simply would not result in as many victories 
as did their earlier, more confrontational efforts.
 For the Communists within the local leadership of New York City’s depart-
ment store unions, this tactical shift had a special significance, since Samuel 
Wolchok and other national URWDSEA leaders substantially altered their 
own political program. To do so, the national URWDSEA leaders embraced 
liberalism and vocally opposed racism and gender discrimination. At the same 
time, unlike the local leaders, national union leaders endorsed militant strikes 
during the war (so long as the government approved them), while repeatedly 
and vocally endorsing the liberal agenda of equal opportunity for all. By war’s 
end, therefore, the Communist-led local unions and the non-Communist 
national union had shifted their respective positions: the Communists were 
now the ones calling for restrained tactics, while the liberals were suddenly the 
more militant of the two factions within the union.
 The national URWDSEA leaders illustrated their support for liberalism by 
supporting many different issues. At the 1942 convention the national leaders 
addressed women’s role within the union for the first time. At that conven-
tion, the first since the country’s entrance into World War II, delegates set up 
an official Women’s Auxiliary, although there are no records indicating what, 
if anything, the auxiliary actually did. The national union leaders also went 
“on record for increasing the participation of women in the leadership in the 
International and its affiliated locals.” Like Kovenetsky, they probably did so 
due to the entrance of large numbers of male union members and male union 
leaders into the armed forces.37
 During the next year, 1943, Wolchok went even further in his pursuit of 
justice for working women. Among other things, Wolchok set up a meeting 
with New York State Governor Dewey to discuss women’s wages, and received 
personal assurance from the governor “that $250,000 would be allotted out 
of the State Budget to set up facilities for establishing and supervising mini-
mum hour and wage regulations for women in New York State retail stores.” 
Although Dewey’s promise does not seem to have resulted in any recorded 
change in women’s status within retail stores, Wolchok’s meeting with Dewey 
was still significant for the history of the URWDSEA. Wolchok, unlike the 
local union leaders, had the ability to set up meetings with the governor to 
make these demands for women’s rights, and thereby take some credit for 
Dewey’s statement, as he publicly did in the union newspaper.38
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 At the same time as he became more supportive of equal rights for work-
ing women, Wolchok also emerged as one of the foremost advocates for racial 
equality within the union. At the 1942 convention Wolchok announced that, 
in the postwar world, “there must be social and economic and political equal-
ity, not merely for the white man, but also for the black man, for the yellow 
man, for every man.” In order to achieve this, Wolchok and other national 
leaders strongly supported the establishment of a permanent and more power-
ful Fair Employment Practices Commission (FEPC), one that would have the 
right to regulate all industries, not just defense industries.39
 Despite these stronger stands against discrimination, the leaders of the 
national union, unlike the local leadership, remained exclusively white and 
almost exclusively male throughout the war. By the end of the war only one 
woman, Betty Weiner, sat on the national Executive Board, and none of the 
vice-presidencies or other major leadership positions were filled by women or 
nonwhites during the 1940s. Essentially, within the union’s national leader-
ship, white men were leading a struggle for women’s rights and racial equality 
in the workplace.
 The national union’s newspaper during the war further demonstrates this 
lack of diversity. Throughout the war the editors of the union’s national news-
paper consistently reflected the national union leaders’ stance on political and 
social issues. And, in the 1940s, despite the numerous articles opposing racial 
and gender discrimination, the editors continued to portray the URWDSEA 
as a union of white men. Cartoons, for example, depicted the union as a large 
and muscular white man, frequently in the same social-realist style that domi-
nated CIO and other union propaganda in the 1930s. Women appeared in 
only one picture representing the union during the war: in a cartoon reflecting 
the delegates to the union’s convention, the cartoonist added some women to 
the convention floor. Other than that, artists always represented the union as 
male.40
 Like the local leaders, the national leaders used a presentation of the 
union’s history to illustrate their vision of the union. The national leaders’ 
history of the union, likewise presented in their union newspaper, gave the 
New Era Committee, led by Wolchok and URWDSEA Vice-President John V. 
Cooney, responsibility for attracting the CIO’s attention. These brave, white, 
male leaders, a report presented in the national union’s newspaper asserted, 
were “denounced as trouble-makers, their characters assassinated. . . . With no 
semblance of reason, with star chamber proceedings and not an iota of justi-
fication,” they had been expelled from the AFL and had joined the CIO. Gone 
were the women workers at the five-and-dime stores whose strikes had been 
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central to the union’s reputation when the New Era Committee had applied 
for a CIO charter; gone, too, were Clarina Michelson and her followers, who 
had played such a large role in the union’s history. And, as in Carnes’s history, 
gone was any role communism had played in founding the unions. Just like 
Carnes’s history, this history was an interpretation designed to emphasize the 
one faction’s important role in the union’s history. According to the national 
union’s history, however, it was the national leaders, entirely white and male, 
personified by Wolchok and Cooney, who had established the URWDSEA. 
These officials, this account suggested, could best lead the struggle for social 
justice for the workers they represented, as well as for other marginalized 
groups.41
 With their different understandings of the union’s history, it was perhaps 
not surprising that local leaders of the department store unions and the 
national leaders of the URWDSEA were in a near-constant state of struggle 
throughout the war. At the 1942 convention, for instance, the first conven-
tion after the Gimbel’s strike, when it came time for Wolchok to be re-elected 
(without any opposition) as president of the URWDSEA, the delegates from 
the department store unions as well as some other left-wing union delegates 
(Benjamin Gudes, the president of Drug Clerks’ Local 1199, and Arthur 
Osman), abstained from voting in a protest of Wolchok’s leadership. They also 
requested the right to address the convention floor to explain their abstention 
in detail. Wolchok found this demand absurd, and he made a speech to that 
effect, addressing himself to Osman, who had asked to make the speech:
Brother Osman, if the majority of the delegates and the members they 
represent here do not want me, or did not want me to be reelected, why 
didn’t you place somebody else in nomination? I think that would have 
been the proper thing to do. . . . I think that this Convention has heard 
enough to know that not you alone built Local 65, and that no Halperin 
[sic] alone built Local 1250. . . . [It was] the International’s money, the 
Internationals’ strength together with the efforts of local unions that 
did it.
Wolchok spoke for a long time after making these remarks, pointing out that 
Osman, Gudes, and others had had the opportunity to take the presidency 
away from Wolchok at earlier conventions in 1937 and 1939. They had instead 
chosen to support Wolchok, and in his view, their complaints ever since were 
tantamount to betrayal, considering all the money and time which Wolchok 
had put into helping to build union membership.42
 Chapter 
 John Cooney, who rose in support of Wolchok, was even more outspoken 
on the subject of Wolchok’s immense contributions to the union. Cooney was 
also far more open about his contempt for the department store union lead-
ers and their left-wing allies. As Cooney himself put it, “It is pretty difficult 
to stand here for a week’s time, and listen to a campaign of vilification and 
insinuations, against a man whom those who really know, have grown to love, 
a man whose principal fault is that he happens to be a very decent human 
being, something some people in this hall know nothing about—decency.”43
 These discussions during the convention indicate that the war had only 
inflamed the conflict between liberals and Communists within the depart-
ment store unions. During the war, however, the two sides were substantially 
in agreement about most political issues, endorsing negotiations rather than 
strikes and giving at least rhetorical support for women’s rights and racial 
equality. As a result, their struggle was essentially over power, over whether 
Wolchok or the left-wing local leaders would gain the support of the delegates 
within the convention. And it was Wolchok, not the local leaders, who repeat-
edly won that struggle during the war.
 As has already been indicated, one reason for Wolchok’s success was the 
tactical shifts that took place during the war. Wolchok’s favored strategy—
which had always been far less confrontational than the local leaders’—was 
suddenly extremely effective in both intraunion politics and as an organizing 
tool. Success “in the conference room” was now equally important as suc-
cess “on the picket line,” as Wolchok proudly noted in a speech to the 1942 
URWDSEA convention. The numbers bore out Wolchok’s claim. Between 
1939 and 1942 the union increased its membership by 50 percent, and by June 
1942, the URWDSEA was a truly national organization, the seventh largest 
CIO union in the country.44
 Wolchok’s actions during the Montgomery Ward strike of 1944 enhanced 
his national power still further. Montgomery Ward Vice-President Sewell 
Avery and Wolchok clashed repeatedly throughout the early 1940s. Avery 
proved extremely reluctant to allow the union to set any conditions for his 
business, and found the notion of the closed shop, which forbade the hiring of 
workers who were not union members, particularly objectionable. Despite the 
fact that this demand was a government-sanctioned practice during the war, 
Avery refused to accede to Wolchok’s repeated demand for the closed shop at 
Montgomery Ward. At one point before the strike, in response to Wolchok’s 
repeated demands for the closed shop, Avery lost his temper and informed 
Wolchok that under no circumstances would Avery give way on labor issues, 
since, as Avery repeatedly put it, “no outsider is going to run my business.”45
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 Avery was equally unyielding when dealing with the federal government’s 
War Labor Board (WLB). Members of the WLB, which was empowered dur-
ing the war to resolve differences between labor and management in order to 
prevent strikes, slowdowns, and lockouts in war industries, found negotiations 
with Avery to be particularly difficult. In fact, William H. Davis, the chairman 
of the WLB, remembered his dealings with Avery as “a rather amazing experi-
ence,” since, no matter what Davis and other WLB members did, they could 
not convince Avery to compromise on any labor issues.46
 Avery’s determination to retain complete control over his employees even-
tually forced Wolchok into the strike. On December 8, 1943, the union’s con-
tract with Montgomery Ward expired. Although Wolchok quickly attempted 
to set up a meeting with Avery in order to negotiate the next contract, Avery 
refused to meet with him. Avery backed up his refusal by a dubious claim that 
the union no longer represented a majority of the store’s workers and that the 
union was therefore no longer the workers’ legal bargaining unit. Unable to 
convince Avery to compromise, Davis reluctantly asked Wolchok to agree to 
new elections. In keeping with his desire to avoid industrial conflict during the 
war, Wolchok agreed to Davis’s request, and ordered that the local union hold 
a new election, at the time an almost unheard-of practice for a union which 
had already won recognition.47
 Despite this victory, Avery continued to defy both the union and the WLB 
alike. The WLB issued an order to the company, demanding that they extend 
the previous contract until the elections. Avery refused to follow this order, 
claiming that since his industry was classified as nonessential, he was not 
required to follow the WLB directives. On April 12 workers at Montgomery 
Ward went on strike. They did so with the full support both of the War Labor 
Board and of Samuel Wolchok, who had finally given up on peaceful nego-
tiations with Sewell Avery. As Davis later described the Montgomery Ward 
strike, “this is the first strike that has occurred in America since the no-strike 
plan started in which the War Labor Board was helpless to act. We just could 
not order these men back to work for an employer who was defying our order 
. . . and had refused to maintain the status [quo] long enough to give them a 
chance to vote.”48
 The strike lasted thirteen days, and sympathy strikes broke out at five other 
Ward stores in Detroit and Albany. On April 25 President Roosevelt issued 
an order that the workers return to their jobs and Ward’s comply with the 
WLB order. The strike, Roosevelt informed workers and management alike, 
was a condition “which cannot be permitted to continue in a nation at war.” It 
ended only after the United States Army took over the offices of Montgomery 
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Ward and the attorney general issued an order requiring Avery to negotiate. 
Despite the Army’s possession of the building and the attorney general’s order, 
Avery still refused to compromise on a single demand. United States soldiers 
in full uniform removed Avery from the store building, much to the delight of 
Montgomery Ward employees and the news photographers waiting outside.49
 With the army in possession of the store, the War Labor Board again issued 
its order to negotiate. Company managers, now with no control over their 
store, agreed to comply and extended the old contract. After the army left the 
store, however, Avery quickly reverted to his earlier behavior. He unilaterally 
decided to pay only around 30 percent of the back pay awarded to the strikers. 
Montgomery Ward workers prepared again to return to the picket line, this 
time planning in advance to launch strikes at all Ward stores throughout the 
Midwest. Once again, the army intervened. On December 28, 1944, the U.S. 
Army again took over Montgomery Ward, this time seizing the company’s 
properties in seven different cities across the Midwest and instituting the 
closed shop and back pay rulings of the WLB. The army continued holding 
onto the Montgomery Ward properties and running the stores until October 
1945, when the army finally left and the closed shop at Ward’s ended.50
 Samuel Wolchok found these strikes at Montgomery Ward wonderful 
opportunities to recoup whatever damages his conciliatory strategy had 
caused him before the war. Unlike during the Gimbel’s strike of 1941, here 
it was Wolchok who refused to compromise and emerged victorious after a 
strike. At the same time, he had demonstrated his determination without run-
ning any risk of losing his reputation as a responsible and conservative union 
leader. The president, the attorney general, the War Labor Board, and the 
overwhelming majority of the URWDSEA endorsed these strikes. The success 
of the strikes proved, to almost all concerned, that, as a responsible but still 
militant labor leader, Wolchok was doing a wonderful job as president of the 
URWDSEA.
 Communist representatives of New York City local unions were the only 
people within the union who seemed to oppose Wolchok’s leadership in 1944. 
In part due to the Communists’ unyielding endorsement of the no-strike 
pledge, and in part because of the numerous earlier disagreements between 
Wolchok and the union’s left wing, Arthur Osman bitterly attacked Wolchok’s 
actions during the Montgomery Ward strike. He released a joint statement 
with Local 65 shop stewards condemning the strike as an unnecessary viola-
tion of the no-strike pledge. As the Local 65 resolution put it:
The Montgomery Ward Company and its president, Sewell Avery, 
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have scored another victory in their campaign to sabotage America’s 
war effort and to incite strikes and other interruptions of the workers’ 
contributions to victory. This is the tragic significance of the strike at 
the Montgomery Ward Co . . . The union, by falling for the Company’s 
provocations, is in effect helping Sewell Avery’s treasonous activities.51
 Wolchok responded by launching an all-out attack on Osman, whom he 
dubbed a traitor to the workers at Montgomery Ward as well as the URWDSEA. 
In this response, Wolchok particularly emphasized Osman’s inconsistency in 
both politics and tactics. “Osman,” Wolchok wrote in the union newspaper, “is 
always out in front, fist clenched, teeth set, tongue lashing out in all directions. 
He issues protests, conducts parades, demonstrates in parks, threatens with 
dire punishment anyone daring to disagree with him.” Wolchok went on to 
point out that Osman had, only a few years earlier, been a firm supporter of the 
peace movement. This was only one example of what Wolchok suggested was 
Osman’s larger pattern of hypocrisy. “It is extraordinary,” Wolchok delighted in 
informing his readers, “that [Osman] who but recently strutted to the slogan, 
‘What is Good for the Bosses Is No Good for Labor’ now looks to employers 
for support against the action of Detroit workers. About this I shall say noth-
ing for the present, leaving it for [your] further consideration.”52
 In attacking Osman, Wolchok found yet another issue to unite almost the 
entire URWDSEA. Osman’s actions met with condemnation from virtually 
all local union leaders outside of Local 65, Local 1199, and the department 
store unions. Representatives from these left-wing unions were noticeably 
silent on the issue. But that did not protect them from attacks from the right 
wing. A particularly conservative Joint Board in St. Louis, for instance, sent 
the national union a letter, reading, in part: “It is time that our International 
Union be purged of Arthur Osman and his kind . . . [who have] defied our 
International’s policy and CIO policy in order to gain the objectives of the 
Communist party . . . We therefore request that you as International President 
suspend and remove Arthur Osman as President of Local 65 and as a mem-
ber of our international.” Dozens of other local leaders also moved to show 
their support for Wolchok as well, several of them also joining the call for 
Osman’s resignation. Even leaders of unions that were not affiliated with the 
URWDSEA, such as E. E. Benedict of the Woodworkers of America, called on 
Wolchok to continue his attacks on Osman.53
 Perhaps the most surprising aspect of the struggles around the Mont-
gomery Ward strike was the fact that Wolchok made no effort to have Osman 
removed from the union. After Wolchok’s accusation of treachery and the 
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letters written in response to this charge, Wolchok apparently let the matter 
drop; no more mention was made of the event in the union newspapers or at 
union conventions. Several reasons exist for Wolchok’s restraint in this matter. 
First, Osman’s District 65 was by far the most powerful wholesale workers’ 
union in the URWDSEA, and kicking Osman out of the union might well have 
meant losing District 65 in the process, thus severely weakening the union’s 
presence in the wholesale industry. Even more important, however, these 
conflicts took place at a time when both Osman and Wolchok shared support 
for the need for a national alliance against fascism. Within this alliance all 
anti-Fascists (Wolchok and Osman included) had to unite until the threat of 
fascism had been defeated. Wolchok was among the most eloquent support-
ers of this alliance. In his first monthly column for the Retail Wholesale and 
Department Store Employee, for instance, Wolchok devoted the entire column 
to this united front:
The past few years have given overwhelming evidence of the barba-
rism, cynicism, and ruthlessness of the Nazi-Fascist hordes. . . . Under 
[Roosevelt’s and Churchill’s] leadership, and with the inspiration of our 
Russian and Chinese allies, we are destined to win a glorious victory. 
We must prove ourselves worthy of the noble task in which we are 
engaged. . . . By every means at our disposal, as soldiers and civilians, as 
workers in production and distribution, as American citizens, we must 
render the utmost service and sacrifice. The war represents for all of us 
the paramount issue, the noblest cause.
But the struggle needed to extend beyond international issues, Wolchok 
reminded his readers:
We must [also] give a thought to our domestic problems, those inner 
social questions affecting “life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.” We 
must give thought to those freedoms which our forefathers struggled 
so hard to establish . . . There are certain things in life that the worker 
cannot sacrifice . . . decent standards of living, health and education of 
children, adequate housing for the family . . . the questions of the cost of 
living, social security, education, race discrimination, and many others, 
which call for intelligent solution.54
 This endorsement of liberal reform, combined with total support for the 
war, matched Osman’s wartime politics exactly. In some ways, in fact, labor 
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leaders’ dispute around the Montgomery Ward strike was more about who was 
the better anti-Fascist than it was about anything else. Osman and the Local 65 
shop stewards who released the statement accused Wolchok of placing short-
term concerns (the rights of Montgomery Ward workers) over the struggle 
against fascism. Likewise, in his attack on Osman, Wolchok accused Osman 
of being less committed and more vacillating on the need to fight fascism than 
was Wolchok himself. Yet both Osman and Wolchok restricted themselves to 
verbal sparring, stopping short of the upheaval and disruption that more sub-
stantive attacks would probably have caused.
 If the actions of Wolchok and Osman were in many ways similar, the impli-
cations of these actions were far different. Osman, like many of the Communist 
leaders of the local unions, had taken pride in his confrontational and com-
bative organizing style before the war began. Osman’s willingness to shift his 
support—as the Daily Worker suggested that workers should—from street 
protests to ensuring continual production and distribution made him appear 
to be a hypocrite. Other historians have suggested that the shift was really one 
of method rather than priorities—that Osman and other Communists who 
supported the no-strike pledge sincerely believed that defeating Hitler was 
the workers’ most important concern. It is possible this is true in some cases, 
but critics of the left-wing local leaders now had at least apparent evidence 
for their claim that Communists union organizers placed Communist party 
policy over workers’ interests and had no genuine concern for workers’ causes. 
While there is no evidence that the workers in Local 65 (or in the department 
store unions, for that matter) believed that Osman was a hypocrite, many 
other union leaders and members did believe these charges, and sided openly 
with Wolchok.55
 New York City’s department store unions were not directly involved in the 
Montgomery Ward strike. Perhaps in an effort to maintain some sort of peace 
with Wolchok, the union representatives apparently made no public state-
ments either for or against Osman’s position. At the same time, they contin-
ued working closely with Osman for the duration of the war as well as in the 
postwar era, and they would be subject to the same attacks as Osman in the 
postwar era.56
 Ironically, the successful Montgomery Ward strike indirectly weakened the 
department store unions. Department store union organizers, like Osman, 
had previously been able to dismiss Samuel Wolchok as a compromising and 
weak leader who backed down to management’s every whim. Their successful 
actions during prewar struggles like the Gimbel’s strike allowed them to pro-
vide evidence that they were both more militant and, at least sometimes, better 
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at winning concessions from management. In the Montgomery Ward strike, 
however, Wolchok had taken a widely popular stand and eventually forced 
management to back down. It was a reversal of their prewar positions, one 
that gave Wolchok a decided edge over his once-mighty opponents. Within 
the URWDSEA, the liberal national leaders, not the radical local leaders, were 
the ones in control by war’s end.
Conclusion
Far from being a time when “nothing changed,” the war was a period of 
realignment for New York City’s department store unions. Store managers 
found far greater power as a result of the war, winning public and government 
support and experimenting with new retailing techniques. National union 
leaders similarly found themselves in the government’s good graces as a result 
of their enforcement of the no-strike pledge, and found themselves in a posi-
tion to demonstrate their defense of workers’ rights during the Montgomery 
Ward strike. Local union leaders, however, department store union leaders 
among them, found themselves in a far less favorable position than they had 
held earlier. Rather than remaining the national union’s sometimes-loyal 
opposition, who could successfully mobilize workers to fight against manage-
ment, the war years left Communists in the department store unions severely 
weakened, without the confrontational tactics or reputation that had forced 
managers to submit to unionization during the Depression. And, equally 
important, the conflicts over public space that had given the union strength in 
the 1930s had disappeared during the war.
 These new wartime relationships had critical legacies for the role of retail 
workers in the American labor movement. The postwar years would bring 
severe challenges to the Communists who had led the department store 
unions throughout these unions’ history. A stronger national union leader-
ship and managerial restructuring, both of which took place during the war, 
continued into the postwar era. Over the next few years these two wartime 
developments would bring the department store unions and the URWDSEA 
alike to the point of collapse.
Chapter 5
Collapse, –
Introduction
If the war was a time of shifting power relations, the postwar era was a time 
of rapid and catastrophic change for retail workers’ unions in America. Store 
managers responded to postwar economic changes in ways that weakened 
retail workers’ unions to the point of collapse. Rather than going back to the 
prewar methods of upscale retailing, store managers continued restructuring 
the stores within the city and began laying off workers in an effort to increase 
profits. Managers also opened branch stores in the city’s outer boroughs and in 
a growing number of suburban shopping centers. Union organizers attempted 
to meet these challenges, but they were able to get satisfactory employment for 
only a few of the laid-off workers, and the unions at the branch stores would 
never be as strong as the unions at the main city stores.
 While these changes weakened the unions, Communists and non-
Communists within the CIO’s retail union, now renamed the Retail Wholesale 
and Department Store Union (RWDSU), continued to work together despite 
their differences. (The change of the union’s name took place primarily 
because of the addition of several Canadian union locals into the URWDSEA.) 
Throughout 1946 and 1947, to their credit, national RWDSU leaders like 
Samuel Wolchok refused to resort to anti-Communist attacks against the local 
union leaders. To the contrary, the postwar years seemed to be far more con-
ducive to a productive working relationship than had wartimes. National and 
local leaders alike launched a massive campaign around what they agreed were 
the most important social reforms, like national health care, full employment, 
and a permanent federal agency to combat discrimination. And, as though 
to signify a true easing of tensions between the national union leaders and 
the department store union leaders, Wolchok finally created the Joint Board 
which department store union leaders had long demanded.
 The Communists within the department store unions and other left-
wing RWDSU locals were overjoyed with this new relationship. They took 
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advantage of the newfound autonomy that Wolchok allowed to return to some 
of their prewar practices, particularly trying once more to create a vibrant 
cultural dimension to the unions. Also in these years, department store union 
leaders embraced as never before their connections to radical politics, proudly 
featuring pictures of the unions’ participation in the city’s May Day parade in 
their newspaper.
 The productive relationship between national and local union leaders was 
short-lived. Not long after the 1946 convention, where Wolchok made his 
decision to continue working with the Communists in the RWDSU, Congress 
passed the Taft-Hartley Act. This law forced liberal union leaders like 
Wolchok to abandon the alliances that they had formed with Communists. 
With the passage of the Taft-Hartley Act, the government made it impossible 
to remain silent on the issue of communism, as Wolchok and other national 
RWDSU leaders had attempted to do. In the summer and fall of 1948, the 
federal government launched an investigation of Communist participation in 
the RWDSU. Wolchok, facing increasing pressure from all sides, announced 
his staunch support for anti-communism, and expelled the department store 
unions from the RWDSU. Shortly afterwards, he himself resigned as president. 
The RWDSU was devastated, and as a result, the role of retail workers in the 
American labor movement was all but eliminated.
“Is Stern’s Really Union?”  
The Department Store Joint Board, –
August 14, 1945, was VJ Day, a day of tremendous celebrations in New York 
City. The war that had once seemed endless had now been won, and workers 
in the garment district turned out to celebrate, clogging the streets so badly 
that photographers had difficulty getting through the throngs of revelers to 
take pictures. In the garment factories, “employees dangled their legs out of the 
windows . . . and shouted words to those on the street.” And in the department 
stores many workers simply did not show up, as managers rushed to redeco-
rate the store windows themselves with appropriately celebratory posters and 
signs. (In perhaps the ultimate irony in the history of American retailing, man-
agers at the upscale Saks Fifth Avenue store decorated the store windows with 
heroic portraits of Allied leaders, including a huge picture of Joseph Stalin.)1
 The elation at the war’s end was not to last. Indeed, the end of the war itself 
became the subject for the city’s first postwar strikes, as elevator and dock 
workers went on strike to demand pay for V-J Day. September of that year was 
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to be a month of seemingly endless strikes in the city: 8,000 painters struck 
when managers refused to guarantee an end to discriminatory firing practices, 
and only days later, 11,000 elevator operators in buildings throughout the city 
went on strike, shutting down some of the city’s tallest buildings. Office work-
ers lined up at pay phones all over midtown Manhattan, calling in to work to 
find out if they were really expected to climb dozens of flights of stairs in order 
to reach their workplace. Perhaps most important of all, in October 1945, in 
the largest of the New York City postwar strikes, dock workers returned to the 
picket line, as a strike of 35,000 workers shut down the New York City area’s 
shipping industry against union leaders’ orders, in a militant and often violent 
confrontation.2
 As labor relations became increasingly unsettled in New York, so did 
residential patterns. People were on the move in postwar America, many of 
them moving into the suburbs in very large numbers. Suburbs were growing 
nationwide, at a rate of approximately 2,500,000 people a year. The trend was 
particularly pronounced in the New York area, where many residents moved 
to the city’s outer boroughs, especially into Queens, which grew by more than 
200,000 people between 1941 and 1947. Many others seeking to get out of 
Manhattan left the city limits altogether. During 1947–48, well over half a mil-
lion people moved into the suburbs of Connecticut, New Jersey, and New York 
State.3
 At least some store managers viewed the increasing suburbanization and 
the increasing consumption that accompanied it as a boon for the industry. 
Managers at Bloomingdale’s even went so far as to set up an architectural con-
test for the “best suburban home for New York,” complete with “life-size model 
rooms appropriately and imaginatively furnished to correspond to the archi-
tecture.” At the same time, suburbanization also presented new challenges, 
since a large number of potential customers now lived further away and there-
fore would be less likely to make their purchases in the city. In response, store 
managers increased their efforts to set up branch stores in the suburbs and the 
outer boroughs. Shopping centers sprung up throughout the outer boroughs, 
like the Jamaica section of Queens, and suburban areas like Westchester and 
Long Island. Many of these shopping centers contained a department store 
branch. Managers at Hearn’s, Bloomingdale’s, and Macy’s all set up branch 
stores in the late 1940s, and by the early 1950s such branch stores were every-
where. Retail sales were now a central factor of the suburban economy, with 
gross sales increasing over 300 percent in some parts of Queens, and over 100 
percent in other suburban areas. By the early 1950s Regional Plan Association 
President Frederick Clark could claim with some justification that “practically 
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everyone in the suburban area is now within reach of several branch stores.”4
 Managers ran the branch stores very differently than they did the main city 
stores. As branch store expert John Guernsey reported in a series of articles 
for the Department Store Economist in 1951, managers could operate branch 
stores at 70 percent of the expense of the main stores, in part by paying lower 
salaries to workers. As Guernsey demonstrated, based on a national survey of 
branch store managers, the lower salaries offered to salespeople reflected the 
different requirements managers had of branch store workers. Sales workers 
at the branch stores were less specialized and less highly trained, and there-
fore they could not demand the high salaries of the city-based upscale store 
workers. In branch stores, managers did not expect workers to be experts in 
an individual department or line of merchandise; managers certainly did not 
expect workers to know all the stock on hand, as had been the case for sales 
workers in the main city stores. Instead, managers expected branch store sales 
workers to follow customers through different departments. The real skill 
here, Guernsey wrote, was for workers to remain “folksy and interested,” to 
keep branch store customers satisfied with their shopping experience.5
 By emphasizing branch store workers’ personality and manners rather than 
sales training, department store managers redefined the ideal salesperson. No 
longer was the ideal salesperson a highly trained worker who would remain at 
his or her job for many years. As had been the case in some downscale stores 
like May’s, branch store managers sought part-time workers, especially women 
with “other incomes.” These women would be required to create an atmo-
sphere much like the one they were expected to create in the postwar suburban 
home: within the stores, as within the home, value was placed on politeness, 
friendliness, and companionship, as they traveled around with their customers 
from one department to the next.6
 Union organizers generally responded quite effectively to the increasing 
decentralization of department stores, forming unions at many of the earliest 
branch stores. By 1944 Local 1-S had already organized at the Macy’s branch 
store in Parkchester, and by 1948, only months after Macy’s Jamaica branch 
opened, they had won union certification in the branch store there as well. 
Although organizers had more difficulty at some of the other branches (in the 
1950s they were still working to establish unions within the branch stores at 
Bloomingdale’s, for instance), the opening of branch stores did not immedi-
ately or automatically weaken the unions.7
 Other changes taking place in this era were more difficult for organizers to 
meet. Most of the changes which took place within department stores during 
the late 1940s were a result of management’s constant efforts to meet with what 
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some managers perceived as decreasing profits in the department store indus-
try, rather than demographic changes. Store managers had an easy scapegoat 
for their shrinking profits: the Office of Price Administration (OPA), the war-
time price control administration which had been allowed to continue in the 
immediate postwar era. In an industry analysis published in the Department 
Store Economist, William Gorman, the Controller of Gimbel Brothers, Inc., 
argued that the OPA’s function within the postwar economy was damaging to 
retailers. Gorman noted that a 0.3 percent reduction in the stores’ markup “has 
been caused by the squeeze that OPA has put on retailers by granting increases 
to manufacturers without permitting retailers their historic markup on these 
increases.” Gorman was even more worried by an even smaller increase of one 
tenth of one percent in the ratio of salespeople’s salaries to sales. “This results 
from a combination of higher rates paid to employees, the development of 
shorter working hours, and a lowered efficiency. This latter may just be con-
jecture—perhaps it may be attributed to the fact that somewhere a saturation 
point is reached beyond which an employee cannot go. However, the net sales 
per employee in 1945 were $12,268 against $11,709[,] an increase of only 
4.8%[,] the lowest increase in productivity since 1940.”8
 Gorman claimed that his figures demonstrated store owners’ shrinking 
profits, but conveniently, he neglected to mention in the text that the ratio 
of salespeople’s salaries to the store’s total sales had dramatically decreased 
throughout the war, going from 6.8 percent in 1938 to 5.7 percent in 1945, 
despite a 0.1 percent increase between 1944 and 1945. In addition, Gorman 
offered a rather skewed interpretation of lowered efficiency. As his own data 
indicated, the net sales per employee did increase between 1944 and 1945, 
although the increase was less than had been seen the year before and may 
have been still smaller in real dollars (see table 5.1).
 Other store managers cited different reasons for their reduced profits, point-
ing particularly to rising manufacturers’ prices. In congressional hearings in 
Boston, store managers complained incessantly about manufacturers’ prices, 
arguing that “the public benefits immediately from any price reductions which 
manufacturers and suppliers are able to give” to retailers, the result being that 
the profits of the retail stores themselves were diminishing. Needless to say, 
these retailers also felt that Congress itself was in part to blame, by its earlier 
passage of the Robinson-Patman Act, which tended, according to retailers, to 
“limit competition and raise prices.”9
 Because of their belief that it was in part responsible for their woes, depart-
ment store managers attacked the OPA throughout 1945–46. The Department 
Store Economist reprinted the text of a radio address by J. Howard Pew, the 
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President of the Sun Oil Company, in full, arguing that the OPA was, if any-
thing, adding to the problem of inflation:
Price increases no more cause inflation than wet streets cause rain. Wet 
streets are the result of rain and rising prices are one of many disastrous 
results that follow in the wake of inflation. We have an inflationary con-
dition today primarily as the result of 15 years of government spending 
in excess of income and the issuance of bonds and printing press green-
backs to pay the debt. On top of this we have war-accumulated short-
ages in certain consumer goods, aggravated by OPA controls. . . . Price 
controls in peacetime cannot be made to work without increasingly 
severe, additional restrictions, thus eventually destroying competitive 
enterprise and individual freedom.10
With the war’s end, the department store industry’s trade organization, the 
National Retail Dry Goods Administration (NRDGA), and the much larger 
National Association of Manufacturers, began a concerted effort to end price 
controls. With typical theatrical flair, NRDGA representatives set up a “chamber 
Table 5.1
Salaries and Sales in Large Department Stores, 1935–45
Year
Salespeople’s Salaries  
(Percentage of Sales)
Net Sales per  
Sales Employee ($)
1935 6.5   6,062
1936 6.4   6,537
1937 6.5   6,579
1938 6.8   6,403
1939 6.6   7,208
1940 6.3   7,449
1941 6.2   8,193
1942 6.1   8,951
1943 5.9 10,641
1944 5.6 11,709
1945 5.7 12,268
Source: Data taken from William B. Gorman, “Looking through the Figures—1945,” 
Department Store Economist (July 1946), pp. 18–19.
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of horrors” show in Washington, giving senators and congresspeople an oppor-
tunity to see low-quality goods being sold at high prices, which they claimed 
was the natural result of price controls. Late in 1946 they emerged victorious; 
the OPA came to an end.11
 Managers also sought other ways to cut costs and increase efficiency. One 
of store managers’ first actions after the end of the war was to band together 
in the Retail Labor Standards Association (RLSA). Formed late in 1945, the 
RLSA was designed to coordinate the efforts of department store managers at 
Macy’s, Stern’s, Gimbel’s, and Bloomingdale’s to control their often unpredict-
able employees during contract negotiations. In future strikes and labor nego-
tiations, store managers would be ready to work together, and would freely 
borrow anti-union tactics from each other.12
 Managers also turned to new technologies to increase efficiency. It was in 
the immediate postwar period that store managers began making use of IBM’s 
“billing machine,” for instance, which automatically kept track of how much 
a customer owed. Managers also turned to other technological innovations to 
improve their filing and billing systems, introducing electric typewriters and 
machines that would speed up credit checks.13
 Other cost-cutting methods were geared more directly towards cutting 
labor costs. In particular, store managers began programs of “work simpli-
fication,” a practice of scientific management, in the nonselling jobs, which 
were, in the words of one industrial consultant, “particularly wide open for 
streamlining and improvement.” As Frederick Winslow Taylor had done 
decades earlier, store managers now began to “break down the jobs” of non-
sales employees into the smallest possible steps, and then began to examine 
every step of the work to consider how it could be made more efficient. As 
they instituted these practices, store managers began to lay off workers, often 
in very large numbers. In 1947, for example, managers laid off approximately 
50 of the 1000 full-time employees at Stern’s, or 5 percent of the stores’ total 
full-time workforce. Other store managers followed suit in later years. Albert 
M. Greenfield, a former textile plant manager who took over managing the 
Hearn’s store in 1949, began his career at Hearn’s by laying off 200 of the 
2100 union workers there. Shortsightedly, the union organizers at Hearn’s 
accepted Greenfield’s actions since the layoffs were accompanied by a threat 
that Greenfield would close the entire store if the union opposed the layoffs. 
Managers at Bloomingdale’s and Macy’s also laid off large numbers of work-
ers in the period 1947–49, although it is not known how many. Managers 
often combined the layoffs with speedups, as they attempted to force remain-
ing workers to perform additional duties to make up for the reduced staff. 
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Sometimes even low-level store executives faced additional responsibilities; at 
Macy’s in 1947, for instance, Marcella Loring reported that supervisors were 
“selling, packing, and doing staff work in offices.”14
 These cuts almost all affected nonselling areas, in the back rooms of the 
stores. Managers determinedly avoided cutting back on customer services 
or on sales workers. In fact, many store managers seemed to be increasing 
services, preparing themselves for the end of the shortages that resulted from 
the end of the war. And the self-service experiments during the war rapidly 
came to an end once the war had ended. Store managers and customers alike 
apparently looked forward to the return of doormen, checkrooms, gift wrap-
ping, and full-service shopping that customers had grown accustomed to in 
the prewar era. Many store managers restored these services by the summer 
of 1946, despite their cries of limited profits. Still others reported in an August 
1946 Women’s Wear Daily poll that they hoped to restore many prewar services 
as quickly as possible. And, in the clearest signal of a return to the prewar 
opulence, Macy’s renewed its Thanksgiving parade in 1946. If the store man-
agers had to make cuts, they were determined to do so without sacrificing the 
extravagance and luxury for which the stores were so famous.15
 The cuts behind the scenes nonetheless represented an important chal-
lenge to the unions. Nowhere was this clearer than at Macy’s, where manag-
ers attempted to cut delivery costs by turning their delivery system over to 
the United Parcel Service (UPS). Unlike Macy’s delivery workers, who were 
members of RWDSU Local 1, UPS had a closed-shop contract with the AFL-
affiliated Teamsters. The delivery workers, furious that their union had been 
changed without their consent, declared themselves on strike, and many 
workers in Local 1-S adamantly refused to cross the picket lines at both the 
main 34th Street store and the Parkchester branch. The strike quickly became 
a bitter and violent one, with frequent battles outside Macy’s warehouses as 
police tried to escort UPS trucks past picket lines. On at least one occasion the 
UPS truck drivers got to the Macy’s warehouse by ramming through a line of 
picketers, landing two strikers in the hospital. On other occasions mounted 
police rode into the crowds outside the store with horses, scattering strikers so 
that the UPS trucks could get through the line. Bitter though it was, the strike 
was also brief. Within two weeks Macy’s managers backed down and agreed to 
pay the delivery workers any difference between what the workers had made 
working for Macy’s and what UPS paid its employees.16
 The strike was the cause of even more controversy after its conclusion, 
primarily due to the actions of Jack Straus, the president of Macy’s. During 
the strike, Straus had promised to pay salespeople who had crossed the 
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picket line two days extra pay for every day they worked; when the strike 
ended, Straus made good his promise, and those workers who had crossed 
the picket line received large bonuses for doing so. This policy, which the 
union quickly contested as an unfair labor practice, was eventually allowed, 
since the court declared that rewarding scabs was not legally the same as 
penalizing strikers.17
 The Macy’s strike never led to the sort of outcry that the earlier Gimbel’s 
strike had, and certainly mice and pigeons were not introduced into Macy’s 
during the strike. There are several reasons for this, of course, but perhaps the 
most important is that, unlike during the Gimbel’s strike, workers and union 
leaders seem to have been at least under the impression that most customers 
were in fact in favor of the strike. As one contributor to the Department Store 
Employee described it, customers seem to have respected the picket line:
A cab pulled over to the curb, and two ladies got out. “Please help us 
win our strike. Don’t pass our picket line,” [strikers said.] The ladies 
looked at one another, hesitated and one spoke: “I’m not going in—not 
me.” They walked towards Saks-34th street . . . “Please don’t patronize 
Macy’s. You won’t get waited on anyway. The salespeople are all out!” 
Two old dowagers made a neat about face from Macy’s door.
Whether or not customers actually refused to cross the line, accounts like 
this indicate that pro-union observers took a far more sympathetic attitude 
towards customers during the postwar Macy’s strike than they had towards 
customers during the prewar Gimbel’s strike. The old stereotypes of customers 
as socially irresponsible and insensitive to workers’ concerns had all but disap-
peared during the war, replaced in the public imagination by noble consumers 
who had made almost endless sacrifices for the sake of their country.18
 Short of striking, workers lacked an effective response to the various chal-
lenges which shook the stores and the unions in the late 1940s. Many turned 
to the union for support. Anne Limitone, one of the fifty Stern’s workers 
laid off in 1947, wrote a pleading letter to Sadka Brown: “I have been wait-
ing patient[ly], for this letter saying when I can return to Stern’s Dept Store. 
It would make no difference at all what department I be put in.” This letter, 
and dozens of others like it in the union records, has on it a small notation 
in pencil, presumably made by someone at the union offices, stating simply 
“5–27–47—Unable to place.” Union organizers did what they could, winning 
back a few jobs, and trying to make certain that layoffs took place in order of 
seniority, but their failures greatly outnumbered their successes.19
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 At least a few workers were shocked and upset that the union would or 
could not do more to resolve the various problems which workers faced. 
Another union member at Stern’s, who identified herself only as Miss E. 
Goldstein, wrote Brown a note asking, “Is Stern’s really union, and if they are 
why do they offer you the small sum of $30 per week? Is that union wages? 
. . . I was working for the lowest wage possible for Christmas and now I am 
out again. What about all this temporary work? I am a full-time worker. I have 
always worked steady until last February.”20
 To their credit, throughout the late 1940s, union organizers made seri-
ous efforts to raise workers’ salaries to meet the rapidly rising cost of living, 
demanding and achieving wage increases with each successive contract. The 
$30 a week which made E. Goldstein wonder whether or not Stern’s really had 
a union was, after all, approximately three times the weekly salary of many 
department store workers at the time workers had first formed unions, only a 
little over a decade earlier. But no matter how rapidly union leaders negotiated 
new contracts with wage increases, they could scarcely match the cost of living 
increases. In fact, as Bill Michelson argued in one article for Union Voice, $16 a 
week in 1941 was a better wage than $26 a week in 1945. The end of rent con-
trol and the higher subway fares, combined with national inflation, presented 
union organizers with a serious challenge, one they never adequately met.21
 As workers began to question the value of their unions, local and national 
leaders of the RWDSU attempted to come to some sort of agreement as to 
how they would work together now that the war was over. National and local 
delegates began preparations for another convention in May 1946, this one to 
take place in Akron, Ohio. Local organizers and national leaders were at odds 
on a number of key issues at the 1946 convention. Most of these were ques-
tions of process and union structure. The left-wing delegates, from Local 65 
and Local 1199 as well as from the department store union locals, challenged 
many initiatives of the national union leaders: whether the national undertook 
to collect dues directly from workers, to increase the proportion of dues going 
to the national union, to set voting procedure on union policy, or to appoint 
(rather than hold an election for) vice-presidents for organizing warehouse 
and department store workers, the left-wing union leaders were among the 
first to resist. Only weeks before the convention’s opening, local leaders openly 
condemned Wolchok as a red-baiter and a tool of store management.22
 With so many areas of fierce disagreement, it is important to note that both 
national and local union leaders continued to support many of the same politi-
cal causes. In fact, most of the reformist platforms which the national leaders 
supported at the convention had the full support of the left-wing unions. Both 
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the national and the local leaders called for “a real Full Employment bill [and] 
a people’s tax program that will outlaw discrimination in employment and in 
the social and political life of our country,” as well as “a Health Bill that will 
. . . protect our citizens in time of sickness,” and support for the United Nations 
combined with a commitment to a more genuine world government, all of 
which were fairly standard parts of the liberal agenda in the postwar era. As 
during the war, the struggles between local and national union leaders were 
about power, not politics.23
 Both the agreements and the conflicts between national and local union 
leaders were evident during the 1946 Akron convention. The convention was 
mired in procedural controversy from the outset. Local 65 delegate David 
Livingston demanded the right to have votes called at the request of the 
representatives of one-fourth of the members rather than the representatives 
of one-fourth of the locals. Had it gone through, this proposal would have 
given the left wing, whose locals had significantly more members than most 
locals represented at the convention, a strong advantage in calling such votes. 
Wolchok and the other national leaders strenuously objected, and Wolchok 
quickly tried to silence the opposition by promising that “Brother Osman and 
his delegates can depend upon the democratic way of our living and the demo-
cratic way of my ruling this chair.” After Wolchok’s statement, Livingston’s 
proposal was dismissed.24
 Wolchok was slightly more yielding when he raised the issue of establishing 
executive vice-presidents for the Department Store and the Warehouse 
Divisions. Wolchok insisted that these positions be filled by appointees of his 
own choosing. Delegates from the New York City department store unions 
opposed this move, demanding the right to elect their own leader. If this 
procedure was not followed, the department store union delegates warned, 
“[S]omeone who does not know anything about department stores might 
necessarily be elected to represent department store workers.” Still trying to 
preserve some sort of unity, Wolchok put together a compromise. He promised 
Arthur Osman that if Wolchok was allowed to appoint vice-presidents of the 
Department Store Division and the Warehouse Division, Wolchok would then 
immediately appoint Osman as the head of the RWDSU’s warehouse division. 
Osman accepted, but also warned Wolchok from the convention floor that 
“if I am to be the Director of the Warehouse Department . . . let him appoint 
me . . . [but] not because I will refrain from making an honest presentation 
of my views.” Instead, Osman urged, he should be the vice-president of the 
Warehouse Department because, as leader of the largest warehouse local within 
the union, Osman was uniquely qualified for this position. The overwhelming 
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majority of convention delegates eventually sided with Wolchok on the issue 
of the appointed vice-presidencies, with the department store union leaders 
and their allies in Local 65 and Local 1199 almost alone in their opposition to 
the plan. Wolchok closed the issue by appointing Arthur Osman as the head 
of the Warehouse Division as promised, and making one of his fellow national 
leaders, a strongly anti-Communist union organizer named Jack Altman, the 
vice-president of the Department Store Division, over the objections of the 
delegates from New York City’s department store unions.25
 The left-wing delegates found their greatest success when they challenged 
Wolchok on the question of union finances. Wolchok raised the issue of 
union finances by asking for an increase in the percentage of dues paid to 
the national union in order to devote more funds to Operation Dixie, the 
CIO’s campaign to unionize the southern states. In response to this request, 
a long line of speakers, many of them not connected with the New York City 
department store unions, immediately rose to contest the increase. Martin 
Kyne, who was chairing the meeting, tried to limit the number of speakers in 
a vain effort to quell the protest, and the move backfired as the convention 
broke down into shouts and arguments. Wolchok eventually lost his temper 
and made an accusatory and impassioned speech, asking the delegates if they 
wanted to “keep the International poor.” Wolchok then accused the delegates 
of a lack of true commitment to Operation Dixie: “Everybody speaks about 
this drive, but wants to do nothing,” he complained, before calling for a vote 
on the motion. By turning the debate on dues into a referendum on Operation 
Dixie, Wolchok managed to win, but only by a small margin, especially since 
the left-wing delegates universally voted against the proposal. Of the 75,000 
members represented by the convention delegates, the difference of opinion 
on this subject was less than 15,000, a margin of less than 20 percent.26
 During the 1946 convention, Wolchok refused to resort to attacking his 
opponents’ political beliefs, despite their opposition to his leadership. He 
could easily have forced a showdown with the left-wing delegates by calling, 
for instance, for a resolution against communism. Doing so would have won 
him support from many local leaders outside of New York City. More than 
six months before the Akron convention, the leaders of the RWDSU’s Joint 
Council in St. Louis issued a pamphlet that, among other things, argued that 
all honest union members and leaders should cooperate to drive Communists 
out of the labor movement. Honest union leaders, the pamphlet’s author sug-
gested, “should eliminate the Communists from any political influence. They 
are not a legitimate section of the American labor movement and their tactics 
give us a black eye. In all cases they put their devotion to the Russian dictator-
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ship first, and are willing to sell out and disgrace the labor movement any time 
it suits Russia’s foreign policy.”27 At the convention Wolchok refused to adopt 
this sort of anti-Communist rhetoric, opting instead to continue calling for 
liberal reform without condemning communism, or, indeed, even mentioning 
communism. By doing so, Wolchok created an alliance between Communists 
and liberals in the RWDSU around the reforms that both sought, and around 
their mutual (although never stated) willingness to avoid the word “commu-
nism.” By not naming the real issue that divided them, both sides managed to 
allow room for compromise.
 Samuel Wolchok’s refusal to adopt anti-Communist language during the 
convention was only one piece of evidence demonstrating his renewed sup-
port for cooperation between local and national leaders. This attitude was also 
reflected in his new stance on the New York City department store unions’ 
Joint Board. While before the convention Wolchok had offered to support 
the Joint Board only if the New York local leaders “agree to the Joint Board 
henceforth without [a] vote” on national policies, in November 1946 Wolchok 
reversed his earlier decision and voiced his public support for the formation of 
an official New York City Department Store Joint Board. The New York City 
leaders hailed Wolchok’s decision as “one of historic significance for depart-
ment store workers of New York City.” And, despite the appointment of Jack 
Altman as the new director of department store organization, both Wolchok 
and Altman maintained a more hands-off policy with regard to local negotia-
tion, refusing to participate in contract negotiations until after local negotia-
tors met with store management.28
 With the compromises at the Akron convention, national RWDSU leaders 
and local department store union leaders resolved at least some of their dif-
ferences. For the moment, the left-wing local leaders and organizers, with no 
alternative, were willing to concede any real control over national union pol-
icy. At the same time, through allowing the department store unions to form 
a Joint Board, Wolchok effectively allowed the local unions more autonomy 
than they had seen since the New Era Committee. Formally united after nearly 
a decade of formal divisions, the department store union leaders set about 
creating a strong union movement within the New York City retail trade, and 
they allowed more-conservative union leaders like Wolchok, Cooney, Kyne, 
and Altman control over the national union.
 Local union organizers, more autonomous than they had been for years, 
re-created their local unions as central parts of what must have seemed like a 
revitalized radical movement within the city. Now that the war was over, the 
Communists renewed their annual tradition of marching on May Day. On 
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May 1, 1946, as they had done so many times before the war, Communists 
descended upon the garment district, gathering between 36th and 39th 
Streets, and then marching down Eighth Avenue, a block or two west of the 
stores, before crossing east to gather once again in Union Square. At the head 
of the massive parade, which spanned several blocks, marched war veterans in 
full uniform, with a banner reading “Veterans March for Peace.” Behind them, 
between 21,000 and 60,000 people marched, with thousands more lining the 
streets to watch the parade. Thousands of representatives from the city’s gar-
ment workers’ unions joined, despite the garment unions’ official repudiation 
of the march. Joining them were representatives from other unions: the United 
Office and Professional Workers of America, the National Maritime Union, 
the Furriers Union, and the United Electrical Workers all took part. So, too, 
did the leaders and some members of the department store unions. They 
marched together in the parade, carrying signs announcing that they were the 
“Department Store Union, CIO, for Full Employment,” calling on the huge 
crowd to “Make Gimbel’s Pay a Living Wage!” The department store unions, 
for the first time since 1941, were renewing their connections to a broad-based 
and militant radical movement.29
 If radicalism now seemed resurgent, so too did the department store 
unions. With the truce established at the convention, the next step seemed 
obvious: a united drive against the stores that had thus far eluded unioniza-
tion, like the upscale stores on Fifth Avenue. Beginning with a campaign that 
Jack Altman was to lead against the McCreery store just off of Fifth Avenue, 
the local and international unions alike readied themselves to participate in 
a joint campaign to set up unions all the way up the avenue. And this, in the 
eyes of many observers, might well be just the beginning. Retail labor analyst 
George Kirstein wrote in the summer of 1946 that “the retail industry will see 
in the next year or so an effort to bring its employees under the union banner 
such as it has not witnessed before.”30
 As part of this renewed commitment to a larger and more dynamic move-
ment, union organizers waged a campaign against one of the city’s leading 
and most conservative newspapers, the New York Daily News. Since the 
department store managers advertised extensively within the Daily News, the 
main focus of organizers’ campaign against the Daily News was set around 
forcing store managers to withdraw their advertisements from the paper. The 
campaign was a disaster. Not only did the campaign show the unions wholly 
unable to force managers to withdraw the advertisements; it also helped win 
the unions the focused enmity of the Daily News editors, who became some of 
the unions’ most outspoken critics over the next years.31
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 Local leaders were more successful in their efforts to strengthen the union’s 
cultural and social programs, to revitalize other aspects of the prewar union. 
To do so, they established close institutional ties between Local 65 and the 
department store union locals. In 1947 they adopted the Local 65 newspaper, 
the Union Voice, as the official department store union newspaper, replacing 
the Department Store Employee. At the same time, the department store union 
members, at the local leaders’ suggestion, voted to join the Tom Mooney Hall 
Association (TMHA), Local 65’s cultural society, centered on the Tom Mooney 
Hall, at 65 Astor Place. Among other things, the Hall featured a bar and food 
counter, a bookshop, frequent Saturday night parties, and Club 65, a party 
hall available for use by union members and individual shops within Local 
65. Under the Joint Board and the TMHA, union organizers established local 
glee clubs, frequent dances and parties, and an annual boat ride. They also 
renewed their commitment to the unions’ sports league. All of these activities 
had precedents in the late 1930s, but the scope of the unions’ social activities 
in the late 1940s was both more ambitious and, especially with the existence 
of a permanent social center in the Tom Mooney Hall Association, a more 
established part of the unions’ existence.32
 By far the most ambitious cultural project attempted by the department 
store union organizers in the early postwar era was Thursdays Till Nine. 
Thursdays Till Nine was a union-funded musical comedy about workers at the 
fictional R.H. Maybe Department Store. As with Pins and Needles, the cast of 
Thursdays Till Nine was entirely composed of union members, and although 
the people who wrote Thursdays Till Nine were not department store workers, 
some evidence indicates that workers nonetheless had input into the musical: 
nearly every complaint workers had about working in the stores appeared 
in Thursdays Till Nine, often in an exaggerated format. At R.H. Maybe’s, for 
instance, workers labor under such heavy scrutiny that the accounting depart-
ment notices even a single lightbulb that is left on at night. The workers are 
allowed only twenty-minute breaks, although it takes them ten minutes to get 
to the front entrance of the store and another ten minutes to get back. The 
store owner, R.H. Maybe, has so much leisure time that he plays golf in the 
store when he has nothing else to do. Even the title of the play is a reference 
to the long hours store workers had to put in, since many store managers kept 
the store open until nine o’clock on Thursday nights.33
 Like these details, the main story line of Thursdays Till Nine also dem-
onstrated issues which department store workers had to confront. Perhaps 
drawing on Charlie Chaplin’s famous department store scene in Modern Times 
(1936), Thursdays Till Nine described the department store as a paradise of 
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consumption to which workers have only very limited access. In Thursdays 
Till Nine, Jess, the male lead, is a veteran who works in the store for a salary so 
low that he cannot afford an apartment. Like Chaplin in Modern Times, Jess 
therefore starts spending his nights in the store, and each night tries to pretend 
that the store is his own home. As Jess declared in his opening song, “I dream 
this is . . . a place where love could live and firelight shine. / . . . Five thousand 
toothbrushes stand in the rack / None may I legally use / Six hundred beds / 
And at none of their heads / May I legally line up my shoes.” While Thursdays 
Till Nine therefore portrayed department stores as a sort of consumer’s para-
dise, the authors took pains to demonstrate that the paradise was an illusion. 
Jess, after all, does not really own the endless rows of beds and toothbrushes; 
he can only use them illegally.34
 The influence of workers on Thursdays Till Nine can also be seen in the 
criticisms of films and songs that portrayed department stores without atten-
tion to the class struggles that take place in such stores. When R. H. Maybe 
announces a contest with a grand prize of a fully furnished house for the best 
song written about working in the store, Jess jumps at the chance to win a 
house of his own. Jeannie, the female lead (a fellow worker as well as Jess’s 
love interest), is shocked at Jess’s willingness to participate in the contest, since 
only those songs which glorify department store work have a chance of win-
ning the contest. The song will be used to “knife everyone in the store . . . The 
workers love it at Maybe’s. Look, they write songs about it! No problems, no 
firings, no speedup—they say it here on paper—they’re gonna say it in every 
screen in the country.” This critique echoes and may have even been inspired 
by department store workers’ complaints against some mainstream films of 
the day. Macy’s worker Arthur Adler, for example, who reviewed Miracle on 
34th Street for the Union Voice, wrote satirically: “What else but a fantasy could 
depict Macy’s without a speed-up and low wages. . . . Perhaps the foreword 
should have mentioned something about any resemblance to actual persons 
or events being coincidental . . . Mrs. Walker is very materialistic. She doesn’t 
believe in Santa Claus. (Would you if you had to fire 600 regular employees 
right after Christmas?).” Workers, and the writers of Thursdays Till Nine, had 
a very different view of the department stores than did the writers of Miracle 
on 34th Street: to workers and their allies, these stores were sites where workers 
struggled against managers on a daily basis.35
 Although workers and union leaders enjoyed the production immensely, 
Thursdays Till Nine ran only from November 24 to November 27, far from the 
long-running success that Pins and Needles had become ten years earlier. Any 
number of reasons might explain why the show was never picked up by com-
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mercial producers. For one thing, as wonderful as much of Thursdays Till Nine 
was, it never attained the speed or cleverness of Pins and Needles. Additionally, 
the show’s straight narrative structure, as opposed to the musical revue used 
in Pins and Needles, may have weakened Thursdays Till Nine’s broader appeal. 
Using a musical revue for Pins and Needles allowed the producers of that show 
to draw together many workers’ struggles that would have been difficult to 
compress into a single narrative. The creators of Thursdays Till Nine made 
no major effort to connect the struggles of department store workers to the 
struggles of other workers, focusing instead exclusively on the department 
stores.
 Perhaps the greatest factor in the failure of Thursdays Till Nine was a new 
crisis which union organizers had to face, brought on by the Taft-Hartley Act. 
This act forced union organizers to turn their attention away from the cultural 
projects they had begun setting up under the Joint Board and begin a frantic 
campaign in their own defense. The Taft-Hartley Act, passed over President 
Truman’s veto while Thursdays Till Nine was in rehearsal in June 1947, placed 
severe limits on the powers given to unions during the New Deal, particularly 
by the Wagner Act. If the Wagner Act had created the NLRB elections, the 
Taft-Hartley Act set up new rules regarding which unions could participate in 
NLRB elections. Union officials wishing to participate in these elections now 
had to abandon certain militant tactics, sympathy strikes and secondary boy-
cotts most important among them. And, most devastating for the department 
store unions’ immediate future, union officials wishing to use the NLRB had to 
sign affidavits stating that they were not members of the Communist party.36
 This groundbreaking legislation was in many respects a mark of the begin-
ning of the McCarthy era. It was by no means the first postwar appearance of 
anti-communism; nor was it the first anti-Communist legislation, since the 
Smith Act (which made it illegal to advocate the violent overthrow of the gov-
ernment) preceded it by eight years. But the Taft-Hartley Act, unlike the Smith 
Act, effectively demolished unity between liberals and Communists in the 
labor movement. By making it requisite for union leaders to declare whether 
or not they were Communists, the Taft-Hartley Act forced union leaders like 
Samuel Wolchok to abandon their alliances with Communists around specific 
reforms. Now, any support for reform that Wolchok wished to provide would 
have to be accompanied by his affidavit stating that he was not a member of 
the Communist party. And while Wolchok could sign such an affidavit and 
continue as an official of the union, his Communist allies in the local unions 
could not.
 Local leaders had to be extremely careful about their opposition to the act. 
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While some workers were unquestionably well aware of the leftist tendencies 
of their union leaders, other members had only begun working in the store 
during or after the war, and many were unaware of the political views of their 
union leaders. Local organizers therefore avoided any discussion of leaders’ 
politics while explaining leaders’ refusal to sign the affidavits demanded by 
the act. At one point, Sadka Brown delivered a report to the shop stewards in 
Local 5 in which she declared that “the issue of signing the affidavits is not a 
matter of the political tendencies of the leadership of the union,” but simply a 
result of the leaders’ realization that “nothing good can come from” signing. 
In fact, she argued, signing the affidavits (and thereby endorsing the validity 
of the Taft-Hartley Act) was dangerous to the union’s future in the depart-
ment stores, with the complex anti-union security systems that many stores 
had in place. As Brown’s report described the situation, “the Taft-Hartley Law 
will protect an individual from being thrown out of the union even though he 
admits it is his intention to destroy the union. Into every union, at the request 
of management . . . will come these paid agents. And whether you sign the 
affidavits or not the law says that these lice must be protected. . . . Under our 
current contract, . . . our membership has the right to throw out of our organi-
zation anyone convicted by the membership of anti-union activity.” If Brown’s 
report is any indication, the Communists within the unions decided that the 
way to fight Taft-Hartley was to fight it on grounds other than the affidavits: to 
focus on the fact that Taft-Hartley, as many labor leaders believed at the time, 
would likely make useless the NLRB certification that had earlier been one of 
the most important achievements for a union. The unions, she argued, would 
be better off abandoning the NLRB altogether.37
 Beyond simple refusal to sign the affidavits and a willingness to give up 
the NLRB, one of the most important achievements of the New Deal era, 
union organizers lacked a systematic program for fighting Taft-Hartley. In 
September 1947 organizers were so desperate for a means to fight this act 
that they attempted to get support from store managers, testing the waters for 
managers’ response if the unions lost the support of the federal government. 
In negotiations for the 1948 contract at Stern’s, for instance, union negotiators 
attempted to get management to offer “some positive indication that manage-
ment [is] not seeking to utilize the Taft-Hartley Act to weaken or destroy 
[the] Union.” Surprisingly, some store managers did offer some vague rhetori-
cal support for the unions. During a 1948 bargaining session at Hearn’s, for 
example, managers publicly announced that “we have lived with Local 1250 
peacefully for over eleven years. We say that it is our intention to continue to 
live under harmonious labor relations.” Of course there was no guarantee that 
Collapse, –
store managers would not take advantage should the unions lose in an NLRB 
election, but managers had little interest in fighting the unions so long as the 
unions retained members’ support. “Harmonious labor relations,” essentially 
meaning a lack of strikes, were worth the occasional aggravation of dealing 
with the Communists leading the department store unions.38
 Even as store managers signaled their willingness to work around Taft-
Hartley, a small group of union members indicated their refusal to compromise 
on the issue of communism. Among the most dangerous challenges to the 
Joint Board in the aftermath of the Taft-Hartley Act was the emergence of the 
Rank and File Committees, an organized anti-Communist coalition within 
the department store unions. In the late 1940s several right-wing groups 
of workers, many of them connected to the anti-Communist Association 
of Catholic Trade Unionists, emerged in different department store locals 
under the name of the Rank and File Committees. While these committees 
campaigned in union elections on several occasions, the Communists and 
their allies consistently defeated them. Even at Macy’s, one of the strongholds 
of the Rank and File Committee, the committee never captured more than 
954 of the 4600 total votes in union elections before 1948, and in most unions 
the percentage of Rank and File supporters was far smaller. Rank and File 
meetings were similarly ill attended; in a meeting of the united Rank and 
File Committee of all the department store unions, a Union Voice reporter 
gleefully announced, only around 600 workers came to the meeting. While 
a reporter for the Union Voice might have purposefully underestimated the 
number of Rank and File supporters, other evidence exists that the number of 
dissidents was extremely small. Even leaders of the Rank and File Committees, 
for example, acknowledged before a congressional committee that the largest 
individual Rank and File meetings had had only “as many as 100 people” in 
attendance.39
 If the Rank and File Committees did not emerge as a serious challenge to 
the Communist leaders before 1948, there were still many reasons for concern. 
The attacks on domestic communism were swift and devastating and by no 
means limited to the department store unions. At the national level, the House 
Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC) began labeling all Communists 
as spies and traitors as early as 1946. HUAC and studio executives also moved 
to quash the few Communists who had established a base in the film industry, 
calling in dozens of writers and film executives to testify, and eventually black-
listing any artists working in the industry who refused to state their opposition 
to communism. HUAC also began investigating CIO unions that were linked 
to the Communist party, calling in representatives from the Food, Tobacco 
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and Agricultural Workers Union after a congressman from North Carolina 
claimed that the union’s activities were “threatening to turn into race riots.” 
Perhaps most terrifying of all the national attacks on communism in the late 
1940s was the Mundt Bill, which would have made the Communist party an 
official foreign organization, and required the Communists to turn over the 
names of all members to the FBI.40
 The Communist party also faced local opposition in New York City. By 
1948 the May Day parade in Manhattan was countered by a Loyalty Day 
parade in Brooklyn. Attorney General Tom Clark, who attended the Loyalty 
parade, proudly proclaimed that “by this magnificent demonstration you are 
answering the challenge hurled by Communism, answering it in a peaceful 
lawful forceful American manner.” If the May Day parade that year was large—
around 20,000 people, according to most estimates—the Loyalty Day parade 
was even larger. May Day, the day when Communists claimed the streets and 
truly showed their strength, had now become a symbol of the weakness of 
communism and the strength of anti-communism.41
 The Communist party had one final hope, or so it seemed. The 1948 elec-
tion campaign of Henry Wallace was to be their last stand. Wallace, though 
no Communist, was nonetheless the most prominent opponent of the new 
anti-Communist hysteria that was increasingly gripping the nation. If Wallace 
could win the election, perhaps the conservative fervor would be stemmed, 
and perhaps the left could re-emerge. Within the department store unions as 
elsewhere, Communists began to campaign for Wallace, and as a result they 
likely doomed Wallace’s presidential run, since newspapers snatched up the 
story of Communists’ support for Wallace and used it to discredit his cam-
paign.
 The years 1946–48 had tremendous importance for the collapse of the 
RWDSU. Although no single event in these years automatically signaled the 
unions’ coming crises, these were the years when everything began to turn 
against the unions, even as liberals and Communists in the unions attempted 
to resume a productive working relationship. In these years, managers contin-
ued to restructure the stores, laying off thousands of workers and weakening 
the union in the process. Meanwhile, local department store union organizers 
and national RWDSU leaders continued to push for widespread liberal reform 
like a permanent Fair Employment Practices Commission, national health 
care, and a full-employment bill without ever making explicit their politi-
cal differences. Because of this, the RWDSU faced little internal upheaval. 
Disagreements, when they occurred, could be resolved in a relatively orderly 
manner, as they indeed were during the 1946 Akron convention. But the truce 
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was only temporary. With the 1947 passage of the Taft-Hartley Act, Congress 
effectively demolished their unity. A commitment to liberal reform was no 
longer enough. Through the Taft-Hartley Act, the federal government now 
required that union leaders also declare where they stood on communism. 
By doing so, the government divided liberal union leaders from their former 
Communist allies. On the national level, the local level, and within the unions, 
the stage was now set for a massive national confrontation around commu-
nism.
The Fall of the RWDSU, June–September 
At the end of the tumultuous summer of 1948, Samuel Wolchok claimed that 
there was “just one issue” involved in the conflict between the department 
store union leaders and the national union leaders. Wolchok consistently 
claimed that the issue was whether local union leaders, considering the pas-
sage of the Taft-Hartley Act, could successfully represent department store 
workers in their struggles with management. Despite Wolchok’s claim, how-
ever, the conflict was an exceedingly complex one that would have lasting 
importance for the American labor movement.
 The national RWDSU leaders initially opposed the Taft-Hartley Act, and 
they refused to sign any of the required affidavits throughout 1947. In March 
1948, the national leaders—like many other non-Communist union lead-
ers—reversed their earlier stand on Taft-Hartley. Wolchok, his vice-president, 
John Cooney, and the union’s treasurer, Martin Kyne, signed the required affi-
davits stating that they were not Communists. The only remaining obstacle to 
the union becoming certified by the NLRB was that many of the union’s local 
leaders had not yet signed similar statements. As far as the international offi-
cers were concerned, it was extremely desirable that the local leaders also sign 
the affidavits. It would end any question of the union leaders’ commitment to 
anti-communism, and would end the threat of active state repression of the 
RWDSU. Cooney wrote a letter “to all locals affiliated with the RWDSU, CIO,” 
informing them that all “local unions desiring to use the services of the NLRB 
must . . . file the required affidavits” as soon as possible.42
 While most local leaders followed Cooney’s order and signed the affida-
vits, New York City’s department store union leaders stalled for time. Under 
the Taft-Hartley Act, the unions had to comply with the new regulations 
by August 21, 1948; consequently, the department store union organizers 
attempted to gain themselves a few more weeks by extending their contracts 
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to that date. Store managers, still anxious to avoid disruptive strikes, agreed to 
the contract extensions.43
 Most department store union members supported leaders in their refusal to 
sign the required affidavits. This support was evident regardless of the ability 
of union leaders to sign the affidavits without committing perjury. Members 
of Local 1-S, for instance, voted against their officers—including both non-
Communists like Kovenetsky and Communists like Marcella Loring—signing 
the petitions. To his credit, Kovenetsky followed their lead and refused to sign 
an affidavit. Later, Kovenetsky proudly remembered that he “would sign . . . 
not at the request of Wolchok, but [only] at the request and demand on the 
part of our membership.”44
 As the local union leaders delayed turning in their affidavits, the Rank and 
File Committees forced the issue. In an attempt to wrest control of the union 
away from the Communists, the Rank and File Committee in Local 1-S and 
Local 3 circulated petitions demanding that the union leaders sign the Taft-
Hartley affidavits. The department store union leaders, attempting to steel 
themselves against attacks from the state and trying to work out a systematic 
way of resisting the Taft-Hartley Act, responded fiercely to the Rank and File 
Committees’ attacks. In April 1948, with the full support of the union lead-
ers, the members expelled three members of the Rank and File Committee of 
Local 3 for disrupting the function of the union. While these expulsions did 
not destroy the Rank and File Committees, they at least served as a powerful 
demonstration to Rank and File Committee members at the other stores where 
the support of most of the union members lay. Unfortunately, the expulsions 
also attracted the attention of the Daily News, which dedicated two editorials 
to the expulsions in June 1948. In response to the News editorials, New York 
State governor Thomas Dewey ordered an investigation of the firings. “If it is 
true,” Dewey wrote in his call for an investigation, “that working men will lose 
their jobs because of anti-Communist activities, it is a condition that cannot 
be tolerated.” The federal government also stepped in, as Congress announced 
its intention to hold hearings on the role of Communists in New York City’s 
distributive trades. Before the hearings began, Wolchok ordered the expul-
sions of the three rank-and-file members reversed.45
 Even as the Rank and File Committees were temporarily silenced, a new 
challenge emerged. Before the passage of the Taft-Hartley Act, Local 1250 had 
begun organizing at the Oppenheim Collins store in New York City. In August 
1946, after lengthy and occasionally bitter negotiations, Local 1250 had won 
the contract at Oppenheim Collins. But in 1948, two years after the initial pact 
had been signed, organizers from the Retail Clerks International Protection 
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Association (RCIPA) entered the store to contest Local 1250’s leadership. To 
add insult to injury, the store managers and the RCIPA organizers called for an 
immediate NLRB election, one in which Local 1250 could not participate since 
they had not yet filed the necessary affidavits. Store managers provided pri-
vately chartered buses to take workers to the election, which was won—with 
no other unions on the ballot—by the RCIPA on August 2, 1948.46
 Immediately following the RCIPA’s victory, the strongest Local 1250 sup-
porters at Oppenheim Collins set up a picket line against both store manage-
ment and the RCIPA. Organizers throughout the department store unions 
began support work for the strike, viewing it as perhaps the most important 
strike the union had conducted in its entire history. If they could win this one 
Figure 3
Workers on the picket line in front of the Oppenheim Collins store, 1948. The picket 
signs claim that store managers are trying to use Communism to distract the public 
from the real issue at hand. Meanwhile, the banner on the store window, barely visible 
through the crowd of picketers, informs the public, “The issue is Communism.” (Cour-
tesy of Robert F. Wagner Labor Archives, New York University, United Automobile 
Workers of America, District 65 Photographs Collection)
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strike, then they could demonstrate to all concerned that the Taft-Hartley Act 
had not destroyed Communists’ ability to successfully lead unions. “A victory 
at OC is the best guarantee that you will not have to go through a similar 
experience when your contract expires,” one Local 1250 flyer advised mem-
bers of the other department store unions. “Should this union-busting strategy 
succeed at OC, it will be the signal for the other managements to embark 
on this same course. You can help avoid a strike in your store by helping us 
NOW!” Oppenheim Collins managers also viewed the struggle as a test case, 
complaining that the managers were “being used as guinea pigs by the union 
[because] our contract ends before that of several other major department 
stores.”47
 If the union viewed this test case as management’s fault, managers insisted 
that they were completely innocent in the issue. Publicly at least, managers 
insisted that there was no strike at Oppenheim Collins, but rather an act of 
pointless vengeance against managers whose hands were tied. As their lawyer 
put it, Oppenheim Collins “could not recognize this union local whether it 
wanted to or not” until the local complied with the Taft-Hartley Act. “The 
mass demonstrations are not related to this dispute. We have no dispute with 
the union, for we cannot under the law recognize it.” Store managers also hired 
counter-pickets to stand in the window of the store bearing posters reading: 
“One hundred percent of our employees are at work ready to serve you . . . 
The demonstrators you have seen are hired by a Communist-led union in 
an attempt to force us to deal with Communists . . . Fifteen times the various 
courts of the land have directed that these demonstrations cease.”48
 These claims were extremely effective in winning the support of the main-
stream press. During the Oppenheim Collins strike, the Daily News again 
emerged as the primary voice against the unions. Among other things, the 
Daily News reporters labeled the picketers at Oppenheim Collins as “sidewalk 
vendors” who were “try[ing] to sell the idea that the store’s employees are on 
strike” despite the federally mediated election.49
 Nor was the Daily News alone; a local judge issued an injunction against 
mass picketing at Oppenheim Collins, and even when state supreme court 
judge Samuel Dickstein ruled that the injunction was not acceptable, he made 
it clear where the sympathy of the court lay: the union’s actions, Dickstein 
publicly announced, “clearly overstep the bounds of legal, peaceful picketing. 
Coercion of the type evidently practiced here violates all American standards 
of fair play.” With sentiments like this, it could have been no surprise that the 
injunction was reissued only a few hours after it was struck down.50
 Most insidious of all, however, were the actions of the federal government. 
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In July 1948, as the elections at Oppenheim Collins were getting underway, the 
congressional hearings began on communism in the RWDSU. As during the 
1941 New York State hearings, Louis Broido was again the government’s star 
witness. Broido, the first witness called to testify, informed the subcommittee 
that the Communist leaders in the department stores were a serious danger 
to national security. As Broido put it, within these unions there were “thou-
sands of people, dominated and controlled by left-wing groups, which in case 
of trouble between this country and Russia . . . could cause this country very 
great trouble.” Broido also made a much-quoted claim that he and other store 
managers who had contracts with these unions were constantly forced to deal 
with a “fellow with a red beard that we can’t see.” Demanding an apology and 
retraction for this bizarre and absurd statement, workers threw up picket lines 
around Gimbel’s in a day-long protest.51
 National RWDSU leaders also testified at the hearings, including Samuel 
Wolchok and Jack Altman. When he was asked why Communists had been 
so successful in the department store unions, Wolchok made the obligatory 
statement condemning communism, but he then used the question as an 
opportunity to express his continuing support for liberal reform:
I am very much afraid there are many things that this Congress is 
responsible for. Take . . . housing. What did Congress do? Nothing, as 
far as workers are concerned. . . . You have excluded the retail industry 
from the 40 cents minimum . . . we don’t ever get a promise of being 
treated fair[ly] in that direction.
After suggesting that the Congress itself was responsible for the growth of 
communism, Wolchok went on to add that, despite these facts, “99 percent out 
of 100 [union members] are not Communists,” despite the press’s determina-
tion to smear the international “with a red brush.”52
 Wolchok was in a difficult position at these hearings. As he was testifying, 
his union was slipping away from him. His leadership had always rested on the 
support of the Communists, however much he had fought with them over the 
years. Without them, nearly a fifth of the RWDSU’s total membership would 
not exist, and arguably the union itself would not have existed had it not been 
for their contributions. These were people he could ill afford to lose. At the 
same time, Wolchok had no particular interest in protecting his Communist 
opponents, whose support for his leadership was fleeting at best. His testimo-
ny during the government hearings reflected this balance to some extent, as he 
focused whenever possible on larger issues, neglecting to discuss the specific 
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roles that Communists had played within the RWDSU. Other RWDSU lead-
ers followed Wolchok’s lead, combining condemnations of communism (in 
its vaguest sense, with no mention of any actual individuals) with support for 
liberal reform. Jack Altman, for example, condemned the Communist party as 
“an international conspiracy” during his testimony, but then went on to sug-
gest, as had Wolchok, that if Congress had gotten rid of unemployment, poll 
taxes, the housing shortage, and anti-labor legislation, “then Congress could 
make a great contribution to fighting Communism.”53
 Rank and File Committee members took a different tack, focusing not on 
the larger question of why communism existed in America, but rather spe-
cifically naming names, and testifying that Communists in union leadership 
made the unions undemocratic. Rather ironically, the committee members’ 
primary evidence of the lack of democracy in the union was the commit-
tees’ failure in challenging the local leaders, with regard to everything from 
their multiple defeats in union elections to their failure in getting workers to 
support the Marshall Plan. Alice Bartoli, the main Rank and File Committee 
witness from Local 1-S, even went so far as to testify that when she got up at 
a union meeting to make a speech on the dangers of Communist leadership, 
the Communists had outwitted her: “They have the same routine . . . whereby 
Communists form sort of a diamond shape throughout the audience so that 
they can have this claque start . . . booing and shouting derogatory remarks” so 
that it would sound as though large sections of the audience opposed her. (Later 
developments suggest that the derogatory remarks Bartoli heard were repre-
sentative of many workers’ attitudes towards the Rank and File Committees.) 
Partially due to the unusual strength of the Rank and File Committee in Local 
1-S, Marcella Loring became a particular target. According to Bartoli, it was 
Loring who brought the agenda for the Executive Board meetings, after getting 
it from what Bartoli suggested was a mysterious and unknown source. Bartoli’s 
claims were absurd in many respects; as already suggested, the Rank and File 
Committee was always a small minority at Macy’s, and neither Kovenetsky nor 
any other non-Communist Local 1-S leaders ever claimed that Loring or other 
Communists forced the union into any action; indeed, since the Communists 
represented only a small part of the leadership of Local 1-S it seems somewhat 
doubtful that Loring could have forced the union into any particular direction 
even had she seriously intended to do so.54
 Like Wolchok’s testimony, the testimony of Bartoli and the other Rank and 
File Committee members illustrated a very particular political argument. But 
unlike Wolchok’s argument that liberal reform would weaken communism, 
the congressional representatives leading the investigation found Bartoli’s 
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statements very much the ones they were hoping to hear. According to Bartoli, 
communism in the retail workers’ unions was an undemocratic, sinister, and 
ultimately un-American philosophy. Communists had no interest, the com-
mittee now had evidence, in improving workers’ lives; all they were interested 
in was serving Russian policy. The results of the hearings were unmistakable: 
the Communists had no interest in functioning as legitimate union leaders, 
and therefore no right to lead unions, regardless of workers’ repeated willing-
ness to vote for these sinister characters.
 Despite their importance, the congressional hearings had no direct effects 
on the leaders of New York City’s department store unions. This was partially 
because Communists in the department store unions never publicly declared 
themselves as such. Besides their participation in May Day marches—some-
thing that never came up during the hearings—there was no public record 
of these union leaders embracing communism. However, many people 
who did not openly declare themselves Communists went to jail in the late 
1940s and early 1950s, primarily for avoiding questions by pleading the Fifth 
Amendment, something that union leaders did several times during their 
testimony. The government’s inaction probably had more to do with the exis-
tence of the Taft-Hartley Act: the Communists within the union might plead 
the Fifth Amendment during their testimony, but they would either declare 
themselves opposed to communism in their Taft-Hartley affidavits or lose 
control over the union, and sending them to jail would be pointless.
 The lack of direct prosecution allowed some non-Communists within the 
local union leadership to defend their alliance with Communists. Samuel 
Kovenetsky, for instance, insisted that the government’s failure to convict 
or even charge any of the union leaders was proof against any claims of 
Communist insurgency. Years later, when he was asked directly whether any 
of the union leaders had been Communists, Kovenetsky’s avoided the ques-
tion, saying instead that “none of the people that [Wolchok] claimed were 
Communists were ever indicted for any Communist activity.”55
 The congressional hearings did have significant indirect effects on the 
RWDSU. On August 9, 1948, Samuel Wolchok called an emergency meeting 
of the RWDSU General Executive Board, which issued a resolution “to make 
compliance with the Taft-Hartley Law compulsory” for membership in the 
international union. Perhaps not surprisingly, the department store union 
leaders still refused compliance. Wolchok, well aware of his opponents’ posi-
tion, reissued his order, sending them letters ordering them to “take immedi-
ate steps to file the . . . non-Communist affidavits to be signed by all your 
officers” or be removed by the national leaders.56
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 Still, the local leaders did not sign the affidavits, instead taking steps to 
make certain that as many workers and other union organizers supported 
their position as possible. In Local 5, Sadka Brown again began lining up the 
Local’s Executive Board behind the local leaders’ position against signing, 
warning them that it would be the responsibility of all the local organizers 
to “maintain [the] support of membership on the REAL issues and make 
them understand the smoke-screen so that [even if] the International sends 
in administrators . . . the membership [will] support elected leaders.” Brown 
also moved to line up individual union members behind their leaders’ posi-
tion, often by stressing the importance of worker agency and the dangers of 
consorting with state bureaucracies. “Will compliance with law—going to 
NLRB—win [our] program?” Brown rhetorically asked at one meeting with 
Local 5 members. The answer, she asserted, was an emphatic no. “Only unity 
and fight of [the] membership will!”57
 After it became clear that the local leaders were not going to sign the Taft-
Hartley affidavits, national union leaders officially took over the local unions. 
In September 1948, Jack Altman filed internal disciplinary charges against 
the local leaders, accusing them of refusing to comply with Wolchok’s order. 
Wolchok immediately suspended the officers of the New York Joint Board, 
banning them from the international union. Wolchok then appointed John 
Cooney, Jack Altman, and other anti-Communist members of the national 
union leadership the official administrators of the RWDSU’s New York City 
department store unions.
 It was one thing to remove the local leaders on paper, but quite another to 
do so in practice. Local leaders offered members a chance to weigh in, call-
ing for members of the local unions to decide whether to remain within the 
RWDSU and split with their local leaders, or disaffiliate from the RWDSU and 
remain within their local unions. Despite the anti-Communist propaganda 
being hurled at the local leaders by the federal government, store manag-
ers, and even national union leaders, in every department store union with 
Communists in leadership positions—Local 1-S, Local 2, Local 3, Local 5, and 
Local 1250—the members voted to support their local leaders, to disaffiliate 
from the RWDSU and become independent. The members of Local 65 did the 
same.
 Union members had many reasons for siding so overwhelmingly with the 
local leaders, a surprising decision considering that some workers had been 
questioning the value of the unions, and that others had been strong critics 
of local leaders’ radical politics. Certainly few department store union mem-
bers shared the Communist beliefs of the local leaders, although many union 
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members were evidently opposed to the sort of anti-Communist fanaticism 
represented by the Rank and File Committees. But workers had many reasons 
besides politics to support these leaders. Many of these union leaders had been 
officials of their unions, in some way or another, for as long as the unions had 
existed. Additionally, they had substantially improved working conditions 
with each successive contract.
 Perhaps the deciding factor in the workers’ decision was leaders’ emphasis 
on union autonomy. The resolution on disaffiliation adopted by the members 
of Local 5, for example, accused Wolchok and other RWDSU leaders of enter-
ing “into a conspiracy to seize and maintain control over the International 
Union, its locals and its members and their affairs for the purposes, among 
others, of perpetuating themselves in office and destroying local autonomy 
and depriving the workers of material benefits and working conditions.” 
The resolution went on to claim that the national leaders had attacked the 
local leaders because these local leaders “have acted in accordance with the 
desires and instructions of their membership.” The language of such resolu-
tions illustrated the power of the local leaders’ position: members voting for 
disaffiliation would be voting for their right to choose their own leaders, and 
striking a blow against those who would deprive them of this right. The fact 
that a majority of the members of Local 5 (one of the unions which did have an 
active Rank and File Committee) voted in favor of such a resolution suggests 
that a large number of workers believed that Wolchok’s actions were, in fact, 
attempts to limit workers’ control over their unions. And, while no numbers 
are available for how many members voted against such resolutions, there is 
no evidence of a significant pro-Wolchok or pro-RWDSU movement within 
the local unions after disaffiliation.58
 Samuel Wolchok’s position was now a desperate one, and still he did 
not budge from his principles. He would not resort to accusations that the 
Communist local leaders were in maniacal and single-minded service to Russia, 
no matter how commonplace such accusations had become by 1948. Instead 
Wolchok tried to present a rational, reasoned argument why the local leaders 
simply could not provide adequate leadership for the union. In the aftermath 
of the union’s defeat at Oppenheim Collins, Wolchok insisted, NLRB cer-
tification was a central factor in any effort to organize. “The only question 
involved,” Wolchok wrote, “is how to protect you. . . . There are elements who 
will try to becloud this issue. They will yelp about ‘autonomy.’ They will scream 
about ‘democracy’ and the ‘rights of locals.’ . . . Don’t fall for false issues. There 
is just one issue! You can’t get a union shop without an NLRB election, and 
you can’t get on the ballot for such an election if you fail to comply [with the 
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Taft-Hartley Act].” Wolchok’s letter failed to convince workers to change their 
minds.59
 Wolchok and the other national leaders continued in their efforts to retake 
the locals even after workers’ votes for independence in September 1948. 
Wolchok’s appointed administrators of Local 1-S attempted to take control of 
the union’s funds in August, and throughout the remainder of the year these 
administrators continued to try to wrest control of the unions away from the 
elected leaders. Local 1-S leaders like Atkinson and Kovenetsky took direct 
action to prevent this, withdrawing all the union’s funds from the bank before 
the national leaders could do so. Altman responded by showing up at a Local 
1-S Executive Board meeting and demanding the money. Atkinson had con-
sidered this possibility in advance, and he asked two friends “that happened 
to be detectives” to attend the meeting as well. As he remembered, “When 
Altman got up and says, ‘I’ll take the bank-books,’ the boys jumped up and 
pulled out their pistols, and said, ‘You’re not going to take anything.’”60
 The national leaders simply could not retake control over the local unions, 
a tremendous blow to the prestige of the RWDSU. Wolchok personally bore 
the brunt of the national union’s failure, and he consequently found himself 
under fierce attacks from all sides following the purge of the department store 
unions. Having at long last eliminated his most outspoken critics within the 
union, Wolchok immediately faced a new series of attacks from other local 
leaders, this time from the right. Conservative local leaders centered on the St. 
Louis Joint Council complained that Wolchok had been too slow to endorse 
anti-communism and drive the department store union leaders out of the 
RWDSU. As this new group of oppositional local leaders emerged, the main-
stream press quickly turned on the once-revered Wolchok, publishing articles 
on his leadership of the RWDSU with titles like “The Sin of Sloth” and “The 
Penalty of Failure.” Business Week, which before the war had gone so far as to 
compare Wolchok’s leadership to that of John L. Lewis and Sidney Hillman, 
now castigated Wolchok as a failure among labor leaders. Newsweek magazine 
published an article observing that “Sam Wolchok [had always] plodded the 
well-worn rut of a trade-union wheelhorse,” but also noting that Wolchok 
had now lost even that dubious distinction. Women’s Wear Daily columnist 
George Kirstein wrote a scathing column declaring that Wolchok had paid “lip 
service to anti-Communism while at the same time harboring and support-
ing the leftist-led locals and urging employers to do likewise.” And, although 
Time magazine’s article was somewhat more sympathetic, even it agreed that 
Wolchok had appeared “hapless” in the face of the Communists’ desertion. In 
addition, national CIO officials, once among Wolchok’s strongest supporters, 
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joined the attacks on the once-revered Wolchok. CIO President Philip Murray, 
for instance, described the RWDSU leadership as “sitting on their charter 
and running paper organizations,” and called for the Amalgamated Clothing 
Workers to begin organizing retail workers. An anonymous CIO official, sup-
porting Murray’s stance, accused Wolchok of having allowed the RWDSU to 
“wither away on the vine.”61
 Facing attacks from the right wing within the RWDSU, from the CIO 
leadership, and from the national press, in January 1949 Samuel Wolchok 
took action. His career and his union in shambles, Wolchok went on what 
was politely termed an “indefinite leave of absence” from his presidency of the 
RWDSU. He never returned.62
Conclusion
The years between 1945 and 1948 marked the destruction of the RWDSU 
as a major force within the CIO. While the Taft-Hartley Act and the begin-
nings of the McCarthy era damaged many unions, few lost both their most 
recognized national leader and their largest locals within just a few months. It 
was not accidental that the CIO’s retail union was the hardest hit by the early 
McCarthy period. The same Communists that helped create the union by rec-
ognizing that white-collar women working in department stores were able to 
form unions were now costly liabilities to the union.
 Even as the events of these years led to the department store unions’ expul-
sion from the CIO, they also set the stage for these unions’ survival without 
the CIO’s support. Due to Wolchok’s willingness to allow the local unions so 
much autonomy following the 1946 convention, organizers during these years 
were able to create an administrative body in the Joint Board, to join the Tom 
Mooney Hall Association, to produce Thursdays Till Nine, and to establish 
the Union Voice as their local union newspaper. In doing so, they created the 
cultural and administrative backbones of what would become an independent 
retail workers’ union in New York City. If the CIO would cease to be an impor-
tant factor in organizing retail workers after 1948, perhaps this independent 
union would be able to take up that task.
 As local union leaders took their first steps towards independence, and as 
anti-Communist fervor gripped the nation, store managers’ actions would 
become just as devastating to the unions’ future as were the government 
investigations. Managers’ continued experiments with different retailing 
methods, as well as the increasing suburbanization and massive layoffs, would 
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have severe effects on the department store unions in the years to come. Yet, 
perhaps understandably, in 1948 union organizers were so focused on the gov-
ernment investigations and the Taft-Hartley Act that they seem to have all but 
ignored the effects of managerial restructuring, at least temporarily. In the late 
1940s and early 1950s, the decline of American retail unionism would con-
tinue, as managerial restructuring and anti-communism would come together 
to force union leaders to sever their ties to communism.
Chapter 6
 
Defeat, –
Introduction
In the late 1940s and early 1950s, the importance of retail workers to the 
American labor movement was increasingly evident. Manufacturing was now 
beginning its long decline in the heavily unionized North, as factory owners 
relocated to southern states where unions were less of a threat. If retail work-
ers’ unions could again emerge as a major part of the labor movement, per-
haps the labor movement need not follow the manufacturing industry into its 
decline. The result was that the fate of the labor movement was to be decided 
during this period, at the height of the McCarthy era, and in the midst of the 
postwar explosion of middle-class suburbanization. The union leaders who 
had won disputes against some of the most powerful retailers in the country 
were ready to attempt a massive expansion, as New York City’s department 
store unions once again would become the center for a national drive to orga-
nize retail workers.1
 The drive to expand the department store unions barely ever began, despite 
declarations to the contrary. Instead of organizing the nation’s growing pool 
of retail workers, the radicals leading New York City department stores spent 
most of their time trying to figure out how to retain control over the unions 
they had created. Anti-communism, as well as changes in the city and in 
the stores, all worked to threaten Communists’ ability to expand the unions’ 
power. The old coalitions had dissolved, with many who might once have 
thought of themselves as workers now thinking of themselves as members of 
the middle class, moving into the suburbs or the new housing at Stuyvesant 
Town. And, with their control over the exterior environment restored by the 
rise of anti-communism, managers were rapidly restructuring the stores’ inte-
rior environments, allowing customers direct access to goods and eliminating 
skilled sales jobs in the process.2
 In the midst of an increasingly more difficult situation for organizing, 
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union leaders turned to workers for support, adopting first a policy of “union 
democracy” and then, finally, embracing anti-communism, turning on their 
former allies in the Communist party in the process. But no amount of anti-
Communist rhetoric would protect workers from the effects of restructur-
ing, or would protect union leaders from anti-Communist attacks. This they 
learned at Hearn’s. At this store, workers—with the encouragement and sup-
port of union leaders—voted to make concession after concession after the 
closing of the Loeser’s store, to allow managers at Hearn’s to more successfully 
compete with the nonunionized 14th Street stores like Klein’s and Ohrbach’s. 
But the concessions did workers little good: in 1953, Hearn’s managers 
announced that they were laying off thousands of workers in the store in an 
effort to restructure the store. Workers went out on strike in protest.
 The Hearn’s strike was a test for the newly anti-Communist union in two 
important ways. It was the first strike that took place after the union condemned 
communism, and the first strike where department store workers challenged 
managers’ postwar attempts at restructuring of the stores. The union amassed 
powerful allies in this strike, winning the support of AFL and CIO leaders alike; 
but these allies were unable to force Hearn’s to settle. Additionally, the union’s 
official condemnation of communism did nothing to prevent Hearn’s managers 
from referring to the union leaders’ radical past in advertisements during the 
strike, insisting that the unions were radical political entities and keeping the 
union leaders on the defensive throughout the strike. Anti-communism, the 
workers would discover, in no way guaranteed victory. The Hearn’s strike ended 
in defeat, and with it ended any chance workers had of preventing managers 
from restructuring New York City’s department stores, and any possibility of a 
powerful retail workers’ union in America.
The World of Tomorrow:  
Stores and City Transformed, –
By 1953 New York City had forever changed from the prewar era. Met Life’s 
Stuyvesant Town project was open and accepting tenants by 1947, and by 1948 
it had so dominated real estate in lower Manhattan that area landlords adver-
tised to potential tenants that their apartments were “near Stuyvesant Town.” 
Like Parkchester before it, Stuyvesant Town was an experiment in a new sort 
of city life, one that was friendly and serene. One resident quoted in the Times 
described Stuyvesant Town in terms that could have been used to describe the 
postwar suburban ideal:
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Where I used to live, nobody said anything to anybody. Here, when we 
meet a neighbor in the elevator, we say ‘Good morning.’ or something 
like that. And when we come out of the building, do you know what we 
look at first? The grass, and that tree over there—it’s a maple, they tell 
me. Sometimes we see a bird sitting on a branch. I say that’s a good way 
to start the day—with neighbors, trees, and a little wildlife.
Pleasant neighbors, grass, wildlife, and nondescript trees, with no sign of strife 
or class struggle: that was what Stuyvesant Town, like the suburbs, promised 
residents in the postwar era.3
 The reality was far more complicated than the pastoral images that Met 
Life and some tenants presented. In particular, Met Life’s policies on choosing 
tenants came under fierce attack. “Negroes and whites,” Met Life President 
Frederick Ecker openly announced, “don’t mix.” Like Parkchester before it, 
Stuyvesant Town reflected Ecker’s beliefs, and no African American tenants 
were allowed in the new housing development. In response to critics, Met 
Life did construct a separate housing development in Harlem, the Riverton 
houses. But if this silenced some critics, others continued to protest against 
the segregation. The most important protests came from Stuyvesant Town 
tenants themselves, some of whom set up a Tenants’ Committee to End 
Discrimination in Stuyvesant Town. Jesse Kessler, a Local 65 organizer and 
Stuyvesant Town resident, allowed Hardine and Raphael Hendrix, an African 
American couple, to move into his apartment in Stuyvesant Town for a month 
while Kessler was away. The month passed without major incidents, although 
there were plenty of minor ones: historian Arthur Simon noted that the 
couple’s son “needed constant accompaniment because occasionally someone 
made a hostile remark . . . or anonymous shouts would come from some win-
dow. A few threatening phone calls meant that he had to be kept away from the 
telephone, too.” When Kessler returned in September, the Hendrixes moved 
into the apartment of Lee Lorch, a mathematics instructor at City College, 
who was going to be teaching at Pennsylvania State College for an academic 
year. Met Life officials, although they made some efforts at continued resis-
tance, backed down after the city council passed a bill making the continued 
de jure segregation of Stuyvesant Town and other Met Life properties illegal.4
 The controversy around segregation illustrated not only the complexity of 
the Stuyvesant Town project; it also illustrated just how powerful anti-commu-
nism had become, even in a city that had once been a center of communism 
in America. The proponents of discrimination in Stuyvesant Town raised the 
issue of communism to attack their opposition. To conservative papers like 
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the Daily News, the campaign for the integration of Stuyvesant Town was a 
Communist conspiracy, a way to stir up trouble where none actually existed. 
“Some of our Councilmen,” the News proclaimed, “have allowed themselves to 
become so intimidated by Commie pressure that they’re actually contemplat-
ing voting for . . . a bill with a most peculiar look and odor . . . aimed directly 
and viciously at Stuyvesant Town.” Met Life executives agreed, claiming that 
the bill desegregating Stuyvesant Town “stems right out of the Communist 
line” and would “open the gates to race hatred” rather than integration.5
 The rise of the middle class, both at Stuyvesant Town and in the postwar 
suburbs, would have profound effects on New York’s department store unions. 
For one thing, the postwar middle class would openly reject the sort of radical 
politics that, during the Depression, had allowed doctors and writers to envi-
sion themselves as white-collar workers and to throw their support behind 
strikes at the city’s department stores. Radicalism of any sort was taboo in 
Stuyvesant Town; Met Life evicted both Lorch and Kessler soon after the City 
Council passed the bill eliminating segregation in the private housing devel-
opment. In the suburbs, the process of eliminating radicalism was, to be sure, 
more complicated, but equally important to community leaders. One of the 
many arguments for the prefabricated houses of Levittown, for instance, was 
that the homeowners there would never become Communists, since working 
on their homes would occupy all their spare time. Not until a new genera-
tion came of age would radicalism again become a central part of city life; by 
the 1960s, of course, the New Left—the children both of African American 
and Puerto Rican working-class migrants to the city and of the middle-class 
residents of Stuyvesant Town and the suburbs—would create powerful radical 
movements of their own; but throughout the 1950s the idea of a large-scale 
radical movement was highly unlikely.6
 There were other ways in which the rise of the middle class would affect 
New York City’s department stores, particularly in the branch stores. Workers 
at the branch stores (nearly all of whom seem to have been women) were 
teachers working on weekends, students who worked nights, and women over 
40, at least some of whom were married. Much like the residents of Stuyvesant 
Town, these workers thought of themselves as members of the middle class, 
and part of being middle class was proving that husbands and fathers could 
support their families. The result was that workers in these stores now insisted 
that they didn’t really need their jobs, that they worked mostly to get out of the 
house and earn a little “pin money . . . even though,” as one union organizer 
later told historian Minna Ziskind, “many of these women worked when their 
husbands were laid off or ended up disabled or ended up with lousy-paying 
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jobs.” Attempting to prove to one another as well as to any observers that they 
did not need their jobs, workers in the branch stores, Ziskind suggests, had 
little interest in striking for higher pay or the right to form unions, making the 
unions at these branch stores weak at best.7
 Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the emergence of the middle class 
would be a justification, if not the main one, for the rise of what one retail 
executive called a “new era in retailing.” Throughout the city, managers would 
restructure their stores to meet the demands of the large numbers of poten-
tial middle-class consumers. This was warranted to a degree; at least some 
Stuyvesant Town residents decided where to shop due to the shopping experi-
ences that different stores offered, even more than the merchandise carried 
by different stores. Corinne Demas, who lived in Stuyvesant Town as a child 
from 1948 through the 1960s, remembered her mother and other women liv-
ing in Stuyvesant Town making these comparisons. Despite their proximity, 
Demas remembered, the downscale stores on 14th Street held little appeal for 
Stuyvesant Town residents. Klein’s, for instance, still catering to the same mar-
ket it had catered to in the early 1930s, was dingy and unpleasant: “Clothing 
that was not hung up on great long metal pipes was dumped out on palatial 
wooden tables with edges like animal troughs . . . Everything about Klein’s had 
an aura of poverty: the dim lighting, the low ceilings, the dull linoleum on the 
floors. In the communal try-on room women . . . squinted at themselves in the 
narrow, cloudy mirrors. Everyone pretended not to be looking at each other,” 
so heavy a stigma was attached to shopping in this sort of establishment. If 
they associated Klein’s with forbidding and depressing poverty, residents of 
Stuyvesant Town also found stores that catered to the upper class unsuitable 
for their shopping needs. Demas remembered that, in stores that continued 
catering to wealthier customers, store clerks made middle-class people feel 
unwelcome. “I always felt,” Demas wrote, “as if we didn’t quite belong in 
these stores . . . The saleswomen always seemed like temporarily impover-
ished countesses, who treated us with polite disdain. Their ‘May I help you?’ 
sounded accusatory.”8
 As Demas’s remarks suggest, with the opening of Stuyvesant Town and the 
expansion of the suburbs, there emerged a group of customers who fit neither 
in the rough-and-tumble world of Klein’s and Ohrbach’s nor in the exclusive 
and refined world of the upscale stores. Some managers, especially those at 
Hearn’s, explicitly responded to Stuyvesant Town by restructuring the stores. 
At Hearn’s, only a few blocks west of Stuyvesant Town, the store could now 
potentially come to serve a very different (and far more affluent) group of 
customers than the former working-class customer base. Hearn’s managers 
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met the challenge with enthusiasm, even opening a Stuyvesant Town “model 
apartment” so that Stuyvesant Town residents could come to the store and 
see how to most effectively furnish their new residences. The store also began 
carrying a “Stuyvesant Towner” collection of furniture, designed to save space 
in the relatively small apartments but still look attractive. Hearn’s also hired 
many more salespeople, in an effort to offer a more upscale experience to the 
new Stuyvesant Town residents who, they were sure, would soon be crowding 
the store’s aisles.9
 If Hearn’s was the earliest transformation, it was also an exceptional one. 
As Hearn’s managers began to implement full-service shopping on 14th Street, 
everywhere else in the city store managers worked to replace full-service shop-
ping with more efficient means of consumption. It was an era of tremendous 
experimentation: some store managers—most of them in cities besides New 
York—even went so far as to open vending machine branches, where custom-
ers inserted coins to purchase goods like hosiery, underwear, accessories, 
stationery, and toys. These machines, although they attracted a great deal 
of attention, were generally considered novelties, fascinating but ultimately 
not a particularly realistic substitute for the more traditional stores. At the 
same time, stores throughout the country did begin including a few of these 
machines inside nonautomated stores, particularly to sell candies and cold 
drinks.10
 Unlike vending machines, nonmechanized self-service was an increasingly 
realistic and popular method for increasing efficiency. What had begun during 
World War II as a method to save labor now became a method to save money. 
Developments at Gimbel’s illustrate the expansion of self-service retailing dur-
ing the late 1940s and early 1950s. At Gimbel’s in 1949 managers began their 
cost-cutting efforts by eliminating the entire gift-wrapping unit immediately 
after Christmas. Over the next year, store managers redesigned most of the 
departments in the store with open merchandise display cases, the World War 
II technique that allowed customers direct access to samples of merchandise 
without going through salespeople. By January 1951 they had completed this 
modernization program in many of the departments, and store managers 
were already announcing the plan’s success. As Gimbel’s manager Nat Cohen 
announced approvingly, “open fixtures almost amount to self-service for 
the shopper.” Other managers seconded Cohen’s opinion: the open displays, 
another manager claimed, “give the merchandise a chance to sell itself.” Now 
customers could inspect and select their purchases before the intervention 
of a salesperson. But managers were not finished; at Gimbel’s in 1950 they 
also initiated fully self-service shopping in select departments. In the notions 
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department, for instance, customers could now enter, select an item from the 
shelves, and take it to the cashier without the intervention of a salesperson.11
 Other store managers followed Gimbel’s managers’ lead in establishing 
self-service departments. At Bloomingdale’s, managers transformed their 
housewares department into a fully self-service department in August of 1952, 
and top managers at Bloomingdale’s also called for all departments in the store 
“to focus on merchandise assortments and encourage self-selection” from 
then on. Managers at Macy’s also increasingly experimented with self-service, 
establishing a self-service counter for Maidenform® brassieres early in 1952 
and then launching a one-day self-service dress sale in October of that year. 
By 1953 Macy’s managers had also instituted a self-service toy department.12
 There were numerous reasons that department store managers began to 
institute self-service. Certainly customer preference for self-service was a factor 
managers frequently cited, but there were many other reasons why self-service 
became so prominent in the early 1950s. First among them was increasing 
competition from supermarkets. For years before managers had introduced 
self-service into department stores, supermarkets in America had offered 
consumers an opportunity to try self-service when shopping for groceries, and 
they were so efficient that by the early 1950s these supermarkets had begun 
to branch out, carrying socks, nylon hosiery, toys, records, underwear, and 
sometimes even electrical appliances. These lines were extremely successful, 
offering customers cheaper and faster alternatives to the full-service depart-
ment stores, and spurring department store managers to revamp their own 
operations to resemble the supermarket managers’ success.13
 In addition to the new competition from these self-service establishments 
was the increase in nationally advertised brands which accompanied the rise 
of television. By the early 1950s clothing and dry goods manufacturers were 
advertising their particular brands directly to customers, and the result was 
that customers entered stores already knowing what they wanted to purchase. 
By 1953 some store managers estimated that 60 percent of customers asked 
for children’s merchandise by brand name, and between 25 and 30 percent of 
customers for other items asked for merchandise by brand name. Combined 
with television advertising, the result was that “nowadays . . . the average 
woman entering the store knows exactly what she wants,” as one salesperson 
put it. For the first time, complete self-service was a real option, since custom-
ers did not need salespeople’s help to make their selections. As in the branch 
stores, the salesperson’s job was now primarily to show “courtesy [and] interest 
in the customer’s needs” and only secondarily “to have some knowledge of 
merchandise.”14
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 But the most important factor behind the rise of self-service was the cost 
efficiency of the practice. Initially, there was some question of whether or not 
self-service would be economically more efficient than full-service shopping. 
Store managers seemed particularly worried that they would be expected to 
reduce prices if they instituted self-service. As one manager put it, services 
were “business building activities” that were supposed to cost a lot of money. 
But as they experimented, store managers discovered that self-service was an 
extremely effective way to make more sales, and that the increase in volume 
more than made up for any loss in profits per sale. One study found that in a 
self-service department, an average employee totaled 20,250 sales each year, 
while in a full-service store, the same employee would make only 12,300 sales 
each year.15
 As managers sacrificed the control that full-service shopping had allowed 
them, they began using new technologies to regain some control over the 
process of consumption. If self-service meant that customer shoplifting would 
now be a much bigger concern, television allowed store managers to keep an 
eye on customers, through the installation of store security cameras. Other 
new technologies had even more important implications for retailing in 
America, among them the electronic price tag. As Richard Neumaier wrote 
in the Department Store Economist, the introduction of the electronic price 
tag signaled that “a new era in retailing has arrived!” Now, rather than relying 
upon salespeople and cashiers to know the prices of goods,
an electronic eye will read the punched hole information in the mer-
chandise ticket and translate these electronic impulses into electro-
magnetic fields on a magnetic tape. . . . The only judgment required in 
this entire process is in the production of the original merchandise tag 
and in the punching of a tabulating card of the merchandise received 
which can be a by-product of the accounts payable operation. For all 
other phases the human element has practically been removed.16
 Other store managers agreed with Neumaier on the importance of remov-
ing the “human element,” namely, the large numbers of highly trained work-
ers employed in the stores. As a Detroit store manager told a reporter for the 
Department Store Economist, “Every operation must be studied to make it easier 
and faster, so that there is greater efficiency and economy in operation. One of 
the necessities of the future is for stores to control expenses through greater and 
greater productivity per employee. The scientific layout of merchandise and 
service departments is one of the most important ways of accomplishing it.”17
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 The introduction of self-service forced union organizers to pay close 
attention to the changes taking place in the industry. By late 1952 Local 1250 
organizer Peter Montanaro declared at a union meeting that “the department 
store[s] as we now know them will no longer be—. . . They are all going to have 
some self-service departments, due to overhead and competition from non-
service stores.” But if union organizers were aware of the changes by 1952, they 
were not aware that these changes posed a threat. Montanaro assured his lis-
teners, “members’ jobs . . . would probably not be touched, except for changes 
in classification.” The union seemed similarly unconcerned at Gimbel’s, where 
Louis Broido was able to reassure the union that store managers would give 
the workers a raise if managers “were able to improve the efficiency of this 
business by the rationalization of our procedures, and the more effective use of 
manpower . . . all consistent with fair dealing with our employees.” In return, 
union officials assured Broido that employees would support this practice, so 
long as the “fair dealing” with employees continued.18
 Other labor leaders were even slower to realize the possible effects of 
self-service retailing on attempts to organize in the retail industry. As late 
as November of 1953, after New York City’s department store unions had 
launched their first challenges to managerial restructuring, delegates to the 
national CIO convention in Cleveland nonetheless declared that “self-service 
must be accepted as means of cutting costs and of increasing sales” and that 
it “presented no great threat to organized labor and might even be a benefi-
cial force for the workers in that particular industry.” On this point, the CIO 
delegates were entirely incorrect. Managers’ decisions to institute self-service 
retailing would, in fact, lead to some of the most devastating challenges which 
union organizers and workers faced in the first twenty years of the department 
store unions’ history. And these challenges would arise at a time when New 
York City’s department store union leaders were struggling just to retain the 
unions they had helped create over the previous decades.19
Unions Transformed, –
In the late 1940s and early 1950s, the left-wing leaders of New York City’s 
department store unions increasingly emphasized the “democratic” nature of 
the unions in order to gain workers’ support. They badly needed this support: 
the unions faced numerous challenges throughout these years, and serious 
internal divisions could have destroyed the unions. In order to prevent these 
divisions from forming, radical union organizers emphasized the unions as 
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an arena for workers to express their political views, whatever those views 
might be. It was a particularly good tactic against the strongly conformist 
anti-communism that was becoming more powerful throughout the country 
in this era.
 The split with the RWDSU left the department store unions in an extremely 
precarious position. Since union officials had refused to sign the required 
non-Communist affidavits, the unions were not certified, and could not par-
ticipate in any NLRB elections should store managers call for any such elec-
tions. Meanwhile, the contracts which the unions had signed with the stores in 
1948 were coming up for renewal in 1949, and the managers of at least some 
stores now began to announce in their training programs “that under [the] 
Taft-Hartley Act [the employees] do not have to join [the] Union.” Managers 
at Macy’s took a slightly different tack; in order to encourage dissension 
within the unions’ ranks, managers there began publishing articles in the store 
newspaper, the Macy’s Star, encouraging workers to “take an active personal 
interest in how their union is run,” suggesting that “we hope you will attend 
its meetings regularly, stay all the way through, participate in debate and vote 
on the issues that come before you.” On top of this, managers at all the stores 
continued to lay off large numbers of workers, weakening the unions still fur-
ther.20
 As managers continued to challenge the legitimacy of the newly indepen-
dent unions, other labor organizers also launched attacks against the depart-
ment store unions. The RWDSU and the Amalgamated Clothing Workers 
both began to attempt raids on the department store unions, launching repeat-
ed efforts to secure the “liberation” of the workers within the fugitive locals, 
who were “trapped behind the iron curtain,” as one CIO leader described 
them. Even former allies had turned on the unions. By 1951 Mike Quill, once 
a staunch supporter and the guest of honor at the unions’ Counter Carnival, 
threatened to picket the department stores during the Christmas rush “in 
order to compel management to sign with [the] CIO.”21
 Somewhat surprisingly, department store union leaders were able to find 
some common ground with store managers around the actions of AFL and 
CIO organizers. While store managers did oppose the unions on many issues, 
they also opposed the sort of jurisdictional fighting which Quill and other 
AFL and CIO organizers waged within the industry. And they had no inten-
tion of actively taking a side in the various intraunion struggles: the last thing 
store managers wanted was to have to contend with more cross-picketing. As 
a result, even while trying to undermine the unions, managers took pains to 
demonstrate their neutrality in the intraunion struggles. While control over 
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Local 1-S and the other department store union locals was still tied up in court 
between the national RWDSU and the local leaders, for instance, Macy’s man-
agers announced to employees that they would ask both local and national 
leaders to attend negotiations until the jurisdictional dispute was settled. 
Similarly, Bloomingdale’s managers announced to employees that their biggest 
concern was not who won the bargaining rights, but rather that “the needs of 
the employees are met” by making sure grievances were handled as quickly as 
possible. Stern’s managers went even further, barring international RWDSU 
officers from contract negotiations, since those negotiations had always been 
carried on by local leaders in the past.22
 With store managers at least attempting the appearance of neutrality, 
department store union leaders quickly moved to meet the challenges posed 
by the state and the other unions. In late October 1948, only weeks after split-
ting with Wolchok over their refusal to file with the NLRB, the department 
store union leaders began submitting the required forms to the NLRB, includ-
ing the much-hated affidavits asserting that they were not members of the 
Communist party. All the leaders except for William Michelson signed these 
affidavits in 1948 and 1949.23
 As late as 1950, several union leaders had serious doubts about their 
decision to sign the non-Communist affidavits. When William Michelson 
finally decided to sign, in the spring of 1950, Arthur Osman strongly opposed 
Michelson’s decision. As Osman put it, the point was to win workers’ loyalty, 
not to get NLRB recognition:
Now, two years after we made the stupid blunder of filing, two years in 
the course of which the dirt from our eyes was washed out by tears . . . 
let’s not commit the same blunder . . . our leaders should no longer file 
affidavits wherever they can afford not to file . . . Without filing, you 
can’t get a union shop. What does it matter if you have a union shop? 
Do you think that if we were certified at Stern’s and all the people in 
Stern’s who hate our guts were compelled to pay dues that this would 
make them good defenders of our union? We don’t need their lousy few 
pennies. We’re hoping to salvage their hearts and souls.24
 The anxiety about NLRB certification, Osman said in this remarkably 
insightful and impassioned speech, was spurred by a fear of workers. If work-
ers opposed the union, the NLRB might help convince them that the union 
was legitimate. But, as Osman here pointed out, if workers opposed the union, 
then they had already been defeated. Moreover, as Osman recognized, with 
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Communist-led unions under attack from all sides, their defense could not 
rest on the government, which was all that signing the Taft-Hartley affidavit 
could accomplish. The government, in Osman’s view, was eventually going to 
attack the unions in any case. Only workers’ support could give Communist 
organizers in the department store unions the ability to continue to resist the 
growing movement of anti-communism. Without that support, the unions 
could not survive, whether they had a union shop or not.25
 As Osman predicted, the unions remained subject to anti-Communist 
attacks despite union leaders’ decisions (Michelson included) to sign the 
required affidavits. In particular, raiders from the AFL and the CIO repeat-
edly reminded department store union members of the Communist politics 
of the unions’ current leaders. One RWDSU flyer, for example, attacked Sam 
Kovenetsky by noting that the Russian-sounding “Ykstenevok . . . spelled 
backwards is Kovenetsky,” and stating that “you’d be a 100% nobody today, 
Sam, except for [the] CIO.” The RCIPA was even less subtle in their anti-
Communist attacks on Local 1-S. One RCIPA flyer warned Kovenetsky “that 
workers have a right to expect . . . that their union will be administered with-
out being torn internally by factional strife promoted by alien political groups.” 
Faced with these attacks, the non-Communist Kovenetsky decided that the 
benefits of unity with the other department store union leaders were simply 
not worth the price of being dubbed a Communist. In 1949, only months after 
leaving the RWDSU, Local 1-S rejoined the CIO as a union independent from 
the RWDSU.26
 With the attacks continuing, with their unity dwindling, and with jail as 
a near-certainty, organizers in the other department store unions made two 
defensive moves. First, they moved to consolidate the unions as much as 
possible. Throughout the late 1940s and early 1950s they experimented with 
various types of consolidation, first creating the Distributive Workers Union, 
which encompassed the department store unions and Osman’s Local 65. Late 
in 1950, they joined the DWU with other left-wing unions which had been 
purged from the CIO as the Distributive Processing and Office Workers Union 
(DPOWU). Through the merger which created the DPOWU, the New York 
City locals of this union, primarily encompassing office, wholesale, and retail 
workers, became District 65, which its leaders proudly heralded as “New York’s 
largest union!”27
 As they moved to consolidate their unions, organizers also attempted to 
revive what they called “the fighting spirit” of the 1930s, to win, as Osman had 
so eloquently put it, the “hearts and souls” of the workers. Union organizers 
therefore set their sights on reviving and expanding the union’s recreational 
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program still further, to remind workers of the vibrant role the union could 
play in their lives. A union calendar from the fall of 1951 illustrates the 
unions’ greater commitment to social and cultural activities. On September 
10 the union sponsored a “founding festival,” a party to celebrate the creation 
(nearly a year earlier) of the DPOWU and District 65. On the 15th, the Tom 
Mooney Hall Association night club reopened after renovations, and the 
union held a second party to celebrate. On the 17th, the District 65 photogra-
phy club opened an exhibit of photographs at the Tom Mooney Hall. The 21st 
of September marked the beginning of a “festival of dance featuring square 
dances, international folk dances, etc.” On October 1 began the union’s art 
exhibit. On October 8 the union held a “Festival of Song.” On October 15 the 
union began “Health Week,” and on October 22 they rented Madison Square 
Garden, “the only hall [in New York] that can accommodate us,” for a mass 
meeting. Other events, such as boat rides up the Hudson River, also gave 
union members a chance to socialize and make connections, some of them 
extremely important. (Stuyvesant Town resident Jesse Kessler first met the 
Hendrixes, the African American couple who would move into his apartment, 
on a union boat trip.)28
 Other programs also contributed to make the union a more central part of 
workers’ lives. In particular, District 65’s cooperative buying service allowed 
store workers to buy all sorts of goods, ranging from hosiery to appliances to 
children’s clothes, at prices below even employees’ discount prices at the stores. 
And, in the early 1950s, the union also took over workers’ pension funds from 
the company, partially in order to discourage raiding by AFL and CIO com-
petitors.29
 These programs, though they may have made the union far more impor-
tant to workers’ daily lives, were very different from the cultural programs of 
the late 1930s. In the 1930s, as already suggested, these programs had served 
to win workers’ support, but they had also served to create coalitions between 
union members and the larger left-wing movement. Between 1948 and 1953, 
however, there scarcely remained a left-wing movement to unite with. In 
this era, the largest left-wing gathering in Union Square, once the center of a 
radical movement so powerful it threatened to wrest control of the city streets 
from store managers, was the vigil on the eve of the execution of Julius and 
Ethel Rosenberg. The somber mourning was a far cry from the dynamic and 
determined movement to bring about a new social and political order in the 
early 1930s.30
 Yet if the cultural programs could no longer function as a way to create 
a broad-based coalition, the union organizers were successful in another of 
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their key goals. They were able to retain the support of most workers within 
the store. At every union where the radicals had been in control they won the 
NLRB elections of 1948 and 1949. The victories were sometimes by very slim 
margins. While at Bloomingdale’s the union’s returns were overwhelmingly in 
favor of the local leadership, with 1886 of the 2600 workers voting for Local 3, 
at Stern’s Local 3 won by a far less impressive margin of 763 to 612.31
 The reelected union leaders responded to their narrow victories by attempt-
ing to solidify workers’ support wherever possible by giving workers more 
power over the union, a practice they called union democracy. “Democracy” 
became an oft-repeated concept within the unions in these years. When the 
unions became part of the Distributive Workers Union, for instance, Nicholas 
Carnes announced that the DWU constitution guaranteed “real democracy,” 
unlike within the RWDSU. “The right to secede [which was guaranteed under 
the new union constitution] would guarantee respect for each other’s prob-
lems, and that eliminates the need to secede,” Carnes announced at a union 
meeting. Additionally, Carnes emphasized that the formation of the DWU 
required “respect for diverse opinions and the right of all members to express 
them.” Local 65 leader David Livingston agreed on this point, arguing that 
democracy meant the right of union members to hold many different opinions 
on political issues.32
 Union democracy was accompanied by a greater emphasis on answering 
workers’ complaints within the stores. The union leaders proudly announced 
to the readers of Union Voice that the unions repeatedly met managers’ con-
tinual threats to cut jobs and wages either by ensuring that workers were laid 
off in terms of seniority, or, sometimes, by preventing layoffs and wage cuts 
altogether. As Sadka Brown instructed the Local 5 Executive Board, they had 
to take all actions on grievances on a “daily [basis] if need be,” because “in this 
way, we can and will win over more and more Stern workers—until only [a] 
small group of disruptors will remain outside our ranks.”33
 Organizers’ formal protests against management’s actions were strongest 
when backed by the threat of a strike, and managers, engaged in restructur-
ing the stores, resisted everything except strikes. At nearly every store during 
this period, even in places like Stern’s where nearly half the employees did not 
support the radical union leaders, union members issued strike threats nearly 
every time there was a contract up for negotiation. Rather than face a strike, 
store managers backed down on nearly every issue, allowing the unions to 
expand their contract to include storewide seniority clauses, union-sponsored 
health insurance plans, and cost of living adjustments.34
 Some of the unions’ victories in these years went far beyond the standard 
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subject matter for bargaining. Before Local 1-S split from the other unions, 
for example, union organizers in that local staged a protest against a window 
display at Macy’s, which had a “doll representing a baby born on the ‘Amos 
and Andy’ radio program. Dominating the window display was a caricature 
of a Negro man in the style used by those who spread race hatred. . . . Macy 
workers who noticed the window immediately called management to ask for 
removal of the display.” After some delay and numerous protests by union 
members, managers took the display down.35
 With managers suddenly on the defensive against strike threats, union 
organizers pressed their advantage, making their first major efforts to fight 
discrimination within the stores. Their particular goal was the expanded hir-
ing of African American workers in office and sales jobs. Five of the eighteen 
African American workers hired at Gimbel’s and Saks between October 1952 
and February 1953 received office jobs, once reserved for white workers. At 
some stores, the union was also beginning to demand desegregation even of 
the coveted sales jobs, long held exclusively by whites. By late 1951 Union 
Voice was able to report that, due to members’ interracial struggles against 
discrimination, twelve African American workers had obtained sales jobs in 
Bloomingdale’s over the course of the year.36
 Union leaders also took measures to ensure that individual workers sup-
ported their struggle against discrimination. In May 1951, for instance, the 
union brought up charges against Rose Amos, an office worker at Gimbel’s, 
after Amos reportedly used “slanderous remarks, vile language, and dis-
crimination against other members in the department,” including racial slurs 
against her African American and Jewish coworkers. The department store 
unions’ joint General Council eventually expelled Amos from the union.37
 While they took a stronger stand against racial discrimination than they 
had done in previous years, most union organizers were more hesitant than 
ever about demanding rights for women. In fact, some union leaders during 
the late 1940s and early 1950s even called for preferential treatment for male 
breadwinners, apparently without complaints from members or other orga-
nizers. At one report to a Local 5 general membership meeting, Sadka Brown 
assured the members that during negotiations the union “certainly want[s] 
to be sure that those jobs which, in the main, are filled by bread winners and 
heads of families, provide rates of pay which will enable families to maintain 
their self-respect and dignity.”38
 Although union organizers were actively celebrating the male breadwinner 
norm for the first time in the union’s history, they nonetheless allowed work-
ers themselves to discuss and debate gender issues within the union press and 
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at union meetings. They often did so, however, in ways that limited workers’ 
agency even as they allowed workers an opportunity to voice their opinions. 
A Local 65 member named Harold Pearlman, for instance, wrote a letter to 
the Union Voice demanding an apology for the editors’ decision to print a 
“cheesecake” photograph of a young woman in a bathing suit with the caption 
“Looks inviting—the water we mean.” Pearlman’s letter unleashed a small and 
brief storm of controversy which illustrates the complex and in some ways 
limited nature of union democracy within the department store unions. Other 
union members quickly wrote in, with arguments on both sides. “Cheesecake” 
proponents adopted a wide range of arguments, arguing, among other things, 
that
nature tricks out her products with all sorts of engaging curves and 
bumps and dimples . . . The cigarette people come along and say ‘If 
nature can get continuity with these bumps and things why can’t we 
use them to sell cigarettes?’ They print a picture of a pretty girl in their 
advertising and the sales mount. . . . ‘Why not [do the same in] UNION 
VOICE?’ 39
 Women supporters of the validity of cheesecake photographs offered quite 
different arguments. Elizabeth Fallone, one of the few department store work-
ers who got involved in the debate (most of the participants who gave their 
local union affiliation were members of Local 65), wrote in claiming that she 
was “ashamed of some of my fellow Union members who are jealous of a gal 
for being beautiful. Why shouldn’t our union paper have a beauty, amateur 
golf, swimming or bowling contest? . . . One girl is beautiful, one is talented, 
another brilliant[,] so let each benefit in her own right.” To Fallone, the editors’ 
decision to print cheesecake photographs was the union’s way to allow women 
to be recognized. Some other women in the union apparently agreed about the 
importance of these photos for women, one calling them (in verse) “beauties . . . 
selected from the brood / Of UNION chicks, who work and organize / To get 
out from the nasty solitude / Produced by what they call ‘free enterprise.’”40
 At least one additional opponent also spoke up, arguing that such photo-
graphs were politically dangerous:
Is it not white chauvinism to characterize the Negro as only a good 
entertainer and only a good cook? Then it is equally supremacist to 
characterize the women as capable of only bearing children and only 
cooking. . . . Both attitudes help fascism, which grows stronger in the 
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soil of confusion and disunity. . . . To be consistent in the struggle 
against fascism, one must root out all attitudes which stifle the full 
contributions which all people can make.41
 This debate over cheesecake photographs strongly suggests that 
Communists’ support for women’s importance within the union, limited as 
it had always been, was rapidly eroding. The editors’ continual support for 
the right to print cheesecake photographs in the union paper was hardly the 
sort of attitude encouraged in the 1930s, when—as we have seen—men in the 
department store unions were reportedly more respectful of the role women 
played in unions. While some women in the late 1940s, Elizabeth Fallone 
among them, may have seen these photographs as opportunities for women to 
be recognized within the union, this suggests just how limited such opportuni-
ties were: exploitation of this sort was as close as these women came to feeling 
as if they did play an important role in the unions’ daily existence.
 The debate over cheesecake photographs also speaks volumes about the role 
of workers in affecting union policy during the late 1940s and early 1950s. The 
union newspaper in these years became something that it had never before 
been: a space for workers to address and discuss political issues. The editors’ 
willingness to print the multiple views on the subject of these photographs 
illustrates their support for union members’ participation in debate and dis-
cussion. At the same time, while printing the various sides of the debate, the 
editors continued to publish the photographs at the center of the debate, often 
with blurbs referring to the ongoing “cheesecake controversy,” and asking the 
readers for their opinion on the suitability of the photographs in the union 
paper. In addition, in the end, the proposal to ban cheesecake (whose support-
ers wrote only two of the nine letters printed during the debate) was soundly 
rejected when the editors said that while they had “listened carefully to the 
arguments of both sides, and having a few ideas on the subject themselves, 
. . . will continue publishing, from time to time, photos of beautiful, shapely 
and alluring women . . . who by good fortune happen to come within our view.” 
In the same editorial that announced this decision, the editors reminded their 
readers “that neither women nor anyone else should be judged by appearance 
alone, and that women play an essential and dignified role in our mutual fight 
for a better life for working people.” In a decision fraught with irony, the edi-
tors printed this statement next to a photograph of a woman in a bathing suit 
holding a volleyball.42
 Like Union Voice, union meetings also became spaces where workers could 
debate and explore political issues, even issues like women’s rights to which 
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union leaders paid little attention. By 1951 women workers were themselves 
raising issues of women’s treatment in the union. Bloomingdale’s worker 
Florence Holt, for instance, gave reports at several membership meetings at 
Bloomingdale’s on the “Special Problems of Women Members,” pointing out 
that while “women constitute a clear majority of the membership, yet this 
fact is hardly reflected in posts of leadership,” and she called for a “thorough 
examination of job rates, job opportunities, and problems of women members 
. . . Such a committee might find, for example, that the double job of women 
members as homemakers and wage earners supplies the basis of a future 
struggle for the 35-hour week.”43
 Again, the fact that Holt was able to lead a discussion on gender discrimi-
nation within both the stores and the union demonstrates the extent to which 
union leaders allowed workers to play an expanded role in the union. At the 
same time, the fact that Holt’s report, insightful though it was, had few if any 
actual effects on the roles of women in the union illustrates the limits as well 
as the possibilities for workers to take leadership during this era of union 
democracy.
 Two major political issues became testing grounds for the fragile democ-
racy that existed in District 65 in the early 1950s: the Korean War and the 
May Day parade. Union leaders voiced strong opposition to the Korean War at 
union meetings, pointing out that the wartime inflation (price increases which 
were not accompanied by proportional wage increases) made the war an issue 
which workers absolutely had to confront. As Local 1250 organizer Bernard 
Tolkow put it, “the National Emergency proclaimed by the President means 
that our members and all the rest of the workers who do the fighting and dying 
in the war will pay the costs in increased taxes, higher prices for food, cloth-
ing and rent, and at the same time suffer the wage freeze.” In addition, Tolkow 
argued, the war was responsible for some of the layoffs workers faced. The war 
created “shortage[s] in certain materials, such as are used for major appliances, 
with resultant lay-offs in these departments.”44
 Union members were more supportive of the war than their leaders. In one 
vote that took place in Local 3 on a resolution supporting a cease-fire, 297 
workers abstained, 86 voted for the cease-fire, and 450 voted against any reso-
lution for a cease-fire. While these figures demonstrate that the overwhelming 
majority of Bloomingdale’s workers supported the war, they also illustrate that 
Communists still wielded considerable, albeit minority, influence within their 
unions. Not only could they raise the issue of the war; they could also convince 
approximately one-sixth of the voting members to oppose it.
 The discussion around the Korean War again illustrates the limits as well as 
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the extent of union democracy in New York City’s department store unions in 
the early 1950s. As had occurred in the late 1940s, union organizers allowed 
and even encouraged discussion and debate on the issue of the cease-fire. 
Even more importantly, the local department store unions took no official 
stand on the Korean War, despite union leaders’ and many organizers’ strong 
opposition to the war. However, District 65 did take an official stand opposing 
the war, much to the anger of many department store union members. It was 
a compromise, but one that allowed union leaders to continue to support the 
Communist party’s line on the war.45
 Similar debates and compromises occurred around the unions’ role in the 
Communist party’s annual May Day Parade. In a report from a 1951 union 
meeting, one pro–May Day worker voiced firm support for marching on May 
Day, calling the annual parade a “commemoration of the struggle for the 8-
hour day,” and loudly denying that supporting the parade would necessarily 
mean supporting communism, something which almost none of the workers 
favored. The discussion surrounding May Day engulfed the union in such 
controversy that even District 65, one of the largest Communist-led unions in 
the country, did not endorse the parade. As one report put it, “In keeping with 
the harmonizing policy of the District, the officers propose that our District 
not endorse the parade, though individual Locals could do so.” The individual 
department store union locals did not endorse the parade; any members or 
leaders from these locals who wished to march in the May Day parade were 
welcome to do so, but they would not be allowed to carry banners giving the 
union’s name.46
 Union organizers’ continual efforts to radicalize their members earned 
them the enmity of more-conservative union members. As early as February 
1951, Local 1250 Executive Board members informed Nicholas Carnes that 
“1250 members believed that the union was no longer theirs and we must find 
a way to bring the Union back to the people” and that some felt that he was 
“losing touch and interest in 1250” since the formation of District 65. William 
Michelson reported similar complaints that year, the year when the debates on 
the Korean War and the May Day march reached their height, the most com-
mon being that there was “too much politics in the Union,” and that “District 
65 is a subversive organization.”47
 In response to these sorts of charges, for the first time since the late 1930s 
union leaders recruited store workers to become additional full-time orga-
nizers. Florence Holt, the activist who had raised the issue of women’s role 
in the union, became a full-time organizer of Local 3. Local 1250 recruited 
three department store workers to help work full-time for the union: Peter 
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Montanaro, Peter Stein, and Bernie Tolkow. Similar influxes of male work-
ers into leadership roles occurred in Locals 2 and 3, where John Meegan and 
Murray Silverstein became full-time organizers as well. At the same time as 
it represented a continued shift towards male dominance of the local unions, 
this shift helped solidify the unions’ commitment to their version of democ-
racy in several ways. First, by recruiting workers as organizers, the union lead-
ership became significantly closer in age to the workers in the stores. Second, 
adding more organizers meant that there were more people to deal with work-
ers’ complaints and questions. Third, at least some of these new organizers 
did not share the leaders’ radical politics: Peter Montanaro and Peter Stein in 
particular were some of the unions’ most outspoken opponents of Communist 
politics.
 In the aftermath of their purge from the RWDSU, New York City’s depart-
ment store union organizers therefore adopted union democracy both as a 
rhetorical tool and as a limited political practice. Whether in Osman’s rejec-
tion of the NLRB, Livingston and Carnes’s emphatic verbal support for union 
democracy, Brown’s instructions to stewards to concern themselves more with 
workers’ grievances, the new role of the union newspaper and union meetings 
as vehicles for workers’ discussions, the compromises around May Day or the 
Korean War, or the recruitment of workers as additional full-time organizers, 
union leaders took every opportunity to demonstrate the existence of democ-
racy within the union. To some extent, this tactic was successful; it allowed 
organizers, for a time at least, to convince workers that the local unions were 
worth the fight against opposing unions and a federal government that might 
at any moment resume its attacks on the department store unions. At the same 
time, the union leaders’ particular version of union democracy meant, among 
other things, a strong emphasis on men as the critical actors in the union, as 
editors began printing cheesecake photographs in the union newspaper, and 
men emerged both as the primary subjects of collective bargaining and as 
the overwhelming majority of the new full-time organizers recruited in this 
period.
 It is also important to remember that, despite the successes in keeping the 
union at the stores where it already existed, the union was utterly unsuccessful 
in expanding to new stores. In fact, the union signed not one new contract 
after its defection from the CIO. Instead, most of the union organizers’ efforts 
in these years were devoted to fighting off raids by the CIO and the AFL. In 
the late 1940s and early 1950s, when retailing was becoming a more and more 
important part of the national economy, New York City’s department store 
unions were struggling simply to keep unions where they already existed. To 
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make matters even more tragic, at least at times they were unable to accom-
plish even this limited goal.48
Closings
Their efforts at union democracy bought the union leaders little time. By 
the early 1950s managerial restructuring had become an even more serious 
threat to union members’ jobs. The closing of the Loeser’s store in 1952 was 
the most serious sign of the new threat, and the result was that union leaders 
now sought to break their connections with American radicalism, renouncing 
communism as an undemocratic and anti-American movement and attempt-
ing a reconciliation of sorts with the AFL and CIO leaders whom they had so 
recently come to condemn.
 The closing of stores was the most devastating of the effects of managerial 
restructuring. Those store managers who could not restructure their stores 
as quickly as their competition lost customers, and their businesses were in 
serious danger. Stores on Fulton Street in Brooklyn were in particular danger, 
since the managers of the Fulton Street Abraham & Straus (A&S) store were 
by far the most successful at exploiting the new sales environment. Even A&S’s 
main Fulton Street store was easily accessible to new residents of the Long 
Island suburbs. In addition, the store had two successful branches, both on 
Long Island. Finally, A&S managers, who had never signed a union contract, 
established self-service retailing in A&S branch stores immediately after the 
war and cut costs accordingly, long before most other managers were able 
to follow suit. In addition, A&S used extensive television advertising, one of 
the first New York City stores to begin regular use of the new medium. In 
November 1951, A&S managers, having already cut operating costs and estab-
lished themselves as the leaders in the new retailing environment, had passed 
Gimbel’s to become the second largest retail establishment in New York City. 
They had also begun to take over other store branches, including a Loeser 
branch on Long Island.49
 By the late spring of 1951, A&S was already in a very strong position. And 
in May of that year, when the Supreme Court struck down state “fair trade” 
laws—laws which allowed manufacturers input into the retail prices store 
managers charged customers—managers at Macy’s launched a price war, cut-
ting their prices across the board. Other store managers declared their indig-
nation at Macy’s tactics, but they quickly followed suit as best they could. A&S 
was among the most successful in the price war, promising that Macy’s might 
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be offering a 6 percent discount, but A&S would offer “immediate savings of 
up to 10 percent and even more.” For most of June 1951, shoppers crowded 
into stores throughout the city, especially at Macy’s and A&S.50
 The workers represented by Local 1250 at the Loeser’s store, always one 
of A&S’s major competitors, were the first casualties of the 1951 price war. 
In January 1952 Loeser’s owners declared that they were no longer making 
sufficient profits to make the store worth running, and announced that they 
would either sell the store or simply close it. In any case, the workers who were 
employed there were going to lose their jobs, although workers could apply for 
jobs with the new management if someone else was willing to buy the store.51
 At first, union leaders expressed confidence that, if necessary, they could 
virtually prevent the closing of Loeser’s by picketing managers’ all-important 
going-out-of-business sales. As William Michelson said in a speech before a 
District 65 General Council meeting:
The Loeser management is playing with the idea of selling all of the 
present stock of merchandise to some other department store in New 
York for the purpose of a gigantic liquidation sale. We have informed 
them that if they sell the goods to any of our stores, our people won’t 
handle a stick of the merchandise and if they sell it to another store, not 
in our union, no customer will be able to pass the picket lines that we 
intend to establish.
In order to secure workers’ support, Michelson promised, store managers 
would have to offer a significant severance package. In addition, Nicholas 
Carnes, the leader of Local 1250 and therefore the head of the Loeser’s union, 
called for an intensive letter-writing campaign asking community, government, 
and religious leaders to do something to protect the workers at Loeser’s.52
 Through these tactics, organizers were able to win a substantial severance 
package of one and one-half to two weeks’ pay for each year of employment. 
Since many Loeser’s workers were long-time employees who had been with 
the store for several decades, the settlement totaled approximately $600,000 
to be divided among the 1500 workers at Loeser’s. Still, the union was able to 
find new jobs within the district for only around a hundred of the workers at 
Loeser’s, and a substantial severance package still amounted to a bitter defeat 
for the workers at Loeser’s and the union. The workers, despite their union, 
were now unemployed.53
 The closing was a lesson to other department store workers in many 
respects. Store managers, if pushed too hard, would close their stores. If before 
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1952 managers had been on the defensive, backing down every time work-
ers threatened to strike, after 1952 the situation was reversed. Managers now 
had the more powerful threat: that the stores might close. In 1952 and 1953 
union organizers repeatedly capitulated to store management on a number 
of relatively minor issues. In April 1952, only a few weeks after the Loeser’s 
store closed, Hearn’s workers voted “to permit the store to be open on Monday 
nights” due to the company’s “serious financial conditions.” Similarly, in 1953 
managers of the Norton’s store asked Local 1250 to waive a dollar-a-week 
increase which the union had won for a year so that the managers could 
increase their advertising and thereby compete with Ohrbach’s. Union mem-
bers voted and agreed by 82 to 1 to give up the dollar a week.54
 The closing of Loeser’s also allowed more-conservative workers to renew 
their attacks on the union leaders. Disgruntled union members charged that 
the store closing was the result of all the time union leaders wasted on politi-
cal causes, specifically radical political causes. In February 1952 Carnes was 
forced to devote the majority of at least one membership meeting to a defense 
of the union’s actions during the closing of Loeser’s. Cornered and outnum-
bered, Carnes resorted to surprisingly undemocratic tactics, including calling 
any criticism of union policy “slanders. . . . He pointed out how the Union 
made efforts to have the store purchased . . . He [also] pointed out the wonder-
ful severance pay settlement achieved by the Union.”55
 Carnes was not alone in his new willingness to resort to authoritarian tac-
tics to try to stem the rising tide of criticism. With the CIO’s own retail unions 
floundering, by early 1952 some RWDSU leaders were talking about remerg-
ing with District 65. Department store union leaders, having already signed 
the Taft-Hartley petitions, seemed open to it, but when they raised the issue 
with union members, the fury was so great that even a leader as popular as Bill 
Michelson was forced to resort to authoritarian attacks on his opponents. Like 
Carnes only a few days earlier, Michelson first “deplored the ‘noise’ that was 
made over the issue,” complaining that “members have abandoned the Union 
to a few leaders,” and then argued that the union members should therefore 
trust those leaders. If before the closing of Loeser’s, union democracy had 
been a key concept within the union, after the store closed, these democratic 
leaders sounded far more authoritarian than at any other time in the unions’ 
history.56
 As radical leaders began to talk about a merger with the CIO and adopt 
more authoritarian tactics in the aftermath of the closing of Loeser’s, the federal 
government renewed its attacks. In the summer of 1952, a federal grand jury 
assembled to investigate the possibility that union leaders had contributed 
 Chapter 
District 65 funds to the Civil Rights Congress (CRC), an organization which—
among other things—provided bail funds for Communist party leaders. 
Unsuccessful in efforts to get CRC leaders to testify about the source of funds, 
the grand jury charged that William Michelson and Nicholas Carnes had 
embezzled $80,000 from the union to send to the CRC. Subpoenaed to testify, 
both Michelson and Carnes vehemently denied the charges, which were 
dropped for lack of evidence. The grand jury investigation formally ended in 
the fall of 1952, but not before the CIO rescinded its offer of a merger.57
 With the closing of Loeser’s and the grand jury investigation resulting in 
increased criticism from workers, union leaders increasingly adopted anti-
Communist positions in order to satisfy at least some of their critics. When 
the time came to endorse a candidate for the 1952 presidential election, 
union organizers first talked about not choosing a candidate at all, since both 
Democrat Adlai Stevenson and Republican Dwight Eisenhower endorsed 
such anti-Communist policies as the Korean War, the Taft-Hartley Act, and 
the Smith Act. In October 1952, when it came time for the union to choose 
a candidate, the organizers of District 65 had to choose between the liberal 
anti-Communist Stevenson or no candidate whatsoever. At a district-wide 
shop stewards’ meeting on October 8, the stewards chose to endorse Adlai 
Stevenson. Union leaders, still desperately needing members’ support against 
the mounting state attacks on the union, followed suit, and quickly set out 
to publicize their endorsement, which they viewed as an “example of union 
democracy,” as one headline in the Union Voice called it. “The average working 
folk of America,” the reporter covering the event reminded the union mem-
bers, “don’t usually have the place, the means or the opportunity to sound off 
on national political affairs . . . But in trade unions like District 65, it’s differ-
ent. The average working man and woman gets [sic] a chance to be heard . . . 
talking over the serious issues of public affairs—and most important, register-
ing their sentiments and conclusions in public.”58
 Their endorsement of Stevenson was only one of many signs in 1952 that the 
union leaders were moving towards an anti-Communist line. By November of 
that year, the death of CIO leader Philip Murray appeared in the Union Voice 
with the announcement that “officers and members of DPO joined millions 
of American workers and their leaders . . . in expressing sorrow” at Murray’s 
death. Rather than a critical assessment of Murray’s achievements and short-
comings, the Union Voice article focused exclusively on Murray’s wonderful 
accomplishments, including an unusually vacuous quotation from Arthur 
Osman stating that Murray’s “contribution . . . was inestimable. He served 
his fellow workers during his entire lifetime and finally gave his life in their 
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service.” If in the late 1940s Murray had been an open critic of the unions and 
had authorized CIO raids on these unions, by 1952 District 65 uncritically 
celebrated Murray and other CIO leaders who had once been dismissed as 
top-down and authoritarian figures.59
 As the unions moved closer towards the anti-Communist CIO, some indi-
vidual organizers adopted more and more anti-Communist rhetoric. Peter 
Stein announced to a Local 1250 Membership Meeting in May of that year 
a slew of charges against communism and Communists. Communists, Stein 
told the workers, “work to undermine the democratic processes of our union 
. . . They spread the story that . . . our leaders were preparing to abandon the 
struggle for Negro rights” by discussing rejoining the CIO.60
 As the union increasingly became a site for anti-Communist rhetoric in late 
1952, a second grand jury investigation began. This time, federal prosecutors 
charged District 65 leader David Livingston with perjury by claiming not to be 
a Communist in the affidavit he had signed to satisfy the Taft-Hartley Act. The 
grand jury subpoenaed Livingston, but Livingston refused to answer any ques-
tions, on the grounds that doing so would deprive him of the right to refuse to 
answer questions about the political or personal activities of other District 65 
members.61
 The second investigation became far more serious than the first. Following 
Livingston’s refusal to answer questions, the grand jury issued a subpoena 
“ordering [the organizers] to produce every single book and record in their 
possession” relating to District 65. Union organizers adamantly refused, claim-
ing that had they complied they “would be unable to operate. . . . We would 
have no contracts—we would be unable to collect dues or process claims in the 
Security Plan Office.” In addition, they pointed out that it would have meant 
releasing “the names and addresses of hundreds of workers in unorganized 
shops . . . which would be made public and place their jobs in jeopardy.” In the 
fall of 1952, a judge sentenced Livingston and fellow District 65 leader Jack 
Paley to three months in jail each for their refusal to provide the requested 
documents. In addition, after Livingston refused to answer these questions 
before the grand jury, the NLRB called Livingston to the stand. Before the 
NLRB, however, Livingston answered questions, assuring the board under 
oath “that he was not a member of the Communist Party, nor did he believe in 
overthrow of the government by force or any illegal means.”62
 With members and organizers demanding that their leaders stop support-
ing Communist policies, and the government sending District 65 leaders to 
jail for their suspected roles in the Communist party, union leaders found 
themselves again in freefall. Throughout 1952, in self-defense, they moved 
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closer to an anti-Communist position. Union organizers withdrew from front 
organizations like the CP-backed National Negro Labor Congress (NNLC) in 
November 1952 when the NNLC began criticizing the DPOWU’s unwilling-
ness to devote more energy to organizing in the south. By April 1953, after 
the split with the NNLC, the DPOWU came out with an official statement 
condemning communism at their convention. Communists were, as Arthur 
Osman now declared, “sinister, disruptive, and incompatible with the spirit, 
aims and objectives of a free and democratic trade union movement.”63
 Communist party activists answered the DPOWU leaders’ attacks on 
communism. By the summer of 1953, CP publications like the magazine 
Political Affairs openly attacked the DPOWU as revisionist and racist. As Alex 
Kendreck and Jerome Golden wrote in the June 1953 issue of the magazine, by 
trying to adhere to a liberal rather than a Communist line, District 65 leaders 
were adopting “third-force demagogy . . . to camouflage their roles as lackeys 
of Wall Street.” The article also referred to David Livingston, who was singled 
out with particular ire, as a “foul-mouthed renegade,” whose “path of renegacy 
was paved by the whole process of corruption and softening-up.”64
 Between members’ increasing support for anti-communism, and the state’s 
willingness to persecute Communists in the union, organizers had no choice 
but to separate themselves from their former allies in the Communist party. By 
early 1953, whether through the vocal attacks on Communists, the endorse-
ment of Stevenson, or the union leaders’ newfound admiration of Philip 
Murray, District 65 had become an avowedly anti-Communist organization. 
Radicalism had fallen, and the union leaders no longer needed to worry about 
workers’ complaints that there was “too much politics” in the union.
Defeat
Throughout their history, department store union leaders had learned the 
value of a common enemy. Shared hatred for corrupt union leaders, wealthy 
women, and fascism had all been the foundation for alliances at various 
points in the unions’ history. Now Communists joined that pantheon of 
villains, as District 65 leaders sought to reunite with the CIO around their 
shared anti-communism. Just weeks after the DPOWU’s official resolution 
against communism, talks about a merger between the CIO and District 
65 resumed, and this time the talks ended in a merger in early May 1953. 
As CIO leader Walter Reuther anointed the DPOWU conversion to anti- 
communism:
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[T]he National Executive Board of the DPO has implemented its anti-
totalitarian position by a statement of policy which pledges that the 
DPO “both by word and deed, has and will manifest an aggressive, 
affirmative support for democracy and democratic institutions, and 
at the same time vigorously oppose and distrust all forms of outside 
interference in the conduct of Union affairs.”
Reuther’s statement is a crucial one, both because it demonstrated his approval 
of the merger and because it indicated the reasons for the merger. To Reuther, 
and to many other CIO leaders, one qualification for CIO leadership had 
become a willingness to take a stand against communism. The department 
store union leaders, in their decision to become anti-Communists, had once 
again found a powerful set of allies.65
 In late May 1953, just days after the merger, workers went on strike at 
Hearn’s, the 14th Street store which had long been Local 1250’s main base of 
operations. As already noted, after the opening of Stuyvesant Town, Hearn’s 
managers attempted to restructure the store, to offer residents of these exclu-
sive complexes a more upscale shopping experience than the other bargain 
stores on 14th Street. From now on, managers proudly announced, “only first 
quality goods” would be carried in the store, and customers would have only 
indirect access to goods.66
 Within two years, Hearn’s managers learned what other store managers had 
already known: that such a process was not cost-effective. This was especially 
true after the 1951 opening of the Lane’s store at 14th Street and Fifth Avenue, 
another self-service, downscale store. Launched with tremendous fanfare, 
including an hour-and-a-half television show and massive charity donations 
to a fund drive to fight cerebral palsy, the opening of Lane’s was one of the 
most important signs of the expansion of self-service retailing in New York 
City. It was an immediate and tremendous success. At least 50,000 custom-
ers attended the store’s opening day, and the store did an estimated $175,000 
worth of business that day. “By midday,” Women’s Wear Daily reporter Fred 
Eichelbaum wrote, “the crowds became so dense on the street floor that the 
management decided to close the doors and admit new waves of shoppers 
only in safe intervals. At times the ‘human sea’ of shoppers caused a complete 
paralysis of movement.”67
 Combined with Klein’s and Ohrbach’s, the opening of Lane’s emphasized 
even more strongly the role of 14th Street as a center of downscale, self-service 
retailing. In 1952, therefore, Hearn’s managers again decided to change the 
way in which the store was run, rapidly cutting both prices and services, 
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to once again create “a 14th Street Store with 14th Street prices,” one which 
could successfully compete with other, cheaper 14th Street stores. Managers 
quickly began cutting jobs, and the cuts were more severe than anyone had 
expected. Though Local 1250 organizer Peter Montanaro estimated when the 
job cuts were first announced that only 125 workers would lose their jobs, 
Hearn’s managers had other plans. In July 1952, when the cuts began, Hearn’s 
employed nearly 2000 workers at two stores (the main 14th Street store as well 
as a small branch store in the Bronx). By May 1953 the company employed 
only 800 workers. In addition to this mass firing, managers demanded severe 
concessions from workers who remained on the job, requiring Hearn’s workers 
to put in extra hours on Monday nights in order to compete more effectively 
with the other stores on 14th Street.68
 Throughout this transformation, union members and leaders alike will-
ingly negotiated away both the jobs of many members and the rights of the 
workers who still had jobs. They did so in part because of the recent closing 
of Loeser’s and the constant if unspoken threat that the same fate might befall 
Hearn’s if they did not make concessions. In addition, store managers, particu-
larly owner/manager Albert Greenfield, promised the union that the job cuts 
would be temporary, at least according to union organizers. As Montanaro 
described it to a Local 1250 membership meeting when one round of job cuts 
began in July 1952, they had managers’ assurance that “in a short time, all 
[workers] will be back on the job, plus more.”69
 Whatever they may have promised, managers did not rehire workers. 
Instead, they continued cutting jobs. Some departments were closed down 
altogether and reopened as leased concessions, which were not covered by the 
union’s contract. Hundreds of other workers were simply laid off. In the spring 
of 1953, when the union’s contract expired, union organizers discovered that 
they had greatly underestimated managers’ ruthlessness. For several weeks, 
managers at Hearn’s stalled negotiations, and then on May 9, when Hearn’s 
shop steward Max Klarer demanded that managers cease stalling and begin 
negotiating immediately, store managers promptly fired Klarer.70
 On Thursday, May 14, workers at the two Hearn’s stores began what 
Women’s Wear Daily described as a “sit-down strike.” Cashiers sat at their 
jobs, but refused to wait on customers. One customer “selected a spool of 
ribbon and asked a salesgirl to put it in a bag,” but the worker refused. A 
reporter for Women’s Wear Daily attempted to get change, but the cashiers 
would not even do that. The telephone operators went even further to dis-
rupt store activity, informing all customers that “the store was not open 
for business and that there was labor trouble.” Hearn’s managers called the 
0Defeat, –
police and for the remainder of the day store managers themselves manned 
the telephones.71
 Hearn’s president Clement Conole responded by going down to the silent 
selling floor, where all the workers were standing around informing customers 
that the store was on strike. Conole made a prepared announcement inform-
ing workers that they must either get to work or leave; workers ignored him. 
At 4:30 p.m., accompanied by police officers and store executives, Conole went 
down to the selling floor again. “At 10:10,” Conole announced, “I spoke to you 
to perform your regular duties or leave the store. Since you have not done 
so, management has no other alternative then [sic] to advise you that you are 
herewith discharged for the illegal seizure and retention of our premises. We 
again ask that you leave the premises.” The strikers had now lost their jobs.72
 Hearn’s managers, united with other managers as part of the Retail Labor 
Standards Association, drew on the methods other association members had 
used to fight the unions, especially those employed during the Oppenheim 
Collins strike. First, Hearn’s managers took out large advertisements in the 
city’s major newspapers, calling the public’s attention to the union leaders’ 
radical politics. In a New York Times advertisement, Hearn’s managers claimed 
that
Arthur Osman . . . has for 16 long years spoken again and again for 
Soviet causes and Soviet ideas . . . David Livingston . . . was sentenced 
to 3 months in jail for refusing to show . . . union records to a Federal 
Grand Jury investigating subversive activities and espionage. . . . William 
Michelson . . . was identified by former FBI agent T.C. Kirkpatrick ‘as a 
member of the Communist Party who has sat in at secret conferences 
and caucuses of the various officers of the Communist Party.’ 73
Also in a rehash of managers’ successful tactics at Oppenheim Collins, Hearn’s 
managers sought to take advantage of the divisions between the different retail 
workers’ unions, inviting the RCIPA into the store to organize the scabs. The 
RCIPA agreed, at least initially, notifying the NLRB that they were prepared 
for a union election of the Hearn’s scabs. (As the national CIO became more 
involved in the strike, the RCIPA would withdraw their request for a union 
election at Hearn’s.) In addition, Hearn’s managers immediately applied for 
and received an injunction against mass picketing. The injunction limited the 
number of picketers to 200 at the 14th Street store and 50 at the smaller Bronx 
store. Finally, store managers threatened to close down if the unions’ remaining 
picketers did not desist. In a slightly veiled reference to the Loeser’s closing a 
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few months earlier, managers at Hearn’s warned that “if this store were put out 
of business it would not be the first one they have succeeded in undermining.” 
In fact, Albert Greenfield argued at a stockholder’s meeting that the “under-
mining” was purposeful, making the far-fetched claim that the Communists 
who ran the unions “want to destroy all business,” and were using the strike to 
do so. Store managers also came up with new tactics, such as offering a “strike 
price” discount for any customers willing to cross the picket lines.74
 If store managers drew on their history to win the strike, workers attempted 
to follow suit. In particular, strikers returned to their 1930s tactics by making 
extensive use of pageantry and publicity stunts. On the day of the highly publi-
cized coronation of Queen Elizabeth II of England, for example, Hearn’s work-
ers held a mock coronation of a queen of their own. Eleanor Cerro, a telephone 
operator at Hearn’s, dressed up in a fancy gown, mounted a horse-drawn 
carriage (decorated with a banner reading “Royal Blessings to 800 Workers on 
Strike at Hearns Dept. Stores”), and accepted a crown from Carl Andren, the 
former leader of Bloomingdale’s Local 3 who had since become vice-president 
of District 65.75
 From the beginning, Hearn’s strikers demonstrated that their message of 
choice was a demonstration of their support for anti-communism. Strikers 
carried picket signs calling potential shoppers’ attention to managers’ “Un-
American Store,” where managers had “fired Veterans and Gold Star Mothers.” 
Other picket signs called on the public: “Let’s not be 20% Americans—Make 
Hearn’s negotiate 100% American way!” By calling attention to their own 
patriotism, as mothers of soldiers and as veterans, and their opposition to the 
“Un-American” activities of store managers, strikers attempted to use anti-
communism against Hearn’s managers.76
 The strikers won at least some public support through these anti-
Communist messages. Unlike the Gimbel’s and Oppenheim Collins strikes 
of the 1940s and even the less-controversial five-and-dime sit-down strikes 
of 1937, some mainstream newspapers enthusiastically supported the Hearn’s 
strike. The New York Post, for example, ran a lengthy editorial supporting the 
strike, condemning the “large-scale advertising campaign which Hearns has 
directed against the leadership of the union in an effort to create the impres-
sion that the strike is Communist-led and Communist-inspired.” (Hearn’s 
managers briefly pulled all their advertising from the Post in protest.) In addi-
tion to the Post’s editorial, television news programs aired frequent stories 
on the strike, including one on the crowning of the Hearn’s strike queen. In 
addition, WABC broadcast a special 15-minute program, “The Story Behind 
the Hearn’s Strike,” in which union leaders (Arthur Osman and William 
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Michelson, most prominently) and five strikers spoke directly to the audience 
about the cause and goals of the strike.77
 Like the local media, national union leaders strongly endorsed the Hearn’s 
strike. Both AFL and CIO leaders voiced their support for the Hearn’s strike, 
writing letters to the NLRB demanding that the board bring a suit against 
Hearn’s over the company’s unfair labor practices, such as the firing of union 
members without adequate notice. Even former enemies of the union, like Mike 
Quill, who had only two years earlier threatened to picket those stores which 
retained contracts with the department store unions, now called on the public to 
boycott Hearn’s. In addition, the Teamsters voted to support the strike, meaning 
that no union truck drivers crossed the picket line. (Store managers were able to 
continue deliveries by using nonunion truck drivers.)78
Figure 4
The disastrous strike at Hearn’s, 1953. After a court injunction limited the strikers to 
three picketers, this is all that was left of the picket lines: three people with signs in front 
of the entrance to the store. (Courtesy of Robert F. Wagner Labor Archives, New York 
University, United Automobile Workers of America, District 65 Photographs Collec-
tion)
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 CIO leaders also attempted to counteract managers’ claim that the strike 
was inspired by communism. Walter Reuther called store managers’ claims 
“selfish and unrealistic,” and assured the public that the strike at Hearn’s was 
“a legitimate strike over important economic issues,” and he drew his readers’ 
attention to the “continual use of deceitful propaganda” by Hearn’s managers 
as a particularly despicable practice.79
 The most important role CIO leaders played in supporting the strike was 
in their extensive fundraising for the strike fund, which grew rapidly. By mid-
June, with the help of the CIO leaders, the union had raised $350,000 for the 
strike fund, by far the largest strike fund the union had ever had at its disposal. 
The New York City CIO Council also agreed to pay for newspaper advertise-
ments to counter Hearn’s anti-Communist advertising campaign.80
 Perhaps due to the active roles played by so many national union leaders, 
the strikers also got strong support from local politicians during the Hearn’s 
strike. Like the CIO and AFL union leaders, New York Senator Herbert 
Lehman called upon the NLRB to make sure that “the present law be fairly and 
reasonably applied, and that an unfair labor practices complaint be issued.” 
Similarly, mayoral candidate Robert Wagner promised the union that if he 
became mayor, he would use his “power and influence to create a speedy 
settlement of the Hearn’s strike.”81
 National citizens’ groups also took strong pro-union stands. In particular, 
the liberal anti-Communist Americans for Democratic Action (ADA) and the 
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) both 
endorsed the strike. The ADA created a fact-finding committee to gather evi-
dence to further disprove managers’ claims that the strike was a Communist 
conspiracy. The NAACP’s role was even more important, especially after 
Hearn’s managers attempted to recruit African American workers as strike-
breakers by offering them opportunities for sales jobs. The NAACP not only 
condemned this act publicly (spreading its message to a number of different 
New York City African American newspapers), but the Executive Board of the 
New York City chapter of the NAACP also released a statement that “the strike 
at the Hearn stores merits the support of all fair-minded people in our city.”82
 It was an impressive strike in many ways, many of them attributable to 
strikers’ successful manipulation of anti-communism. Through adopting 
anti-communism as a defining concept for the strike, union organizers had 
recruited more powerful and more numerous allies than in any other strike 
they had conducted. And with hundreds of thousands of dollars at their dis-
posal (in large part due to these supporters), the strikers were able to mount a 
public relations campaign to rival managers’ own.
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 Despite all these supporters, far more prestigious and arguably far more 
numerous than in earlier strikes, the Hearn’s strike ended in disaster and 
defeat. There were several reasons for the defeat. First, and most important, 
liberal alliances were not the same thing as radical ones. The supporters in 
the Hearn’s strike, despite their prominence, were supportive in a very differ-
ent way than earlier coalitions. If during earlier strikes allies had challenged 
managers’ control over public space and stores alike, the unions’ allies during 
the Hearn’s strike showed no interest in presenting similar challenges. Here the 
support consisted of funds and public statements, a far cry from the illegal dis-
ruption that had been such a powerful part of the unions’ activities in earlier 
years.
 In addition to the very different nature of the allies, the federal government 
played a far more direct role in the Hearn’s strike than it had in the unions’ 
successful prewar strikes. Despite the public outcry around the strike and the 
demands of many different labor leaders and liberal politicians, the NLRB 
dismissed all of the union’s claims of unfair labor practices, sanctioning the 
firing of Klarer and the other Hearn’s workers. Even worse for the union, that 
summer, a federal appellate court issued a second injunction. This injunction 
forbade any further mass picketing at Hearn’s, limiting the strikers to three 
pickets at each entrance. A third injunction in October banned “all picketing” 
at Hearn’s, charging that the sit-down strike was an “illegal act calculated to 
deliver a knockout blow at the very outset at the strike,” as well as finding the 
unions guilty of “undue noise, shouting, booing, catcalling, chanting in uni-
son, and unlawful interference with persons desiring to patronize plaintiff ’s 
stores.” But the final defeat came not because of the government’s decision, 
but out of the union’s obedience to the government’s decision. No one—nei-
ther union leaders, nor workers, nor their allies—suggested that violating the 
injunction would be an acceptable tactic. With the court willing to act and 
the NLRB refusing to do so, and with all parties involved determined to prove 
their support for the government (and therefore their anti-communism) by 
following the law, by November 1953 the end had come. As Local 3 organizer 
Murray Silverstein sadly admitted at a General Membership Meeting, “The 
Hearn strike for all intents and purposes is over. We [have] suffered a severe 
blow.”83
 With anti-communism as a central tenet of the union’s political platform, 
the workers were once again able to assemble an extremely powerful set of 
allies during the Hearn’s strike. But this same practice limited their ability to 
challenge the government’s decisions, whether in the NLRB’s refusal to inter-
vene or in the judge’s anti-picketing injunction. With the federal government 
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standing behind managers’ right to restructure the department stores, anti-
Communist unions could not resist restructuring. It was in many respects the 
ultimate defeat for the radical unions that had once represented the possibility 
of unionized retail workers in America.
Conclusion
In the five years following their split from the RWDSU, union leaders desper-
ately sought a way to expand retail workers’ unions. They never found it. Union 
democracy, while it gained them the support of some workers, proved unable 
to win much support after the closing of Loeser’s. Once the union could not 
protect members’ jobs, members demanded that union leaders spend more 
time trying to fight layoffs and less time taking part in radical political activ-
ity. The result was that the union democracy practiced within these unions led 
directly to the union leaders’ eventual adoption of anti-Communist politics.
 Union democracy had other limits as well, most of them relating to the 
union’s stance on gender issues. Between 1948 and 1953, as they ostensibly 
made the union more democratic, Communist union leaders put cheesecake 
photographs in the union newspaper, appointed increasing numbers of men 
to union leadership, and declared their determination to support the rights 
of breadwinners and heads of families within the union. This opposition to 
women’s equality represents in part Communists’ always contradictory atti-
tude that women’s equality was an important cause that was still far less impor-
tant than both working-class interests and racial equality. Other explanations 
exist, however. First, union leaders were not immune from larger historical 
forces; the country as a whole shifted towards a more conservative gender sys-
tem in the late 1940s and early 1950s, and union leaders may have simply been 
caught up in this larger change. Additionally, union leaders’ determination 
to not alienate union members in these years made union leaders even more 
susceptible to shifting mainstream views, especially on issues they viewed as 
secondary.
 Like union democracy, the anti-communism adopted by the department 
store unions was a more limiting tactic than it might have seemed at the time. 
It did keep union leaders from going to jail after Livingston’s and Paley’s brief 
sentences. It also kept workers satisfied that union leaders were not pursuing 
any hidden political agendas. At the same time, it could not allow workers 
the ability to challenge managerial restructuring, largely because it did not 
allow for any strident criticism of the government’s actions. Adopting anti-
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communism as a central tenet meant that workers and union leaders alike 
had to either go along with the government’s decisions or face doubts as to 
whether their anti-communism was genuine. At a moment when the govern-
ment supported managers’ right to make profits, even if those profits came at 
the expense of workers’ control over their jobs, anti-communism was not a 
viable strategy to fight for workers’ interests.
 As a result of the Hearn’s strike, the members and leaders of New York 
City’s department store unions brought an end to any chance they might once 
have had of creating a powerful retail workers’ union in America. The unions 
continued to represent the workers at most of the stores where they had 
signed contracts, and continued to play an important role in the city’s labor 
movement as part of District 65. But they would expand no further. And even 
where they remained, the changes were quite evident. By 1953 store managers 
increasingly employed casual, part-time, and unskilled labor, an extremely 
difficult group of workers to organize. If there was a moment when New York 
City’s department store unions seemed to be the first step towards a national 
union of retail workers, by 1953 that moment was largely over. The unions, 
and the workers they represented, had indeed suffered a severe blow in their 
failure to prevent managerial restructuring during the Hearn’s strike, a blow 
from which the American labor movement still has not recovered. 
ConClusion
Where Labor Lost,  
and Why
Over the past ten years, store managers have been experimenting with even 
less labor-intensive forms of retailing. Beginning in the 1990s, managers at 
several stores, including large downscale chain stores like Wal-Mart, K-Mart, 
and Home Depot, began installing automated checkout counters in addition 
to the more traditional staffed checkout counters. Customers at these stores 
can now take their goods to the automated counters, scan their goods, either 
swipe a credit card or feed bills into the machine, place their goods in a plas-
tic bag, and leave the store. If all goes well, it is now possible to go shopping 
without having any contact at all with any store workers, except perhaps for 
the security guards at the door. Luckily for store workers, to date these experi-
ments have been generally unsuccessful. Frequent breakdowns and customer 
inexperience make the machines so inefficient that managers at a few stores 
have given up automated checkout counters as a complete loss. So far, accord-
ing to one source, store managers have been unable to use the automated 
checkout machines to replace any workers, since workers must be on hand 
to replace the machines at a moment’s notice. Despite that, the number of 
machines is increasing, going from present in 6 percent of all stores in 1999 to 
present in 19 percent by 2002.1
 The labor movement’s response has been relatively muted. In September 
of 2002, a reporter asked John Sweeney, president of the AFL-CIO, about the 
emergence of automated checkout machines. Sweeney’s response was telling:
Sweeney . . . chuckled as he recounted the frantic phone message he 
received from a concerned neighbor. “Have you seen those self-check-
out machines in our grocery store?” she asked the labor leader, whose 
federation represents 13 million union workers. . . . Sweeney’s eyes wid-
ened for effect as he quoted the caller: “What’s going to happen to all 
those workers?” Sweeney—who said he has not used the self-scan giz-
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mos that popped up in his store last month—put his neighbor’s mind at 
ease. “The union is very much aware of this,” Sweeney said, and there is 
a general understanding “that no workers will be displaced as a result.”
In his confidence, Sweeney left out a few points, including the fact that many 
stores using the automated checkout machines are not unionized, making 
it difficult to imagine how he could guarantee that no workers would be 
displaced. He also forgot his history, not remembering that CIO leaders had 
made similar assurances when self-service emerged fifty years ago. With such 
a lack of attention and concern, it is difficult to imagine that the labor move-
ment will reemerge in the retail sector in the near future.2
 The American labor movement, it should be noted, continues to be rela-
tively strong in certain sectors, even some white-collar sectors such as govern-
ment jobs (where many workers are forbidden to strike, making these unions 
rather ineffective). But for white-collar workers in the private sector, retailing 
included, the American labor movement is virtually nonexistent, with only a 
tiny fraction of these employees organized into unions. For a moment dur-
ing the Great Depression, it looked as though the American labor movement 
could have been a far more powerful and representative movement, one that 
had unions that represented large numbers of retail workers. For blue-collar 
workers in the factories, the sit-down strikes led to permanent and relatively 
powerful unions. But in retailing, the parallel sit-down strikes led to no such 
result.
 This study has examined both why retail workers’ unions succeeded 
initially and why these unions failed in the long run. Their successes were 
remarkable. New York City’s department store workers formed unions at the 
largest retail stores in the world; they won the eight-hour day, significant pay 
raises, and public acclaim; and they forced the CIO, dominated though it was 
by notions of male blue-collar workers storming the factories, to set up a retail 
workers’ union.
 The successes of these unions were inherently related to communism. 
Communists recognized that department store workers were, after all, part of 
the working class, that these men and women deserved support in their efforts 
to form unions. The Communists who organized these unions also deserve 
credit for their recognition that labor struggles had to be carried on in imagi-
native and nontraditional ways. A strike had to be dynamic and inventive; it 
had to take advantage of the surrounding environment, to challenge manage-
rial control wherever possible, inside the store as well as outside. The men 
and women who organized New York City’s department store unions took 
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full advantage of these tactics. Whether at Union Square or on 34th Street, 
the Communists were remarkably successful at taking advantage of struggles 
going on around the stores. Finally, the Communists were both willing and 
able to create broad-based coalitions, especially in their use of cultural activi-
ties to create the Popular Front. These were important achievements for which 
they deserve credit.
 It is important to note that Communists were responsible for these achieve-
ments, not the Communist party. In many respects, in fact, the Communist 
party almost limited the unions’ successes. Gussie Reed’s letter to Michelson, 
for instance, and the narrow interpretation of Communist policy that it rep-
resented, could have had major effects on the unions’ future had Michelson 
not chosen to ignore Reed’s instructions. In addition, and perhaps even more 
important, at the height of the attacks on the union in the early 1950s, the 
Communist leaders of the unions decided to follow Party policy and engage 
workers in a debate about American foreign policy and the Korean War, rather 
than focusing on the rise of self-service retailing and the massive numbers of 
layoffs. It should be noted, however, that there is little evidence that they lost 
department store workers’ support due to their following of Russian policy in 
the 1940s and early 1950s, as other historians have claimed happened with 
Communists in other sectors of the labor movement. In fact, the moment it 
seemed possible that union leaders would wholly lose workers’ support by fol-
lowing such policies, Communist union leaders split with the CP and adopted 
an anti-Communist line.
 The Communist party was hardly the most important factor limiting the 
successes of Communists. There were other issues that the unions never 
successfully confronted, most important among them race and gender. The 
alliances the unions formed had extremely surprising racial limits. Had the 
unions been willing to ally with the “Don’t Buy Where You Can’t Work” cam-
paigns, for instance, they might have found themselves part of an even more 
powerful movement, one that challenged understandings not only of class, 
but of the racial divide that continues to plague the labor movement in many 
industries. Instead, they ignored these movements, for the most part adopting 
a relatively conservative understanding of the importance of a labor union, 
which held that the union was designed to protect workers already employed, 
not to worry about who was being employed. As a result, racial segregation—
whether in the city or in the stores—faced only a few fleeting challenges from 
the department store unions.
 An equally serious limit of Communist leadership was the Communists’ 
fleeting commitment to women’s equality within the unions. While certainly 
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the leaders of the department store unions gave lip service to women’s rights 
and recognized that women workers could and should form unions, the fact 
remains that little effort was made to encourage women workers to take lead-
ership roles in these unions, and women’s response to the cheesecake photo-
graphs in the union paper in the late 1940s indicates that they felt their roles 
within the union were limited in the extreme.
 The ultimate failure of retail workers’ unions in America, however, was the 
result not of these limits of the unions’ leadership, important though those 
limits are, but rather of three interlocking historical developments. The first 
was the rise of anti-communism. Anti-communism led to the destruction of 
the coalitions that had served the unions so well in their early struggles. Just 
as important, it meant the destruction of the CIO’s retail workers’ union, the 
RWDSU. Anti-communism also gave employers a valuable weapon during 
strikes. It would severely weaken the unions, leaving them isolated and vul-
nerable. Closely linked to anti-communism, the rise of the middle class meant 
that the white-collar workers who had once played so important a role in the 
unions’ struggles had now disappeared into the suburbs or into developments 
like Parkchester and Stuyvesant Town, ceasing to accept that they had anything 
to do with unions or, indeed, with workers. The third of these developments 
was the transformation of American consumption, particularly the rise of 
self-service retailing. Once self-service retailing was introduced, stores could 
function with casual and easily replaceable labor, a difficult group of workers 
to organize. With stores that relied on this sort of labor, the collapse of the 
national union, and the disappearance of their allies, further union organizing 
in retail stores was nearly impossible.
 It was the combination of these factors during the Hearn’s strike that meant 
the final blow against New York City’s department store unions. The gov-
ernment stepped in and declared that managers had a right to make profits 
through instituting self-service, and that unions had no right to interfere in 
that process through picket lines. This decision was momentous not only in 
its content, but also in its context. Certainly it was not unique; judges had 
issued similar injunctions during the unions’ very first strikes at Klein’s and 
Ohrbach’s. But with union leaders and members clinging to the hope that the 
coalition formed around liberal anti-communism would adequately replace 
the coalitions once formed around communism, the injunction during the 
Hearn’s strike took on a different meaning entirely. To violate the government’s 
order would have meant adopting a radical, not a liberal, response. And to do 
so while attempting to fend off accusations that their liberal anti-communism 
was a sham was nearly impossible. To the leaders of the union as well as to 
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their allies, anti-communism meant respect for the government’s rulings, even 
when those rulings were against workers’ interests. The strike ended in defeat, 
and with that defeat ended any chance of preventing the transformation of 
retail work.
 The history of these retail workers’ unions must be integrated into our 
larger understandings of the history of the labor movement during the CIO 
era. Historians who use male blue-collar workers to represent the history of 
the CIO allow the roles of communism and anti-communism in American 
history to remain underanalyzed. Male blue-collar workers were critical both 
to the CIO’s success and to its representation throughout the union’s history, 
but historians have all too frequently allowed them to stand in for the entire 
CIO workforce, including the CIO’s advances in retailing only as a minor and 
peripheral anecdote. But the peripheral nature of unions in the retail field 
was itself a result of specific historical events. Without understanding these 
events, we fall far too easily into thinking that retail workers are fundamentally 
more difficult to organize than are workers in manufacturing or construction, 
or—even more tragically—we forget about the existence of retail workers’ 
unions altogether. To do so represents a dangerous historical fallacy. Retail 
workers could and did form powerful and lasting unions given the correct 
historical circumstances. For a moment in the 1930s those circumstances 
existed: workers found leaders with diverse political and tactical approaches, 
and with strong connections to other social movements. Managerial restruc-
turing and the concurrent rise of anti-communism in the late 1940s and early 
1950s brought this historical moment to an end, crippling the American labor 
movement in the process.
 Now, at the turn of the twenty-first century, there are few hopeful signs for 
the future of the American labor movement in the retail industry. Certainly 
John Sweeney’s reported chuckle was not really warranted under the circum-
stances. In their 2003–4 strikes, the United Food and Commercial Workers 
took on the grocery industry in Southern California, and lost, as store manag-
ers used the threat of Wal-Mart openings and store closings to justify cutting 
benefits to a hesitant public. The UFCW’s defeat in the Southern California 
strike, the largest retail workers’ strike in American history, does not bode 
well for the future of the American labor movement. Until and unless union 
organizers figure out a way to recapture some of the dynamic radicalism and 
solidarity that characterized the 1930s labor movement, unions in American 
retailing—and indeed, in America as a whole—will remain ineffective, little 
more than fading shadows of the mass organizations they once were.
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